CASE OF ILAŞCU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

Application no. 48787/99 · Delivered 2004-07-08 · ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:0708JUD004878799 · Languages: EN · EN · FR

Application no.
48787/99
Delivered
2004-07-08
Respondent State
MDA;RUS
Conclusion
Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Procedure prescribed by law;Article 5-1-a - Competent court) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Procedure prescribed by law;Article 5-1-a - Competent court) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Procedure prescribed by law;Article 5-1-a - Competent court) (Russia);No violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property;Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition) (the Republic of Moldova) (Russia);Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition) (Russia);Pecuniary damage - award;Non-pecuniary damage - award
Convention articles
1, 2, 2-1, 3, 5, 5-1, 5-1-a, 34, 35, 35-1, 35-3, 41, 46, 46-2, P1-1
Importance
Key case
Original
HUDOC ↗
PresidentL. WildhaberJudgeC.L. RozakisJudgeJ.-P. CostaJudgeG. RessJudgeNicolas BratzaJudgeL. LoucaidesJudgeI. Cabral BarretoJudgeF. TulkensJudgeC. BîrsanJudgeJ. CasadevallJudgeB. ZupančičJudgeJ. HediganJudgeW. ThomassenJudgeT. PanţîruJudgeE. LevitsJudgeA. KovlerJudgeE. Fura-SandströmRegistrarP.J. Mahoney
Summary
Preparing…

CASE OF ILAŞCU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

(Application no. 48787/99)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

8 July 2004

Contents

Introduction.............................................. 1

Procedure................................................ 2

(a) Written observations of the parties...................... 3

(b) The witness hearings................................ 4

(c) The documentary evidence........................... 5 The facts................................................ 6

I. The applicants ..........................................6

II. Establishment of the facts................................ 6

III. General background to the case.......................... 8

A. The dissolution of the USSR and the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict over the break-away of Transdniestria 8

B. The presence of the army of the Russian Federation and its personnel in Transdniestria after the agreement of 21 July 1992 26

(a) Before ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation 26

(b) After ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation. 30

C. Economic, political and other relations between the Russian Federation and Transdniestria 33

D. Moldovan-Transdniestrian relations.................... 37

IV. The particular circumstances of the case................. 41

A. The applicants' arrest, pre-trial detention and conviction.. 41

B. Events subsequent to the applicants' conviction; Mr Ilaşcu's release 47

C. The applicants' detention after conviction............... 49

D. Steps taken up to May 2001 to secure the applicants' release 55

E. Mr Ilaşcu's release on 5 May 2001..................... 56

F. Steps taken after May 2001 to secure the other applicants' release 57

G. International reactions to the applicants' conviction and detention 58

V. International law, domestic law and other relevant agreements 59

The law................................................. 69

I. Whether the applicants come within the jurisdiction of the Republic of moldova 69

A. Arguments submitted to the Court..................... 69

B. The Court's assessment............................. 72

(a) The concept of “jurisdiction”.......................... 72

(b) State responsibility for a wrongful act................... 75

II. Whether the applicants come within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation 82

A. Arguments submitted to the Court..................... 82

B. The Court's assessment............................. 88

(a) Before ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation 88

(b) After ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation. 90 III. The Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis.................... 92

A. The complaint under Article 6 of the Convention......... 93

B. The complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention 93

C. The complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1......... 93

D. Mr Ilaşcu's complaint under Article 2 of the Convention... 93

IV. Alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention.............. 94

A. Arguments submitted to the Court..................... 94

B. The Court's assessment............................. 95

V. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention............... 96

A. Arguments submitted to the Court..................... 96

B. The Court's assessment............................. 96

(a) Mr Ilaşcu....................................... 99

(b) The other three applicants: conditions of detention and treatment during detention 101

(i) Mr Ivanţoc................................... 101

(ii) Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa..................... 102 VI. Alleged violation of Article 5 of the convention.............. 103

VII. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the convention............. 106

VIII. Alleged violation of article 1 of protocol No. 1............. 107

IX. Alleged failure to observe Article 34 of the convention....... 107

X. Application of Article 41 of the convention.................. 110

A. Damage.......................................... 110

B. Costs and expenses................................ 113

C. Default interest.................................... 113

Operative provisions....................................... 114

Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Casadevall joined by

Judges Ress, Tulkens, Bîrsan and Fura-sandström............ 118

Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Ress...................... 123

Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Nicolas bratza joined by Judges Rozakis, Hedigan, Thomassen and Panţîru....... 127

Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides.................. 139

Dissenting opinion of Judge Kovler........................... 142

ANNEX

In the case of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Mr L. Wildhaber, President,

Mr C.L. Rozakis,

Mr J.-P. Costa,

Mr G. Ress,

Sir Nicolas Bratza,

Mr L. Loucaides,

Mr I. Cabral Barreto,

Mrs F. Tulkens,

Mr C. Bîrsan,

Mr J. Casadevall,

Mr B. Zupančič,

Mr J. Hedigan,

Mrs W. Thomassen,

Mr T. Panţîru,

Mr E. Levits,

Mr A. Kovler,

Mrs E. Fura-Sandström, judges,

and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 23 January, 26 February and 11 September 2002, 8 October 2003 and 7 May 2004,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

INTRODUCTION

Lastly, the applicants alleged that Moldova and the Russian Federation had obstructed the exercise of their right of individual application to the Court, thus breaching Article 34.

PROCEDURE

In its decision on admissibility, the Court held that the questions whether the responsibility and jurisdiction of Moldova and the Russian Federation might be engaged under the Convention, and whether the Court had jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the applicants' complaints, were closely linked to the merits of the case, to which it accordingly joined them.

(a) Written observations of the parties

Observations were also submitted by the Romanian Government, whom the President had invited to intervene in the proceedings in the interests of the proper administration of justice (Article 36 of the Convention and Rule 61 §§ 2 and 3). The parties replied (Rule 61 § 5). A request to intervene was also submitted by Mrs Ludmila Gusar, a civil party in the proceedings which led to the applicants' conviction by the “Supreme Court of the MRT”. The President of the Grand Chamber refused her request.

(b) The witness hearings

The Court appointed four delegates, Mr G. Ress, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Mr J. Casadevall and Mr E. Levits, who heard witness evidence in Chişinău and Tiraspol from 10 to 15 March 2003. In Chişinău the witness evidence was taken at the headquarters of the OSCE mission in Moldova, which greatly assisted in the organisation of the hearings. In Tiraspol the Court's delegates took evidence from the applicants and other witnesses resident in Transdniestria at Tiraspol Prison no. 3, and from the witnesses belonging to the armed forces of the Russian Federation at the headquarters of the Russian Operational Group in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova (“the ROG”).

The following witnesses did not appear: Olga Căpăţina, who was admitted to hospital just before the hearings after being assaulted; Vladimir Gorbov and Mikhaïl Bergman, whom the respondent Governments said they were unable to contact; Petru Godiac, whose absence was not explained; Valeriu Păsat, who was not present in Moldovan territory; and lastly Valeriu Muravschi and Petru Tăbuică, who did not give reasons for their absence.

The Court deplores the fact that such witnesses as Commandant Bergman failed to appear and finds it hard to believe, in view of his high profile, that it was impossible to contact him in order to summon him to give evidence to its delegates. It reserves the right to draw the necessary inferences in the absence of statements by these witnesses.

(c) The documentary evidence

THE FACTS

I. THE APPLICANTS

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS

(i) In assessing both written and oral evidence, the Court has hitherto generally applied “beyond a reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof required. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact; in addition, the conduct of the parties in relation to the Court's efforts to obtain evidence may constitute an element to be taken into account (see, mutatis mutandis, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 64-65, § 161, and Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII).

(ii) As regards the statements taken down by the delegates, the Court is aware of the difficulties that may arise in assessing such depositions obtained through interpreters: it has therefore paid particular attention to the meaning and weight to be given to the witnesses' statements to the delegates. The Court is likewise aware that a large number of relevant facts concern events which took place more than ten years ago in an obscure and particularly complex context, which makes some degree of imprecision about dates and other details inevitable. It does not consider that that in itself can cast doubt on the credibility of the witness evidence.

(iii) In a case where there are contradictory and opposing accounts of the facts, the Court is inevitably confronted with difficulties which any court of first instance is bound to meet when seeking to establish the facts, regard being had, for example, to the fact that it does not have direct and detailed knowledge of the conditions obtaining in the region. Moreover, the Court has no powers to compel witnesses to appear. In the present case, out of fifty-one witnesses called, seven did not appear before the delegates. Consequently, the Court found itself having to deal with the difficult task of establishing the facts in the absence of potentially important depositions.

(a) on the particular circumstances of the applicants' arrest, conviction and detention: the applicants; Mrs Tatiana Leşco and Mrs Eudochia Ivanţoc, the wives of the second and third applicants; Mrs Raisa Petrov‑Popa, the sister of the fourth applicant; Mr Ştefan Urîtu, detained in 1992 with the applicants; Mr Constantin Ţîbîrnă, a doctor who examined the applicants in 1995-98 while they were detained in Tiraspol and Hlinaia; Mr Nicolae Leşanu, a doctor who examined the applicants in 1995-97 while they were detained in Tiraspol and Hlinaia; Mr Vladimir Golovachev, the governor of Tiraspol Prison no. 2; Mr Stepan Tcherbebchi, the governor of Hlinaia Prison from 1992 to 2001; Mr Sergey Kotovoy, the governor of Hlinaia Prison; Mr Yefim Samsonov, “Director of the Prison Medical Service of the MRT”; and Mr Vasiliy Semenchuk, a doctor at Hlinaia Prison since 1995;

(b) on the measures taken by Moldova to secure the applicants' release and on relations between Moldova, the Russian Federation and Transdniestria, various Moldovan officials and politicians: Mr Dumitru Postovan, Attorney-General of Moldova from 1990 until July 1998; Mr Valeriu Catană, Attorney-General of Moldova from 31 July 1998 to 29 July 1999; Mr Vasile Rusu, Attorney-General of Moldova since 18 May 2001; Mr Vasile Sturza, Deputy Attorney-General of Moldova from 1990 to 1994 and Minister of Justice from 1994 to 1998; Z, a former Moldovan government minister; Mr Victor Vieru, Deputy Minister of Justice since 2001; X, a former Moldovan senior official; Mr Mircea Snegur, President of Moldova from 1990 to 1996; Mr Alexandru Moşanu, President of the Moldovan parliament from 1990 to 1992; Y, a former Moldovan diplomat; Mr Andrei Sangheli, Prime Minister of Moldova from 1992 to 1997; Mr Anatol Plugaru, Moldova's Minister of Security in 1991-92; Mr Nicolai Petrică, general in the Moldovan army from 1992 to 1993; Mr Andrei Stratan, former Director of Customs; Mr Vladimir Molojen, Director of the Information Technology Department; Mr Ion Costaş, Minister of Defence in 1991-92; Mr Valentin Sereda, Director of the Moldovan Prison Service; Mr Victor Berlinschi, member of the Moldovan parliament from 1990 to 1994; Mr Constantin Obroc, Deputy Prime Minister in 1991-92 and adviser to the President of Moldova from 1993 to 1996; Mr Mikhail Sidorov, member of the Moldovan parliament; and Mr Pavel Creangă, Moldovan Minister of Defence from 1992 to 1997.

(c) on the presence of the ROG and the Russian Federation's peacekeeping troops in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, soldiers from those units: General Boris Sergeyev, commander of the ROG; Colonel Alexander Verguz, officer commanding the ROG; Lieutenant-Colonel Vitalius Radzaevichus, former member of the command structure of the ROG; Colonel Anatoliy Zverev, commander of the Russian Federation's peacekeeping troops in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova; Lieutenant-Colonel Boris Levitskiy, president of the military tribunal attached to the ROG; Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Shamayev, military prosecutor attached to the ROG; and Mr Vasiliy Timoshenko, former military prosecutor attached to the 14th Army and the ROG.

III. GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

A. The dissolution of the USSR and the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict over the break-away of Transdniestria

On 27 April 1990 the Supreme Soviet adopted a new tricolour flag (red, yellow and blue) with the Moldavian heraldic device and a national anthem which, at that time, was the same as Romania's. In June 1990, against a background of autonomist and independence movements within the Soviet Union, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic took as its new name the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. It proclaimed its sovereignty on 23 June 1990 (OSCE information document of 10 June 1994 – see note to paragraph 28 above).

On 23 May 1991 the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic changed its name to the Republic of Moldova.

To date, the “MRT” has not been recognised by the international community.

After the proclamation of Moldova's independence, the DOSAAF equipment situated in that part of the national territory controlled by the Moldovan Government passed into their hands and the remainder – located in Transdniestria – passed into those of the Transdniestrian separatists.

The respondent Governments did not contest the veracity of the detailed information set out below, although they gave different interpretations of the facts (see paragraphs 50, 56-57, 60, and 62-64 below).

The Moldovan Government did not comment on this point.

Although several witnesses made the assertion (see Annex: Mr Urîtu, § 66; Mr Postovan, § 182; Z, § 272; and Mr Plugaru, § 286), the Court cannot accept that it has been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Lieutenant-General Iakovlev was released in exchange for a number of Moldovan police officers held prisoner by the Transdniestrian forces. It has heard different accounts of the exact reasons for Lieutenant-General Iakovlev's release and, in the absence of any documentary evidence about what took place during the investigation or about his release, it can neither dismiss nor accept the accounts of the witnesses, most of whom, in the delegates' opinion, were generally credible.

On the other hand, the Court notes that all the witnesses questioned on the subject agreed that a Russian general had travelled from Moscow to Chişinău to obtain Lieutenant-General Iakovlev's release.

The Court accordingly considers it to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the authorities of the Russian Federation interceded with the Moldovan authorities to obtain the release of Lieutenant-General Iakovlev.

The parties disagreed about how these weapons came to be in the possession of the Transdniestrians.

The Court notes the explanation given by an ROG officer (see Annex: Colonel Verguz, § 359) about the forcible seizure of weapons by women and children and observes that this account was contested by all the Moldovan witnesses questioned on the subject.

The Court considers it highly improbable that women and children could have seized weapons and ammunition guarded by armed military personnel in locked stores without the guards' agreement.

In short, the Court considers it to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Transdniestrian separatists were able to arm themselves with weapons taken from the stores of the 14th Army stationed in Transdniestria. The 14th Army troops chose not to oppose the separatists who had come to help themselves from the Army's stores; on the contrary, in many cases they helped the separatists equip themselves by handing over weapons and by opening up the ammunition stores to them (see Annex: Mr Urîtu, § 65; Mr Petrov-Popa, § 130; Mr Postovan, §§ 182 and 201; Mr Costaş, § 407; and Mr Creangă, § 457).

The applicants further asserted that, on 20 July 1992, armoured combat vehicles, mine throwers, battle tanks and armoured transport vehicles were transferred from 14th Army units to the separatists. In addition, during the fighting, eight 14th Army helicopters had taken part in transporting ammunition and the wounded on the separatist side.

In a written statement sent to the Court by Mr Leşco's representative on 19 November 2001, Mrs Olga Căpăţînă, a former volunteer attached to the Moldovan Ministry of National Security from 15 March to 15 August 1992, said that during that period, as evidenced by a certificate issued by the Ministry, she had worked for the general staff of the Russian army, at the 14th Army's command and espionage centre, under the name of Olga Suslina. While working there, she had sent the Moldovan Ministry of National Security hundreds of documents confirming the participation of Russian troops in the armed operations and the massive contribution of weapons they had made. She had also gathered information proving that the separatists' military operations were directed by the 14th Army, which coordinated all its actions with the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Government submitted that Cossacks could be found in other parts of the world and that everyone had the right to freedom of movement.

The Court notes that several documents in the file and statements taken down by the delegates show that large numbers of Cossacks and other Russian nationals went to Transdniestria to fight alongside the separatists. It further notes that the Russian Government have not denied this.

The Court accordingly considers it to be established beyond a reasonable doubt that large numbers of Russian nationals went to Transdniestria to fight in the ranks of the Transdniestrian separatists against the Moldovan forces.

Referring to this book, the applicants mentioned by way of example the destruction of a Moldovan unit by the 14th Army at Chiţcani on 30 June 1992 and the shelling by the 14th Army of several Moldovan positions at Coşniţa, Dubăsari, Slobozia and Hârbovăţ between 1 June and 3 July 1992.

The other parties did not comment on the information given in the book.

The Court notes that one witness directly involved at the highest level in the military operations during the conflict asserted that part of the territory on the left bank of the Dniester had been mined, that this work had been done by specialists, and that after the end of the conflict the Moldovan army had had to have recourse to foreign specialists in order to demine the area (see Annex: Mr Costaş, § 406). That information was not disputed by the other parties.

Taking account also of the witness's credibility, the Court can take it to be established that part of Moldovan territory situated on the left bank of the Dniester was mined by the forces opposing the Moldovan army. On the other hand, it notes that this witness was unable to assert categorically that the mines had been laid by 14th Army personnel, but merely contended that logically work of such a technical level could only have been carried out by professionals, that is by 14th Army troops. It likewise notes that this witness asserted that the separatists had seized anti-personnel mines previously held in the 14th Army's stores. In the circumstances, the Court considers that this assertion is not certain “beyond a reasonable doubt” and therefore cannot take it as established that it was 14th Army or ROG personnel who laid mines on the left bank of the Dniester.

On the contrary, they asserted, as appeared from the witness evidence taken by the Court's delegates, that the 14th Army had intervened actively, both directly and indirectly, in the Transdniestrian conflict, against the armed forces of Moldova. The Transdniestrian separatists had been able to arm themselves with weapons belonging to the 14th Army and with the 14th Army's complicity. The Moldovan Government considered that no faith could be placed in assertions that women had forcibly seized weapons and ammunition from the 14th Army's stores. Moreover, not a single Russian soldier had subsequently been disciplined for negligence or complicity in the seizure of equipment from the 14th Army's stores.

The Russian Government went on to say that the Russian Federation had remained neutral in the conflict. In particular, it had not supported the combatants in any way, whether militarily or financially.

These assertions are corroborated by the information contained in OSCE report no. 7 of 29 July 1993, added to the file by the Romanian Government, and by other sources (see Annex: Mr Moşanu, § 244). In that connection, the Court notes both the abundance and the detailed nature of the information in its possession on this subject.

It sees no reason to doubt the credibility of the Moldovan witnesses heard, and notes that their assertions are corroborated by the Moldovan Government, who confirmed these facts in all of the observations they submitted throughout the proceedings.

As to the Russian Government's allegation that the witnesses belonged to political circles opposed to the Russian Federation, the Court notes that this has not been substantiated.

Moreover, it is not possible for the Court to determine precisely on the basis of the statements taken what the relative strengths of the combatants were. However, regard being had to the support given by the troops of the 14th Army to the separatist forces and the massive transfer of arms and ammunition from the 14th Army's stores to the separatists, it is certain that the Moldovan army was in a position of inferiority that prevented it from regaining control of Transdniestria (see Annex: Z, § 271; and Mr Costaş, § 401).

Three military units which had been part of the 14th Army decided to join the new army of the Republic of Moldova. These were a unit at Floreşti (ammunition store no. 5381), the 4th artillery regiment at Ungheni and the 803rd rocket artillery regiment at Ungheni.

The soldiers of the 115th independent battalion of sappers and firemen of the 14th Army refused to enlist in the armed forces of Moldova and “placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the Transdniestrian region”, according to the terms used by the Russian Government.

The copy submitted to the Court by the Moldovan Government bears the signatures of Mr Snegur and Mr Yeltsin only. The Russian Government supplied the Court with a copy bearing the signatures of Mr Snegur and Mr Yeltsin, as the Presidents of Moldova and the Russian Federation respectively. Underneath the signature of Mr Snegur, that copy also bears the signature of Mr Smirnov, without any indication of his status.

Mr Smirnov's signature is not on the copy submitted by the Moldovan Government. In his statement to the Court's delegates, Mr Snegur confirmed that the official document in two copies was signed by him and Mr Yeltsin only (see Annex: Mr Snegur, § 228).

As appears from the witness evidence given to the Court, the broad lines of the agreement were drafted by the Russian side, which presented it for signature to the Moldovans (see Annex: Z, § 281).

The agreement also provided for peacekeeping forces charged with ensuring observance of the ceasefire and security arrangements, composed of five Russian battalions, three Moldovan battalions and two Transdniestrian battalions under the orders of a joint military command structure which was itself subordinate to the JCC.

Article 4 required the 14th Army of the Russian Federation, stationed in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to remain strictly neutral; Article 5 prohibited sanctions or blockades and laid down the objective of removing all obstacles to the free movement of goods, services and persons.

Lastly, the measures provided for in the agreement were defined as “a very important part of the settlement of the conflict by political means” (Article 7).

Article 2 of the agreement provided that the withdrawal of the Russian army from Moldovan territory was to be synchronised with the political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and the establishment of a special status for the “Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova”.

This agreement was not ratified by the authorities of the Russian Federation and so never came into force (see paragraph 115 below).

The Moldovan delegation drew attention to the fact that “MRT” military units had been brought into the security zone with the connivance of the JCC's Russian troops, that new paramilitary units had been formed in the town of Tighina (Bender), which had been declared a security zone and was under the responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping forces, and that firms in Tighina (Bender) and Tiraspol were manufacturing weapons and ammunition.

The Moldovan delegation asked their government to consider the possibility of replacing the Russian peacekeeping forces in Transdniestria by a multinational force under the auspices of the United Nations or the OSCE. Lastly, the Moldovan delegation expressed their hope for rapid implementation of the agreement of 21 October 1994 on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation from Moldovan territory.

Under the terms of the memorandum, the status of Transdniestria is to be based on the following principles: decisions must be agreed by both sides, powers must be shared out and delegated, and guarantees must be secured reciprocally. Transdniestria must participate in the conduct of the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova on questions concerning its own interests to be defined by mutual agreement. Transdniestria would have the right to unilaterally establish and maintain international contacts in economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields, to be determined by mutual agreement.

The memorandum welcomes the willingness of the Russian Federation and Ukraine to act as guarantors of compliance with the provisions contained in the documents defining the status of Transdniestria and in the memorandum. The parties also confirmed the need to pursue the joint peacekeeping forces' common activities in the security zone, in accordance with the agreement of 21 July 1992. In the event of a breach of the agreements, the memorandum also entitles the parties to seek consultations with the guarantor States with a view to measures being taken to normalise the situation. Lastly, the two parties undertook to establish relations between themselves in the context of a shared State within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as it existed on 1 January 1990.

The Russian Government asserted that the peacekeeping forces respected the neutrality required by the agreement of 21 July 1992.

The Court notes the witness evidence given by the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces, Colonel Zverev (see Annex, § 368), to the effect that the Russian peacekeeping forces complied with the agreement. The witness further declared that he was not aware of illegal acts by Transdniestrians in the zone controlled by the Russian forces.

The Court observes, however, that the evidence in question is contradicted by the JCC's official documents, which show, with an abundance of details, that in various areas of Transdniestria under the control of the Russian peacekeeping forces, such as the area of Tighina (Bender), Transdniestrian separatist forces were breaching the ceasefire agreement.

Having regard to the official nature of the JCC documents and the consistency of the information they contain, the Court considers it to be established with a sufficient degree of certainty that, in the area under the responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping forces, the Transdniestrians have not discharged the obligations arising for them from the agreement of 21 July 1992.

“The Presidents advocated the rapid and fair settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict by exclusively peaceful means based on respect for the principle of the Republic of Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for international human rights standards.”

To date, according to the witness evidence given to the Court (see Annex: Colonel Zverev, § 367), no soldier of the 14th Army or the ROG has been employed in the Russian peacekeeping forces.

B. The presence of the army of the Russian Federation and its personnel in Transdniestria after the agreement of 21 July 1992

(a) Before ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation

Russia proposed in 1994 that the ROG's withdrawal from Moldovan territory should be timed to coincide with settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict (see paragraph 93 above), and Moldova only accepted that proposal, which it considered counterproductive, on Russia's insistence and after persuading Russia to declare itself in favour of the speedy release of the members of the Ilaşcu group (see Annex: Y, § 254).

In a press release of 12 February 2004, the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Moldovan authorities were categorically opposed to any synchronisation between the political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from Moldovan territory, and that they sought the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, in accordance with the OSCE's decisions (see paragraph 124 below), especially as the OSCE member States had set up a voluntary fund to finance the withdrawal in question.

The second agreement was approved by the Moldovan Government alone, on 9 November 1994.

The Russian Government submitted that these words meant the present local authorities, which were seen as a mere business partner. They maintained that this did not amount in any way to official or political recognition of the “MRT”.

It further notes that, according to the witness evidence of Mr Sergeyev, the commander of the ROG, Tiraspol airport is used as a free space by both the Russian military forces and the Transdniestrian separatists. The airspace is monitored by Moldovan or Ukrainian air-traffic controllers, depending on whether the territory over which the flight path crosses is Ukrainian or Moldovan. It also appears that Russian aircraft cannot take off from or land at Tiraspol airport without the authorisation of the relevant Moldovan authorities.

Flight security at Tiraspol airport is controlled by the Russian forces as regards Russian aircraft taking off, landing or parked on the ground, and by the Transdniestrian separatists as regards their aircraft. Neither the ROG authorities nor the Russian peacekeeping forces interfere with the way in which the Transdniestrians use Tiraspol airport. For their part, the Transdniestrian separatists do not interfere with the way in which the Russian forces use it (see Annex: General Sergeyev, § 340).

The other parties did not comment on the above information.

Consequently, the principal military prosecutor asked the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation to take additional measures to put an end to the breaches of the law noted within the ROG, to consider whether to bring disciplinary proceedings against Lieutenant-General E. and Major-General D. for failure to maintain effective control and dereliction of duty, and to inform him of the results.

According to the timetable annexed to the agreement, the withdrawal and decommissioning of certain stocks, to be disposed of by explosion or some other mechanical process, was to be completed by 31 December 2001, subject, among other conditions, to authorisation by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, “particularly of the region of Transdniestria”.

The withdrawal (transfer and decommissioning) of surplus ammunition and other ROG equipment was planned to take place by 31 December 2002 at the latest. The withdrawal of the ROG's standard-issue equipment and personnel not forming part of the peacekeeping forces was to be completed by 31 December 2002, on condition that the process of withdrawing ammunition and other equipment to Russia had been completed by then, that other equipment was transferred or decommissioned, and that Moldova discharged its obligations arising under Article 17 of the agreement of 21 October 1994.

(b) After ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation

The Moldovan authorities drew attention to the fact that any withdrawal of ROG personnel not accompanied by removal of the ROG's enormous weapons stocks would increase the risk that Transdniestrian separatists would get their hands on these weapons.

The same press release quoted a declaration by the commander of the ROG, General Boris Sergeyev, to the effect that the latest withdrawals had been made possible by an agreement with the Transdniestrians under which the Transdniestrian authorities were to receive half of the non-military equipment and supplies withdrawn. General Sergeyev cited the example of the withdrawal, on 16 December 2002, of 77 lorries, which had been followed by the transfer of 77 ROG lorries to the Transdniestrians.

The Court has not received any precise information about the quantity of arms and ammunition stocked by the ROG in Transdniestria. According to the applicants and the witness evidence taken by the Court's delegates (see Annex: Mr Snegur, § 235), in 2003 the ROG had at least 200,000 tonnes of military equipment and ammunition there, mainly kept at Kolbasna.

According to information supplied by the Russian Government in June 2001 and not contested by the other parties, the ROG had in addition the following equipment: 106 battle tanks, 42 armoured cars, 109 armoured personnel carriers, 54 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, 123 cannons and mortars, 206 anti-tank weapons, 226 anti-aircraft guns, 9 helicopters and 1,648 vehicles of various kinds. In his witness evidence, General Sergeyev asserted that 108 battle tanks had been destroyed during 2002 and that the destruction of anti-aircraft defence systems was in progress (see Annex, § 341).

In practice, criminal acts of this type are investigated by the Transdniestrian authorities.

C. Economic, political and other relations between the Russian Federation and Transdniestria

The Russian Government denied the existence of a Russian consulate in Transdniestrian territory.

On 27 February 2004 the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the embassy of the Russian Federation in Chişinău in which the Moldovan authorities expressed their regret about the fact that the authorities of the Russian Federation had opened seventeen fixed polling stations in Transdniestrian territory for the presidential election of 17 March 2004 without the agreement of the Moldovan authorities and that in acting thus the Russian authorities had presented them with a fait accompli, creating an undesirable precedent. The note went on to say that the only places in which the opening of polling stations was desirable were the ROG headquarters in Tiraspol, the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces in Tighina (Bender), the Russian embassy in Chişinău and mobile polling stations.

On the other hand, the Court takes it as established that fixed consular posts, operating as polling stations, were opened by the Russian authorities in Transdniestrian territory without the agreement of the Moldovan authorities.

With regard to the press articles submitted by the applicants mentioning the existence of a consular office of the Russian Federation in the territory of the ROG, the Court notes that these too are uncorroborated. However, the Russian Government have not denied the existence of such an office. The Court considers that in view of the special situation of the ROG, stationed in Transdniestrian territory, it is plausible that for practical reasons a consular office should be opened in the territory of the ROG to enable Russian soldiers to settle various problems normally dealt with by consulates.

For their part, representatives of the “MRT” regime have travelled to Moscow on official visits, notably to the Duma.

The other parties did not contest these facts.

According to the study by Iurie Pintea (see paragraph 118 above), from 1993 onwards Transdniestrian arms firms began to specialise in the production of high-tech weapons, with the help of funds and orders from various Russian companies, including the Russian arms producer and trader Росвооружение. Russian companies provide Transdniestrian firms with the technology and equipment they need to manufacture modern weaponry and military equipment. Transdniestrian firms also produce components for Russian arms manufacturers. For example, the Elektrommash company receives the components for the silenced pistols it produces from the Russian Federation and delivers components for various weapons systems assembled in the Russian Federation.

According to the same study by Mr Pintea, nearly 70% of the command structure of the ROG unit stationed in Kolbasna (including the ammunition store) was made up of inhabitants of Râbniţa and Kolbasna, while 100% of the technical staff of the Kolbasna stores (head storekeepers, technicians and mechanics) were inhabitants of the region.

In all, 50% of the ROG's officers and 80% of its non-commissioned officers were inhabitants of the “MRT”.

The other parties did not contest this information.

In addition, between 28 August and 2 September 2001, members of the Duma took part in the celebrations to mark the 10th anniversary of the “MRT” 's declaration of independence.

As shown by a telegram sent on 17 February 2000 by the Chairman of the Russian group Gazprom to the Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova, contracts for supplying gas to Moldova do not apply to Transdniestria, to which gas is delivered separately on more favourable financial terms than those granted to the rest of the Republic of Moldova (see Annex: Y, § 261; and Mr Sangheli, § 268).

D. Moldovan-Transdniestrian relations

Contact was established and maintained mainly through negotiation committees and concerned the political question of Transdniestria's status, and settlement of various aspects of everyday life (economic, social, etc.).

The Moldovan Government said that the Transdniestrian leaders did not possess Moldovan nationality as they had never requested Moldovan identity papers.

The Court notes that the witness questioned by the delegates on this subject denied that any Moldovan identity documents whatsoever had been issued to Mr Smirnov, Mr Mărăcuţă and Mr Caraman (see Annex: Mr Molojen, § 396). In the absence of corroboration of the applicants' allegations, the Court considers that it has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Moldovan authorities issued passports to Transdniestrian leaders.

The Moldovan Government did not comment on this allegation.

In these circumstances, in the absence of corroboration of the applicants' assertions, the Court cannot regard it as established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Moldovan authorities are conducting a policy of supporting the Transdniestrian economy through such export certificates.

IV. THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

It further notes that, in their written observations of 24 October 2000, the Moldovan Government endorsed the applicants' account of the circumstances in which they had been arrested, convicted and detained. In the same observations they indicated that the applicants had certainly been arrested without a warrant, that they had remained for two months on premises belonging to the 14th Army and that the searches and seizures had also been carried out without a warrant.

The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants' allegations about their conditions of detention were very plausible.

A. The applicants' arrest, pre-trial detention and conviction

The details of their arrest are as follows.

The applicants submitted that during their detention in the territory of the 14th Army, they were guarded by soldiers of that army and that while they were there, Transdniestrian police officers came to see them in their cells. They also alleged that during this period they were tortured by 14th Army personnel.

The Moldovan Government said that, in the light of the statements made by the Moldovan witnesses and Mr Timoshenko to the delegates of the Court, it was apparent that 14th Army personnel had taken part in the applicants' arrest and interrogation.

In their observations of 1 September 2003, the Russian Government repeated their initial position, namely that the Court did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine events which had taken place in 1992.

On the merits, they nevertheless acknowledged that the applicants had been detained on the premises of the 14th Army, but asserted that this detention had been of very short duration and that in any event it had been illegal. The Government said that military prosecutor Timoshenko had put a stop to this illegal detention as soon as he had been informed of it. They did not comment on the question whether Russian soldiers had taken part in the applicants' initial arrest.

They submitted that, apart from providing cells for the applicants' detention, the 14th Army personnel had done nothing illegal. In particular, they had not guarded the cells in which the applicants were detained. In that connection, the Government said that the applicants could not have seen Russian insignia on the warders' uniforms because the new Russian insignia, which replaced those of the USSR, had only been introduced by Order no. 2555, issued on 28 July 1994 by the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Government further submitted that Colonel Gusarov (see paragraph 270 below) had not served in the Russian military formations stationed in Transdniestrian territory, but had performed his service at the “Ministry of the Interior of the MRT”.

On that subject, the Court notes that Mr Timoshenko asserted in his witness evidence (see Annex, § 381) that the applicants had stayed on the premises of the 14th Army for a very short space of time, although he was unable to say exactly how long.

Without casting a general doubt on the testimony of Mr Timoshenko, which it considers to be credible, the Court considers that it contains a number of details, including those concerning the length of time the applicants spent on the premises of the 14th Army, which are confused, and moreover refuted by other testimony.

Ilie Ilaşcu was subjected to four mock executions. The first time, his death warrant was read out to him, whereas on the other occasions he was taken out blindfolded into a field where the warders fired at him with blank cartridges until he fainted.

The second applicant was threatened with rape. After a month, as a result of the blows he had received, the third applicant was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where he remained for a month (see Annex: Mr Ivanţoc, § 97).

The applicants had only fifteen minutes per day for outdoor exercise, in an enclosed area. During their detention at the 14th Army garrison headquarters, they were not able to wash themselves or change their clothes.

The toilets were along the corridor, and the prisoners were taken there only once a day by guards accompanied by an Alsatian dog. They had only forty-five seconds in which to relieve themselves, knowing that the dog would be set on them if they took longer. Since they were taken to the lavatory only once a day under the conditions described above, the applicants had to relieve themselves in their cells (see Annex: Mr Ivanţoc, § 95; Mr Leşco, § 115; Mrs Leşco, § 33; and Mrs Ivanţoc, § 40).

They were cut off from the outside world. Their families were not permitted to contact them or send them parcels. They were not able to send or receive mail and had no access to lawyers.

Hallucinogenic drugs administered to Mr Ivanţoc gave him chronic migraines. During this period he was not treated for his headaches and his wife was not given permission to send him medicines.

B. Events subsequent to the applicants' conviction; Mr Ilaşcu's release

C. The applicants' detention after conviction

no. 2 until his conviction, on 9 December 1993. He was then transferred to Hlinaia Prison, to the wing for prisoners condemned to death, remaining there until July 1998, when he was again transferred to Tiraspol Prison no. 2. He stayed there until his release in May 2001.

Mr Ilaşcu was always held in solitary confinement. He was not allowed correspondence, but nevertheless managed to send a few letters out of prison.

Mr Ilaşcu was not permitted to speak to the other prisoners or the warders. He was therefore taken alone for his daily walk, which took place in the evening, indoors.

Mr Ilaşcu's food was 100 grams of rye bread three times a day and a glass of tea without sugar twice a day. In the evening he also received a concoction called “balanda” whose main ingredient is kibbled maize.

At times, authorisation to receive visits or parcels was refused on the orders of Igor Smirnov or Vladimir Antiufeyev/Chevtsov.

In 1999, following his vote for the Sturza government and during the nine months that government lasted, Mr Ilaşcu was not allowed any visits from his family or any parcels. The other applicants, particularly Mr Ivanţoc, suffered similar restrictions.

Mr Ivanţoc and Mr Leşco began to receive only bread for food. Mr Petrov-Popa was transferred to Hlinaia Prison where, in conditions of total isolation, he was told that he would not be permitted any visits for six months.

They were able to see, at their request, the prison doctor, who in most cases restricted his examination to palpation and auscultation.

On one occasion, Mr Ilaşcu was able to have an electrocardiogram; Mr Ivanţoc was operated on for liver disease; Mr Petrov-Popa had an injection for his tuberculosis and was prescribed treatment.

The examinations took place in the presence of prison doctors and warders. The medicines prescribed by the Moldovan doctors, as recorded in the prison medical registers, were not supplied, the only medicines received by the applicants being those brought by their families.

On two occasions, Mr Ilaşcu was allowed to be examined by International Red Cross doctors.

Mr Leşco, Mr Ivanţoc and Mr Petrov-Popa said they suffered from pancreatitis, liver disease and tuberculosis respectively and were not receiving the appropriate treatment.

On the slightest pretext, Mr Ilaşcu was removed to a disciplinary cell.

For example, after the publication in the press of an article about the applicants, prison warders entered the cells of Mr Ilaşcu and Mr Ivanţoc and confiscated or destroyed all the objects they found there. They beat the applicants severely and placed them in disciplinary cells for twenty-four hours.

After lodging his application with the Court, Mr Ilaşcu was beaten by soldiers who kicked him and hit him with rifle butts. He then had a pistol placed in his mouth and was threatened with death if he ever tried to send letters out of the prison again. On that occasion he lost a tooth.

D. Steps taken up to May 2001 to secure the applicants' release

Mr Sturza went one last time to Tiraspol on 16 April 2001 in order to bring the applicants back to Chişinău, but without success. It was only on 5 May 2001 that Mr Ilaşcu was released (see paragraph 279 below).

“Examination of the memorial by the Grand Chamber of the European Court, due to take place on 1 May of this year, may cause serious prejudice to the interests of the Russian Federation and Moldova.

In that context, the Russian side, relying on the agreement reached by the heads of the diplomatic services of the two countries with regard to the need to withdraw the memorial concerned, urges the Government of Moldova to take all the necessary steps to ensure the withdrawal of this document before 30 April and to inform the European Court and Russia's representative to that organ of the fact officially.”

E. Mr Ilaşcu's release on 5 May 2001

Moldovan special forces then took the applicant to the Ministry of Security, where he was questioned briefly before being released.

Decree no. 263, signed on 6 July 1999, provided for a moratorium on enforcement of the death penalty within the territory of the “MRT” from 1 September 1999. This moratorium was apparently also applicable to judgments rendered before that date, but not enforced by the time of the decree's entry into force, which was to coincide with its signature and publication in the Official Gazette. Decree no. 198, signed by Mr Smirnov on 5 May 2001, granted a pardon to Mr Ilaşcu and ordered his release. The decree came into force on the day of its signature.

The Moldovan Government made no comment on the subject of Mr Ilaşcu's alleged transfer, but merely submitted to the Court Mr Smirnov's decree concerning the applicant. Nor did they comment on the decree's authenticity. They added nevertheless that they had heard rumours to the effect that, before signing the decree in question, Mr Smirnov had commuted the death sentence imposed on Mr Ilaşcu to one of life imprisonment.

Mr Ilaşcu asserted that Mr Smirnov's decree was a forgery created after his release. He maintained that, in spite of his release, his conviction remained valid and that if he returned to Transdniestria he would be liable to the death sentence.

F. Steps taken after May 2001 to secure the other applicants' release

At a press conference which he gave on 31 July 2001, the President of Moldova, Mr Voronin, declared: “Mr Ilaşcu is the person who is keeping his comrades detained in Tiraspol.” He pointed out in that connection that he had suggested to Mr Ilaşcu that he should withdraw his application to the Court against the Russian Federation and Moldova, in exchange for which the other applicants would be released before 19 June 2001, but that Mr Ilaşcu had refused to do so. According to the Moldovan press agency Basa-press, Mr Voronin also suggested that if Mr Ilaşcu won his case before the Court that would make the release of the other applicants more difficult.

G. International reactions to the applicants' conviction and detention

Lastly, the authors described the trial as “a political event from beginning to end”. They concluded that some of the terrorism charges preferred against the applicants on the basis of the Criminal Code of the Soviet era would be considered merely free speech issues in modern democracies.

The CPT pointed out that the situation in Transdniestrian penitentiary establishments in 2000 left a great deal to be desired, especially at Hlinaia Prison, where the conditions of detention were deplorable: poor ventilation, insufficient natural light, inadequate sanitary facilities and overcrowding.

On the situation of the applicants in particular, the CPT said that three members of the Ilaşcu group had been detained for eight years under conditions of solitary confinement which were having harmful psychological consequences for at least one of them. The CPT went on to say that solitary confinement could, in certain circumstances, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and that in any event solitary confinement for so many years was indefensible. The CPT asked the Transdniestrian authorities to relax the conditions of detention of the three members of the Ilaşcu group held in solitary confinement by allowing them access to the newspapers of their choice and by ensuring that they could receive visits from their families and lawyers.

The doctors in the CPT delegation were able to examine three of the four applicants, including Mr Ilaşcu. They recommended that he be given appropriate medical treatment for his illness.

The CPT reported accounts of beatings in May 1999 allegedly inflicted on members of the Ilaşcu group imprisoned in Tiraspol by masked individuals.

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOMESTIC LAW AND OTHER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS

“We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine, as founder States of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and signatories of the Union Treaty of 1922, hereinafter referred to as the 'High Contracting Parties', hereby declare that the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no longer exists.

On the basis of the historical commonality of our peoples and the ties that have developed between them, and bearing in mind the bilateral agreements concluded between the High Contracting Parties,

Desirous of setting up lawfully constituted democratic States,

Intending to develop our relations on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for State sovereignty, the inalienable right to self-determination, the principles of equality and non-intervention in internal affairs, of abstention from the use of force and from economic or other means of applying pressure and of settling controversial issues through agreement and other universally recognised principles and norms of international law,

...

Confirming our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Undertaking to abide by the universally recognised international norms relating to human and peoples' rights,

We have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties hereby establish the Commonwealth of Independent States.

...

Article 6

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties undertake to discharge the international obligations incumbent on them under treaties and agreements entered into by the former USSR.”

“The USSR's membership of the United Nations, including the Security Council and all the other organs and organisations of the United Nations system, is continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In that connection, I request that the name “Russian Federation” be used at the United Nations in place of the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”. The Russian Federation assumes full responsibility for all the USSR's rights and obligations under the United Nations Charter, including financial undertakings. Please consider this letter confirmation of the right of all persons currently holding the status of USSR representatives to the United Nations to represent the Russian Federation in the organs of the United Nations.”
“The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation,

Desiring to bring about as rapidly as possible a final ceasefire and settlement of the armed conflict in the Transdniestrian regions;

Endorsing the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and those of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Noting that, on 3 July 1992, the President of the Republic of Moldova and the President of the Russian Federation reached agreement on principles,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

As the seat of the control commission, and in view of the seriousness of the situation, Bender is hereby declared a region subject to a security regime, enforcement of security being the task of the military contingents of the parties to implementation of the present agreement. The control commission will ensure the maintenance of public order in Bender, acting together with the police.

Bender will be administered by the organs of local self-government, where necessary acting together with the control commission.

Article 4

The Russian Federation's 14th Army, stationed in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, will observe strict neutrality. Both parties to the conflict undertake to observe neutrality and not to engage in any action against the 14th Army's property, its personnel or their families.

All questions relating to the 14th Army's status or the stages and timetable for its withdrawal will be settled by negotiations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova.

Article 5

Article 6

A common press centre will be created with the task of providing the control commission with correct information about developments in the situation in the region.

Article 7

The parties consider that the measures provided for in the present agreement form a very important part of the settlement of the conflict by political means.

Article 8

The present agreement will come into force on the day of its signature.

The present agreement shall cease to have effect by a joint decision of the parties or in the event of denunciation by one of the parties, which will entail cessation of the activities of the control commission and the military contingents under its orders.”

“...

The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova considers that within the CIS the Republic of Moldova will make economic cooperation its priority, excluding cooperation in the political and military sphere, which it considers incompatible with the principles of sovereignty and independence.”

Article 11

“1. The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality.

Article 111

“1. A form of autonomy under special conditions may be granted to areas on the left bank of the Dniester and in the south of the Republic of Moldova by virtue of a special status authorised by means of an institutional act ...”

Article 116

“False imprisonment shall be punished by imprisonment for up to one year.

False imprisonment which has endangered the life or health of the victim or caused him or her physical suffering shall be punished by imprisonment for one to five years.”

Article 207

“Usurpation of the powers or title corresponding to an official office, if perpetrated in order to further the commission of an offence, shall be punished by a fine of up to thirty times the minimum monthly salary or up to two years' labour or up to two years' imprisonment.”
“The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as 'the Parties', with the participation of the region of Transdniestria,

Having regard to the new political relations established in Europe and throughout the world;

Confirming that the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation are sovereign and independent States;

Convinced that they must ground their relations on principles of friendship, mutual understanding and cooperation;

Proceeding from agreements the Parties have already reached in the military sphere;

Acting in accordance with the documents adopted at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Have agreed as follows:

...

Article 2

The status of the military formations of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Republic of Moldova is determined by the present Agreement.

The stationing of military formations of the Russian Federation within the territory of the Republic of Moldova is an interim measure.

Subject to technical constraints and the time required to station troops elsewhere, the Russian side will effect the withdrawal of the above-mentioned military formations within three years from the entry into force of the present Agreement.

The practical steps taken with a view to withdrawal of the military formations of the Russian Federation from Moldovan territory within the time stated will be synchronised with the political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and the establishment of a special status for the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

The stages and timetable for the final withdrawal of the military formations of the Russian Federation will be laid down in a separate protocol, to be agreed between the Parties' Ministries of Defence.

...

Article 5

For as long as Russian military formations remain in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, no recourse may be had to them with a view to the solution of an internal conflict within the Republic of Moldova, or for other military actions against third countries.

The sale of any type of military technology, armaments and ammunition belonging to the military formations of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Republic of Moldova may take place only after a special agreement between the governments of the two countries.

Article 6

Movements and military investigations by the military formations of the Russian Federation in the territory of the Republic of Moldova outside their bases will take place in accordance with a plan drawn up by agreement with the relevant organs of the Republic of Moldova.

It is the responsibility of military formations to ensure, both inside their bases and during movements outside, that military objects and property are guarded in the manner prescribed within the Russian army.

Article 7

Tiraspol military airport will be used as the joint base of the aviation of the military formations of the Russian Federation and the civil aviation of the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

Movement of military aircraft inside the airspace of the Republic of Moldova is to take place on the basis of a special agreement concluded between the Parties' Ministries of the Interior.

...

Article 13

Accommodation and barracks, service buildings, vehicle parks, firing ranges and fixed machine tools, stores and the tools they contain, buildings and other premises left unoccupied as a result of the withdrawal of the military formations of the Russian Federation will be transferred for management to the organs of the local public administrative authorities of the Republic of Moldova in the quantity existing de facto and in the condition they are in.

The manner of the transfer or sale of the immovable property of the military formations of the Russian Federation will be determined in a special agreement to be concluded between the governments of the Parties.

...

Article 17

With a view to ensuring the withdrawal of the military formations of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova within the time stated, and their effective operation in their bases within the territory of the Russian Federation, the premises needed for the installation of the military formations will be moved. The amount of money to be paid, the list of premises to be reconstructed and the place where they are to be installed will be determined in a special agreement.

...

Article 23

The present Agreement will come into force on the day of the last notification by the Parties concerning implementation of the necessary internal procedures, and will remain in force until the total withdrawal of Russian military formations from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The present Agreement will be registered with the United Nations Organisation in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.”

Article 1

“Tiraspol military airport will be used by the military units of the Russian Federation until their definitive withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

Movement and joint flights at Tiraspol airport by the civil aviation of the region of Transdniestria belonging to the Republic of Moldova and Russian aircraft will take place in accordance with the 'Provisional rules on the joint dispersed aviation of the military formations of the Russian Federation and the civil aviation of the region of Transdniestria of the Republic of Moldova', and in coordination with the State civil aviation authority of the Republic of Moldova, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Moldova and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

Other aircraft may take off from Tiraspol airport only after coordination with the State aviation authorities of the Republic of Moldova and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.”

Article 3

“The postal aircraft belonging to the Russian units may take off from Tiraspol airport twice a week at most (on Tuesdays and Thursdays, or on other days of the week after prior coordination between the Parties).”

Article 5

Requests by the aviation of the armed forces of the Russian Federation to carry out flying tuition, training flights and flyovers are to be presented before 3 p.m. (local time) through the air traffic coordination bodies (control centres).

Confirmation of such requests and the authorisations needed for use of the Republic of Moldova's airspace will be issued by the anti-aircraft defence and aviation control centre of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova. The decision concerning the use of the Republic of Moldova's airspace, in accordance with the flight request, in the areas where the Russian units are temporarily stationed will be taken by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova.”

Article 7

“Monitoring of the implementation of the present agreement will be carried out by the representatives of the Ministries of Defence of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, in accordance with the special rules drawn up jointly by them.”

Article 8

“The present agreement will come into force on the date of its signature and will remain valid until the definitive withdrawal of the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The present agreement may be amended with the mutual consent of the Parties.”

“1. The Republic of Moldova declares that it will be unable to guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention in respect of omissions and acts committed by the organs of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic within the territory actually controlled by such organs, until the conflict in the region is finally settled.

...”

“At the close of negotiations on questions relating to military property linked to the presence of the Russian forces in Transdniestria, agreement has been reached on the following points:

(a) the first category includes the standard-issue weapons of the United Group of Russian forces, its ammunition and its property;

(b) the second includes weapons, ammunition and surplus movable military property which must imperatively be returned to Russia;

(c) the third includes weapons, ammunition and military and other equipment which can be sold (decommissioned) directly on the spot or outside the places where they are stored. Revenue from the sale of property in the third category will be divided between the parties in the following proportions:

Russian Federation: 50%

Transdniestria: 50%, after deducting the expenses arising from the sale of military property in the third category.

Conditions for the use and transfer of property in the third category shall be laid down by Russia with the participation of Transdniestria.

THE LAW

I. WHETHER THE APPLICANTS COME WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

A. Arguments submitted to the Court

Under Article 1 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties had agreed to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set forth therein. In international law, a State's territorial jurisdiction, which had to be exclusive and total, was called territorial sovereignty. That sovereignty enabled it to exercise in a circumscribed area its State functions, made up of legislative, administrative and judicial acts. But a State not in effective control of part of its territory could not really exercise territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty. In such a case, the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “territory” were not interchangeable. For the Convention to be applicable, it had to be possible for the State to confer and secure the rights set forth in the Convention. Accordingly, the question whether a person came within the jurisdiction of a State was a question of fact; it was necessary to determine whether, at the time of the conduct complained of, the State authorities did or did not exercise effective control over the alleged victims.

The Moldovan Government pointed out that Moldova's lack of control over the territory under the authority of the Transdniestrian regime had been confirmed by all the witnesses heard by the Court.

In that connection, they referred to the numerous attempts made to settle the conflict, confirmed by the evidence of the witnesses heard in Chişinău, to the declarations and interventions of Moldovan political leaders – including those made during negotiations to settle the conflict – and other condemnations of the illegality of the applicants' detention and conviction, chief among which was the Moldovan Supreme Court's judgment of 3 February 1994, to the judicial measures taken against the persons responsible for their detention and conviction and to the economic and other measures taken to reaffirm Moldovan sovereignty throughout Moldovan territory, including the Transdniestrian part.

However, these measures had come to nothing, given that the “MRT” was an entity capable of functioning autonomously in relation to Moldova and that the Transdniestrian authorities had had recourse to reprisals in response to some of the measures concerned.

Consequently, the Moldovan Government submitted that they had no other means at their disposal to enforce respect for the applicants' rights under the Convention without at the same time endangering Moldova's economic and political situation.

Not only had the Moldovan Government not discharged their positive obligations under the Convention, they had even gone so far as to take measures amounting to de facto recognition of the Tiraspol regime or at least tacit acceptance of the situation, such as the release of Lieutenant‑General Iakovlev (see paragraph 50 above), the transfer of Mr Ilaşcu to the Moldovan authorities on 5 May 2001 (see paragraph 279 above), the agreements of 16 May 2001 (see paragraph 174 above) and cooperation, particularly in customs and police matters (see paragraphs 176-77 above).

The applicants asserted that the speech in which President Voronin accused Mr Ilaşcu, after his release, of being responsible for the detention of the other applicants, had been an act capable of engaging Moldova's responsibility under the Convention.

Although the existence of such positive obligations should not be interpreted in such a way as to impose on the authorities an unbearable or excessive burden, States were nevertheless required to display reasonable diligence.

The Romanian Government submitted that in the present case the Moldovan authorities had failed to prove that they had made every effort to secure their sovereignty over Transdniestrian territory. In particular, they criticised the Moldovan authorities for not taking any effective steps to enforce the Supreme Court of Moldova's judgment of 3 February 1994 and for authorising the customs services of the “MRT” to use the stamps and seals of the Republic of Moldova so that goods from the Transdniestrian region could be exported.

B. The Court's assessment

(a) The concept of “jurisdiction”

“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.”

The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.

From the standpoint of public international law, the words “within their jurisdiction” in Article 1 of the Convention must be understood to mean that a State's jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial (see Banković and Others, cited above, § 59), but also that jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State's territory.

This presumption may be limited in exceptional circumstances, particularly where a State is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory. That may be as a result of military occupation by the armed forces of another State which effectively controls the territory concerned (see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, and Cyprus v. Turkey, §§ 76-80, cited above, and also cited in the above-mentioned Banković and Others decision, §§ 70-71), acts of war or rebellion, or the acts of a foreign State supporting the installation of a separatist State within the territory of the State concerned.

Those obligations remain even where the exercise of the State's authority is limited in part of its territory, so that it has a duty to take all the appropriate measures which it is still within its power to take.

The Court has accepted that in exceptional circumstances the acts of Contracting States performed outside their territory, or which produce effects there, may amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.

According to the relevant principles of international law, a State's responsibility may be engaged where, as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises in practice effective control of an area situated outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration (ibid.).

(b) State responsibility for a wrongful act

In addition, the Court considers that, in the case of a series of wrongful acts or omissions, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the acts and continuing for as long as the acts or omissions are repeated and remain at variance with the international obligation concerned (see also draft Article 15 § 2 of the work of the ILC).

The question which arises is therefore whether, despite the above-mentioned finding, the factual situation to which Moldova's declaration and the subsequent observations submitted by the Moldovan Government refer affects the legal position as regards Moldova's responsibility under the Convention.

During the armed conflict, the Moldovan authorities made a series of appeals to the international community, including one to the United Nations Security Council on 23 June 1992 (see paragraph 83 above), asking the Security Council to support them in their struggle for independence. Accusing the Russian Federation of supporting the Transdniestrian separatists, they repeatedly asked Russia to halt the “aggression” against them (see paragraphs 78-79 and 82-83 above).

On 29 July 1994 the new Constitution of the Republic of Moldova was adopted. Article 111 provided for the possibility of granting a form of autonomy to areas which included places on the left bank of the Dniester. Article 11 prohibited the stationing of foreign troops in its territory (see paragraph 294 above).

The Court accordingly sees in the declaration attached to the instrument of Moldova's ratification of the Convention a reference to this de facto situation.

Moreover, that point is not disputed by any of the parties or by the Romanian Government.

Nevertheless, such a factual situation reduces the scope of that jurisdiction in that the undertaking given by the State under Article 1 must be considered by the Court only in the light of the Contracting State's positive obligations towards persons within its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.

It is not for the Court to indicate the most appropriate measures Moldova should have taken or should take to that end, or whether such measures were sufficient. It must only verify Moldova's will, expressed through specific acts or measures, to re-establish its control over the territory of the “MRT”.

In the Court's opinion, when confronted with a regime sustained militarily, politically and economically by a power such as the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 111-61 above), there was little Moldova could do to re-establish its authority over Transdniestrian territory. That was evidenced by the outcome of the military conflict, which showed that the Moldovan authorities did not have the means to gain the upper hand in Transdniestrian territory against the rebel forces supported by 14th Army personnel.

On 12 September 1997 it ratified the Convention and confirmed in its reservations to the Convention its intention to re-establish control over the region of Transdniestria.

On the other hand, the efforts of the Moldovan authorities were directed more towards diplomatic activity. In March 1998 Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the region of Transdniestria signed a number of instruments with a view to settling the Transdniestrian conflict. Meetings and negotiations took place between representatives of Moldova and the Transdniestrian regime. Lastly, from 2002 to the present, a number of proposals for the settlement of the conflict have been put forward and discussed by the President of Moldova, the OSCE and the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 107-10 above).

The Court does not see in the reduction of the number of measures taken a renunciation on Moldova's part of attempts to exercise its jurisdiction in the region, regard being had to the fact that several of the measures previously tried by the Moldovan authorities had been blocked by “MRT” reprisals (see paragraphs 181-84 above).

The Court further notes that the Moldovan Government argued that their change of negotiating strategy towards diplomatic approaches aimed at preparing Transdniestria's return within the Moldovan legal order had been a response to demands expressed by the separatists during discussions on the settlement of the situation in Transdniestria and the applicants' release. They had accordingly abandoned the measures they had previously adopted, particularly in the legal sphere. The Court notes the witness evidence to that effect given by Mr Sturza (see Annex, §§ 309-14) and Mr Sidorov (see Annex, § 446).

The Moldovan Government explained that these cooperation measures had been taken by the Moldovan authorities out of a concern to improve the everyday lives of the people of Transdniestria and allow them to lead as nearly normal lives as possible. The Court, like the Moldovan Government, takes the view that, given their nature and limited character, these acts cannot be regarded as support for the Transdniestrian regime. On the contrary, they represent affirmation by Moldova of its desire to re-establish control over the region of Transdniestria.

During that period, as appears from the witness evidence, in discussions with the Transdniestrian leaders the Moldovan authorities also systematically raised the question of the applicants' release and respect for their Convention rights (see paragraphs 172 and 274-77 above). In particular, the Court notes the efforts made by the judicial authorities; for example, the Minister of Justice, Mr Sturza, made numerous visits to Transdniestria to negotiate with the Transdniestrian authorities for the applicants' release.

It is true that the Moldovan authorities did not pursue certain measures taken previously, particularly investigations in respect of persons involved in the applicants' conviction and detention. However, the Court considers that in the absence of control over Transdniestrian territory by the Moldovan authorities any judicial investigation in respect of persons living in Transdniestria or linked to offences committed in Transdniestria would be ineffectual. This is confirmed by the witness evidence on that point (see Annex: Mr Postovan, § 184; Mr Catană, § 208; and Mr Rusu, § 302).

Lastly, the Moldovan authorities have applied not only to the “MRT” regime but also to other States and international organisations for their assistance in obtaining the applicants' release (see Annex: Mr Moşanu, § 249).

In their negotiations with the separatists, the Moldovan authorities have restricted themselves to raising the question of the applicants' situation orally, without trying to reach an agreement guaranteeing respect for their Convention rights (see Annex: Mr Sturza, §§ 310-13).

Similarly, although the applicants have been deprived of their liberty for nearly twelve years, no overall plan for the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict brought to the Court's attention deals with their situation, and the Moldovan Government did not claim that such a document existed or that negotiations on the subject were in progress.

In the Court's opinion, the fact that at the hearing on 6 July 2001 the Moldovan Government refrained from arguing that the Russian Federation was responsible for the alleged violations on account of the presence of its army in Transdniestria, so as not to hinder the process “aimed at ending ... the detention of the ... applicants” (see paragraph 360 below), amounted to an admission on their part of the influence the Russian authorities might have over the Transdniestrian regime if they were to urge it to release the applicants. Contrary to the position prior to May 2001, when the Moldovan authorities raised the question of the applicants' release with the Russian authorities, interventions to that end also seem to have ceased after that date.

In any event, the Court has not been informed of any approach by the Moldovan authorities to the Russian authorities after May 2001 aimed at obtaining the remaining applicants' release.

In order to determine whether Moldova's responsibility is indeed engaged under the Convention, the Court will therefore need to examine each of the complaints raised by the applicants.

II. WHETHER THE APPLICANTS COME WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A. Arguments submitted to the Court

It had not been possible to honour the undertaking given by the Russian Federation in 1994 to withdraw its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova within three years from signature of the agreement, since this withdrawal did not depend on the Russian Federation alone. Firstly, the authorities of the “MRT” were opposed to it; secondly, technical considerations relating to the removal of military stores had to be taken into account. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul, the deadline had been put back to 31 December 2002, and the Russian Federation intended to honour the agreements reached at the summit.

The ROG troops did not act together with or on behalf of the “MRT”, but had a peacekeeping mission, the objective of its commander being to preserve peace and stability in the region and guard the enormous quantity of weapons still stockpiled there. The peacekeeping forces observed the neutrality required by the agreement of 21 July 1992.

In short, the Russian military presence in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, with Moldova's consent, with the aim of preserving the peace there, could not engage the Russian Federation's responsibility for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.

The Russian Federation did not exercise any economic control over the region of Transdniestria, which conducted its own independent economic policy within the Republic of Moldova, for example by exporting foodstuffs and alcohol with its own labels, but as products of the Republic of Moldova and following the rules applicable to each field of activity. Consequently, unlike the situation in northern Cyprus, the Transdniestrian regime was far from owing its survival to the Russian Federation. In the event of the total withdrawal of Russian troops, the Transdniestrian local authorities would have no difficulty in continuing to carry on their activities freely.

The Government rejected the applicants' allegation that the Russian Federation had opened a consulate in Transdniestrian territory, but admitted that the subject had been on the agenda of discussions with the Republic of Moldova for a long time.

The agreement of 20 March 1998 on questions relating to the property of the 14th Army (see paragraph 299 above) and other agreements on economic cooperation with the “MRT” were private-law contracts between two private parties and were not governed by international law. It could not be concluded on the strength of those agreements that the Russian Federation recognised the “MRT”.

Similarly, no conclusion could be drawn from Articles 7 and 13 of the agreement of 21 October 1994 between Moldova and the Russian Federation (see paragraph 296 above), which provided for joint use of Tiraspol military airport by the military aviation of the Russian Federation and the “civil aviation of the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova”, and the transfer “to the organs of the local public administrative authorities of the Republic of Moldova” of premises vacated or machine tools left behind as a result of the withdrawal of the Russian Federation's military formations. According to the Russian Government, the “Dniestrian region” was regarded in that case as a “business entity” carrying on its own activities inside a specific territory.

As to the remaining allegations, the Russian Government asserted that there was no causal link between the presence of Russian military forces in the region of Transdniestria and the applicants' situation.

In addition, the Moldovan Government asserted that the responsibility of the Russian Federation had to be engaged on account of the participation of 14th Army personnel in the arrest and interrogation of the applicants, their detention on 14th Army premises and their transfer into the charge of the Transdniestrian separatists.

As regards the meaning of the term “local public administrative authorities of the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova” found in certain agreements with the Russian Federation in which specific rights were conferred on those authorities, the Moldovan Government said that it referred to administrative bodies set up in accordance with the constitutional rules of the Republic of Moldova and subordinate to the central authorities. They categorically rejected the interpretation to the effect that the local authorities concerned in those agreements were those subordinate to the Tiraspol authorities.

They relied on the Court's case-law in Loizidou (preliminary objections), cited above, in support of their opinion that the Russian Federation could be held responsible for acts committed outside its territory, but in a region which it controlled.

They further relied on the case-law of the International Court of Justice, which had pointed out in its advisory opinion on the South African presence in Namibia that States were under an obligation to ensure that the acts of private individuals did not affect the inhabitants of the territory in question. They also referred to Kling, in which the General Claims Commission, set up by the United States and Mexico in 1923, had ruled that the State was responsible for rebellious conduct by its soldiers.

They submitted that the 14th Army had contributed to the creation of the separatist military forces. After the end of the conflict, the personnel of the 14th Army had remained inside Moldovan territory.

They submitted that the case-law concerned was wholly applicable to the facts of the present case, firstly on account of the participation of the forces of the 14th Army in the military conflict during which Moldova had tried to re-establish its sovereign jurisdiction over the territory in question, and secondly because of the stationing of those troops in the “MRT”. It was of little consequence that the real number of Russian troops had been gradually reduced in proportion to the local authorities' progress in forming their own armed forces, since the element of dissuasion represented by the 14th Army's continued presence in Moldovan territory remained.

B. The Court's assessment

(a) Before ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation

It also entered into negotiations with the Russian Federation with a view to the withdrawal of that army from its territory.

The Court notes that from December 1991 onwards the Moldovan authorities systematically complained, to international bodies among others, of what they called “the acts of aggression” of the 14th Army against the Republic of Moldova and accused the Russian Federation of supporting the Transdniestrian separatists.

Regard being had to the principle of States' responsibility for abuses of authority, it is of no consequence that, as the Russian Government submitted, the 14th Army did not participate as such in the military operations between the Moldovan forces and the Transdniestrian insurgents.

The Court also notes that even after the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992 the Russian Federation continued to provide military, political and economic support to the separatist regime (see paragraphs 111-61 above), thus enabling it to survive by strengthening itself and by acquiring a certain amount of autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova.

Similarly, after his arrest by soldiers of the 14th Army, the fourth applicant was handed over to the Transdniestrian separatist police, then detained, interrogated and subjected on police premises to treatment which could be considered contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

This is because the events which gave rise to the responsibility of the Russian Federation must be considered to include not only the acts in which the agents of that State participated, like the applicants' arrest and detention, but also their transfer into the hands of the Transdniestrian police and regime, and the subsequent ill-treatment inflicted on them by those police, since in acting in that way the agents of the Russian Federation were fully aware that they were handing them over to an illegal and unconstitutional regime.

In addition, regard being had to the acts the applicants were accused of, the agents of the Russian Government knew, or at least should have known, the fate which awaited them.

It remains to be determined whether that responsibility remained engaged and whether it was still engaged at the time of the ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation.

(b) After ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation

Consequently, in view of the size of this arsenal (see paragraph 131 above), the ROG's military importance in the region and its dissuasive influence persist.

Taking into account the accusations made against the ROG and the dangerous nature of its weapons stocks, the Court finds it hard to understand why the ROG troops do not have effective legal resources to prevent such transfers or thefts, as is apparent from their witness evidence to the delegates.

The Court further notes the information supplied by the applicants and not denied by the Russian Government to the effect that companies and institutions of the Russian Federation normally controlled by the State, or whose policy is subject to State authorisation, operating particularly in the military field, have been able to enter into commercial relations with similar firms in the “MRT” (see paragraphs 150 and 151 above).

Regard being had to the foregoing, it is of little consequence that since 5 May 1998 the agents of the Russian Federation have not participated directly in the events complained of in the present application.

III. THE COURT'S JURISDICTION RATIONE TEMPORIS

A. The complaint under Article 6 of the Convention

However, the proceedings before that court ended with the judgment of 9 December 1993 (see paragraph 215 above), before the dates on which the Convention was ratified by Moldova and the Russian Federation, and the trial is not a continuing situation.

Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the complaint under Article 6.

B. The complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention

C. The complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

D. Mr Ilaşcu's complaint under Article 2 of the Convention

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION

“Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”

A. Arguments submitted to the Court

He asserted in that connection that on 22 June 2001, after his release, the Moldovan authorities had declared that they were not in possession of any document recording the fact that he had been pardoned. It was only on 16 November 2001, in response to the additional questions raised by the Court, that the Government had supplied the Court with a copy of the pardon. The applicant said that on 5 May 2001 he had been “handed over” to the authorities of the Republic of Moldova by virtue of a transfer document given to the head of Moldovan intelligence by Mr Chevtsov, the “Minister of Security” of the “MRT”, a document which he had seen with his own eyes. In addition, Mr Chevtsov had said that the sentence remained valid and would be executed if Mr Ilaşcu returned to Transdniestria.

B. The Court's assessment

It was only in November 2001 that the Moldovan Government submitted to the Court a copy of the decree of 5 May 2001 by the “President of the MRT” pardoning the applicant (see paragraph 281 above). On the same occasion, the Moldovan Government informed the Court of rumours to the effect that Mr Smirnov had commuted the death penalty against Mr Ilaşcu to life imprisonment. The Court notes that the authenticity of the pardon granted by Mr Smirnov has been questioned by the applicant, who alleged that he had been simply handed over to the Moldovan authorities, that the sentence against him remained valid, and that he would therefore run the risk of being executed if he returned to Trandsniestria.

Since Mr Ilaşcu has been released and is now living with his family in Romania, a country whose nationality he possesses and where he holds high office as a member of the Senate (see paragraph 20 above), the Court considers that the risk of enforcement of the death penalty imposed on him on 9 December 1993 is more hypothetical than real.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A. Arguments submitted to the Court

B. The Court's assessment

“For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. ...”

(a) Mr Ilaşcu

The Court reiterates that the Convention is not binding on Contracting States save in respect of events that have occurred since its entry into force, the relevant dates being 12 September 1997 for Moldova and 5 May 1998 for the Russian Federation. However, in order to assess the effect on the applicant of his conditions of detention, which remained more or less identical throughout the time he spent in prison, the Court may also take into consideration the whole of the period in question, including that part of it which preceded the Convention's entry into force with regard to each of the respondent States.

In particular, the Court notes that after sending a letter to the Moldovan parliament in March 1999 Mr Ilaşcu was savagely beaten by the warders at Tiraspol Prison, who threatened to kill him (see paragraphs 249, 250, 269 and 270 above). After that incident, he was denied food for two days and light for three (see paragraph 271 above).

As to the mock executions which took place before the Convention's entry into force (see paragraph 198 above), there is no doubt that the effect of such barbaric acts was to increase the anxiety felt by the applicant throughout his detention about the prospect of his execution.

The applicant's conditions of detention had deleterious effects on his health, which deteriorated in the course of the many years he spent in prison. Thus, he did not receive proper care, having been deprived of regular medical examinations and treatment (see paragraphs 253, 258-60, 262-63 and 265 above) and dietetically appropriate meals. In addition, owing to the restrictions on receiving parcels, he could not be sent medicines and food to improve his health.

There has therefore been a failure to observe the requirements of Article 3.

Mr Ilaşcu was released in May 2001 and it is only from that date onwards that Moldova's responsibility is engaged on account of the acts complained of for failure to discharge its positive obligations (see paragraph 352 above). Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention by Moldova with regard to Mr Ilaşcu.

(b) The other three applicants: conditions of detention and treatment during detention

(i) Mr Ivanţoc

It further considers that the descriptions given by Mr Ivanţoc are sufficiently precise and are corroborated by identical assertions repeatedly made by him to his wife and by the evidence given by other witnesses to the Court's delegates.

In the light of all the information at its disposal, the Court considers that it can take it as established that during the applicant's detention, including that part of it which followed the Convention's entry into force with regard to the respondent States, the applicant received a large number of blows and other ill-treatment, and that at times he was denied food and all forms of medical assistance in spite of his state of health, which had been weakened by these conditions of detention. In particular, the Court draws attention to the persecution and ill-treatment to which Mr Ivanţoc was subjected in May 1999 after lodging his application to the Court (see paragraphs 251-52 above), and in 2001, November 2002 and February 2003 (see paragraphs 254, 256 and 269-72 above).

All these restrictions, which have no legal basis and are imposed at the authorities' discretion, are incompatible with a prison regime in a democratic society. They have played their part in increasing the applicant's distress and mental suffering.

In the Court's opinion, this treatment was inflicted on Mr Ivanţoc intentionally by persons belonging to the administrative authorities of the “MRT” with the aim of punishing him for the acts he had allegedly committed.

Regard being had to the conclusions the Court reached on the question of Moldova's responsibility for the acts complained of on account of its failure to discharge its positive obligations after May 2001 (see paragraph 352 above), Moldova is responsible for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention with regard to Mr Ivanţoc from that date onwards.

(ii) Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa

It further considers that the descriptions given by the witnesses heard, including the applicants and their wives, are sufficiently precise and are corroborated by other evidence in its possession.

The Court emphasises also that these conditions have deteriorated since 2001 (see paragraph 254 above).

In addition, Mr Petrov-Popa has been held in solitary confinement since 1993, having no contact with other prisoners or access to newspapers in his own language (see paragraphs 240, 254 and 255 above).

Both Mr Petrov-Popa and Mr Leşco were denied access to a lawyer until June 2003 (see paragraph 257 above).

Regard being had to the conclusions the Court reached on the question of Moldova's responsibility for the acts complained of on account of its failure to discharge its positive obligations after May 2001 (see paragraph 352 above), Moldova is responsible for the violation of Article 3 of the Convention with regard to Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa from May 2001 onwards.

VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

...”

In the present case, the applicants' conviction had been the result of a flagrant denial of justice, since they had not had a fair trial before the “Supreme Court of the MRT”.

In certain circumstances, a court belonging to the judicial system of an entity not recognised under international law may be regarded as a tribunal “established by law” provided that it forms part of a judicial system operating on a “constitutional and legal basis” reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention, in order to enable individuals to enjoy the Convention guarantees (see, mutatis mutandis, Cyprus v. Turkey, cited above, §§ 231 and 236-37).

In addition, as the purpose of Article 5 is to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see, among other authorities, Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, § 63, ECHR 2002-IV), a “conviction” cannot be the result of a flagrant denial of justice (see, mutatis mutandis, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, judgment of 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240, pp. 34-35, § 110).

The Court also refers to its conclusions under Article 3 of the Convention regarding the nature of the proceedings in the “Supreme Court of the MRT” (see paragraph 436 above).

It follows that there was a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention until May 2001 as regards Mr Ilaşcu, and that there has been and continues to be a violation of that provision as regards the three applicants still being detained.

Taking into account its conclusion above (see paragraph 352) that the responsibility of the Republic of Moldova by virtue of its positive obligations could be engaged from May 2001, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 5 of the Convention by Moldova as regards Mr Ilaşcu. On the other hand, there has been a violation of that provision by Moldova as regards the other three applicants.

VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, ... and his correspondence.

VIII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

As the complaint has not been substantiated, the Court therefore considers that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

IX. ALLEGED FAILURE TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION

“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

They further submitted that the statement by the President of Moldova, Mr Voronin, that Mr Ilaşcu's refusal to withdraw his application had been the cause of the remaining applicants' continued detention (see paragraph 285 above) had been a flagrant interference with their right of individual petition.

Lastly, they submitted that the note from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see paragraph 278 above) had been a serious interference with their right of individual petition.

The expression “any form of pressure” must be taken to cover not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation but also improper indirect acts or contact designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (see Kurt v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, pp. 1192-93, § 160).

Moreover, the question whether contact between the authorities and an applicant constitutes an unacceptable practice from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In that connection, the Court must assess the vulnerability of the complainant and the risk of his being influenced by the authorities (see Akdivar and Others, p. 1219, § 105, and Kurt, pp. 1192-93, § 160, both cited above).

The Court has also had regard to the threats made against the applicants by the Transdniestrian prison authorities and the deterioration in their conditions of detention after their application was lodged. It takes the view that such acts constitute an improper and unacceptable form of pressure which hindered their exercise of the right of individual petition.

In addition, the Court notes with concern the content of the diplomatic note of 19 April 2001 sent by the Russian Federation to the Moldovan authorities (see paragraph 278 above). It appears from that note that the Russian authorities requested that the Republic of Moldova withdraw the observations they had submitted to the Court on 24 October 2000 in so far as these implied responsibility for the alleged violations on the part of the Russian Federation on account of the fact that its troops were stationed in Moldovan territory, in Transdniestria.

Subsequently, at the hearing on 6 June 2001, the Moldovan Government did indeed declare that it wished to withdraw the part of its observations of 24 October 2000 concerning the Russian Federation (see paragraph 360 above).

The Court considers that such conduct on the part of the Government of the Russian Federation represented a negation of the common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and was capable of seriously hindering its examination of an application lodged in exercise of the right of individual petition and thereby interfering with the right guaranteed by Article 34 of the Convention itself.

There has therefore been a breach by the Russian Federation of Article 34 of the Convention.

In the Court's opinion, such remarks by the highest authority of a Contracting State, making an improvement in the applicants' situation depend on withdrawal of the application lodged against that State or another Contracting State, represent direct pressure intended to hinder exercise of the right of individual petition. That conclusion holds good whatever the real or theoretical influence that authority might have on the applicants' situation.

Consequently, Mr Voronin's remarks amount to an interference by the Republic of Moldova with the applicants' exercise of their right of individual petition, in breach of Article 34 of the Convention.

X. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A. Damage

In a letter received by the Court on 12 February 2004, Mr Tănase submitted the new claims of his client, Mr Leşco, updated in order to take account of the period since 2001.

Mr Gribincea did likewise for the other applicants in a letter received by the Court on 24 February 2004.

In particular, the applicants claimed the following sums.

Mr Ilaşcu claimed 1,861 euros (EUR) for loss of salary and other allowances on account of his detention from June 1992 until 28 February 1994, the date on which he was elected to the Moldovan parliament. He said that the allowances he was entitled to as a member of parliament had been paid to his family by the Moldovan Government. Mr Ivanţoc claimed EUR 9,560 for loss of earnings and allowances from his arrest to date. Mr Petrov-Popa claimed EUR 21,510 for loss of income from his arrest to date. Mr Leşco claimed EUR 30,000, that being the value of the flat he had owned in Tiraspol which he had lost following his conviction and his family's departure from Transdniestria.

Mr Ilaşcu, Mr Ivanţoc and Mr Petrov-Popa argued that, as only the Russian Federation controlled Transdniestrian territory, the Russian Federation alone should compensate them for pecuniary damage.

Taking into account the seriousness of the violations complained of, the circumstances of the case, the attitude of the respondent Governments, the lasting effects on their health and the trauma they had suffered, the applicants claimed the following sums for non-pecuniary damage: Mr Ilaşcu, EUR 7,395,000; Mr Ivanţoc, EUR 7,842,000; Mr Petrov-Popa, EUR 7,441,000; and Mr Leşco, EUR 7,800,000.

With regard to the sums claimed for non-pecuniary damage, Mr Ilaşcu, Mr Ivanţoc and Mr Petrov-Popa said that they would be satisfied if the Moldovan Government paid each of them EUR 1,000 and the Russian Federation paid them the remainder.

In short, taking all the heads of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together, the applicants claimed the following sums: Mr Ilaşcu, EUR 7,396,861; Mr Ivanţoc, EUR 7,851,560; Mr Petrov-Popa, EUR 7,462,510; and Mr Leşco, EUR 7,830,000.

The Russian Government said that they could not be held responsible for the alleged violations. Moreover, they contended that the facts the applicants complained of fell outside the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis.

In any event, they considered the sums claimed excessive and unsubstantiated.

It has found that Mr Ilaşcu and Mr Ivanţoc were subjected to treatment which it qualified as torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, that the other two applicants were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3, that all the applicants were detained arbitrarily contrary to Article 5 and that Mr Ivanţoc, Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa are still detained in breach of Article 5.

The Court has also found that Article 34 of the Convention was breached by both the Russian Federation and Moldova.

Consequently, regard being had to the extreme seriousness of the violations of the Convention of which the applicants were victims, and ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards them the following sums, plus any amount that may be chargeable in tax:

(a) to each applicant, EUR 180,000 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage arising from the violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention;

(b) to each applicant, EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage arising from the breach of Article 34 by the Russian Federation and Moldova.

Regard being had to the grounds on which they have been found by the Court to be in violation of the Convention (see paragraphs 352 and 393 above), the respondent States must take every measure to put an end to the arbitrary detention of the applicants still detained and to secure their immediate release.

B. Costs and expenses

As appears from the contract between Mr Leşco's wife and his lawyer, Mr Leşco claimed in addition EUR 200 per month for work by his counsel, making a total of EUR 11,800. That sum represents his counsel's work and expenses since June 1999, when the application was lodged, a period of fifty-nine months, the main items being drafting the application, documentary searches, drafting observations requested by the Court, preparation for the Court's fact-finding mission, studying the records of the hearings before the Court's delegates, communication costs (faxes, telephone bills, normal and urgent mail), translation costs and expenses for visits to the applicants in prison.

The Court notes that the present case gave rise to several series of written observations, an adversarial hearing and the hearing to take witness evidence on the spot, which lasted seven days.

The evidence submitted to the Court shows that the applicants' representatives, Mr Dinu, Mr Tănase and Mr Gribincea, incurred costs and expenses relating to the matters found to constitute the violations.

Ruling on an equitable basis and taking account of the work reasonably necessary to produce the large volume of documents and observations filed on the applicants' behalf, the Court awards the applicants the overall sum of EUR 21,000, less the EUR 3,964 already paid in legal aid by the Council of Europe. This amounts to EUR 4,363 for Mr Dinu's fees and secretarial costs, EUR 3,960 for Mr Gribincea's fees and costs, and EUR 8,713 for Mr Tănase's fees and costs.

C. Default interest

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

(a) to Mr Ivanţoc, Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa, EUR 60,000 (sixty thousand euros) each in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;

(b) to each applicant, EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained on account of the breach of Article 34;

(c) to the applicants, the overall sum of EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), less EUR 1,321.34 (one thousand three hundred and twenty-one euros thirty-four cents) already received in legal aid, in respect of costs and expenses, made up of EUR 1,454.33 (one thousand four hundred and fifty-four euros thirty-three cents) for Mr Dinu, EUR 1,320 (one thousand three hundred and twenty euros) for Mr Gribincea and EUR 2,904.33 (two thousand nine hundred and four euros thirty-three cents) for Mr Tănase;

(a) to Mr Ilaşcu, EUR 180,000 (one hundred and eighty thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;

(b) to each of the other applicants, EUR 120,000 (one hundred and twenty thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage;

(c) to each applicant, EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained on account of the breach of Article 34;

(d) to the applicants, the overall sum of EUR 14,000 (fourteen thousand euros), less EUR 2,642.66 (two thousand six hundred and forty-two euros sixty-six cents) already received in legal aid, in respect of costs and expenses, made up of EUR 2,908.67 (two thousand nine hundred and eight euros sixty-seven cents) for Mr Dinu, EUR 2,640 (two thousand six hundred and forty euros) for Mr Gribincea and EUR 5,808.67 (five thousand eight hundred and eight euros sixty-seven cents) for Mr Tănase;

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 8 July 2004.

Luzius Wildhaber

President

Paul Mahoney

Registrar

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:

(a) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Casadevall joined by Mr Ress, Mr Bîrsan, Mrs Tulkens and Mrs Fura-Sandström;

(b) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Ress;

(c) partly dissenting opinion of Sir Nicolas Bratza joined by Mr Rozakis, Mr Hedigan, Mrs Thomassen and Mr Panţîru;

(d) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Loucaides;

(e) dissenting opinion of Mr Kovler. L.W.

P.J.M.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION

OF JUDGE CASADEVALL JOINED BY JUDGES RESS, BÎRSAN, TULKENS AND FURA-SANDSTRÖM

(Translation)

That view led to the finding, a paradoxical and incoherent one in my opinion, that Moldova breached Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention on account of the ill-treatment, detention and conditions of detention suffered by Mr Ivanţoc, Mr Leşco and Mr Petrov-Popa (only after May 2001), but bore no responsibility for the same facts and above all for the death sentence imposed by the “Supreme Court of the MRT” and the risk of execution as regards Mr Ilaşcu.

As the applicants come within the jurisdiction of Moldova (see paragraph 335 of the judgment), its responsibility is engaged, in my opinion, from the date of its ratification of the Convention to the present and with regard to all the applicants, there being no justification, quite the reverse in fact, for taking the view that its positive obligations did not exist during the period from 12 September 1997 to May 2001, as the majority did. I have set out the reasons why I disagree below.

On the other hand, express or de facto measures of cooperation were taken between the Moldovan authorities and the Transdniestrian separatists: administrative, economic and political agreements were reached, relations were established between the Moldovan parliament and the “parliament of the MRT”, cooperation was introduced for several years in the police, prison and security fields, and other forms of participation were developed in fields such as the issuing of identity papers, air-traffic control, telephone links and sport (see paragraphs 114, 174-75, 177-79 and 185 of the judgment).

As regards the nature and effectiveness of the measures taken or those which could have been taken, certain facts may be more significant than others on account of their consequences. In that connection, having regard to Mr Ilaşcu's release in May 2001, it may be presumed that not all the measures envisaged to obtain the applicants' release could be considered doomed to failure, as the majority seem to admit in the second part of paragraph 347 of the judgment.

(a) On 28 December 1993 an investigation was opened in connection with the persons involved in the applicants' prosecution and conviction, but the absence of information on the measures taken by the authorities to bring this investigation to a satisfactory conclusion could give rise to serious doubts about its effectiveness (see paragraph 221 of the judgment).

(b) The Moldovan Supreme Court's judgment of 3 February 1994 quashing the judgment of the “Supreme Court of the MRT” of 9 December 1993 and ordering the return of the case file to the prosecution service for a new investigation was never acted upon (see paragraph 222 of the judgment).

(c) No steps were taken after the amnesty declared on 4 August 1995 by the Moldovan President. Similarly, the Court has not been informed of any action undertaken by the Moldovan Government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the applicants' behalf, notwithstanding the parliament's request to that effect on 3 October 1995 (see paragraph 227 of the judgment).

(d) On 16 August 2000 the order of 28 December 1993 was declared void by the public prosecutor on the ground that the offences had not been given the correct legal classification. The same decision framed new charges but it was held to be inadvisable to open an investigation on the basis of those charges because prosecution was time-barred. One can only express doubts about the seriousness of proceedings in which the authorities waited for seven years before reclassifying the offences under investigation only to decide in the end that prosecution on the new charges was subject to limitation. Without being able to form a view on the question whether Moldovan law authorises limitation in respect of offences which are the subject of a pending criminal investigation, I must point out that in the present case limitation became possible precisely because of the length of an investigation which had in addition proved to be ineffectual (see paragraph 229 of the judgment).

(e) The opening by the public prosecutor on 16 August 2000 of a criminal investigation in respect of the governor of Hlinaia Prison was not followed up and in any case the governor told the Court's delegates that he had not been informed of it (see paragraph 230 of the judgment and paragraph 137 of the Annex).

(f) As a result of the staying or discontinuance of the above-mentioned investigations, it is now possible for certain senior officials of the “MRT” regime, including Mr Chevtsov, to enter Moldova without being called to account in any real sense for their activities in the regime's service (see Annex: Mr Ilaşcu, § 21; and Mr Rusu, § 304). Moreover, I note, with no small surprise, that since his return to Moldova a former “Minister of Justice of the MRT”, Mr Sidorov, has held high State office in several capacities and has been the President of the Moldovan parliament's Human Rights and Minorities Committee since 2001 (see paragraph 168 of the judgment).

The fateful date “May 2001” seems wholly artificial and nonsensical.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RESS

As the Court has rightly stated, this obligation to re-establish control over Transdniestria required Moldova, firstly, to refrain from supporting the separate regime of the “MRT” in particular after 1997 and, secondly, to act by taking all the political, judicial and other measures at its disposal, especially regarding the applicants' situation and any further violations of the Convention in relation to them. The Court itself notes that there was a “reduction in the number of judicial measures intended to assert Moldovan authority in Transdniestria” (see paragraph 344 of the judgment). I fully agree with the analysis of Judge Casadevall that there is nothing to justify the conclusion that Moldova discharged its positive obligations before Mr Ilaşcu's release in May 2001, but that since this release there have been fewer significant signs, if any, of effective measures which the Moldovan Government could have taken to secure to the applicants their rights under the Convention.

It is obvious that there were different “phases” of more or less effective political and judicial efforts to re-establish Moldova's authority over the Transdniestrian territory and to bring an end to the situation of violations of Convention rights in relation to the applicants. After the “MRT” was set up in 1991-92 with the support of the Russian Federation, it remained all the time under the effective authority or at least under the decisive influence of the Russian Federation and survived thanks to the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian Federation (see paragraph 392 of the judgment). Under these circumstances, it was an elementary duty of the Moldovan authorities to discharge their positive obligations by addressing the applicants' fate continuously and specifically in their bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. This lack of diplomatic efforts and arguments regarding the Russian Federation's alleged violations was obvious after May 2001, but also in my view – as the Court has stated itself – after 1997 (see paragraph 349). The Russian Federation, acting as a guarantor State, was the one to which Moldova, in the framework of its positive obligations, should have addressed itself intensively, by pointing to the responsibility of Russia under the Convention. I cannot see any dividing line between the time of ratification in 1997 and the present, whether in May 2001 or at any other time.

The most crucial question is what measures the Court should indicate as being absolutely necessary for the fulfilment of that positive obligation. In my view, in order not to be held tacitly to acquiesce in the acts of the rebel authority, the State has to

(a) continue its firm protests at bilateral and international levels against the illegal exercise of authority on its territory;

(b) continue to take all possible and legally acceptable measures to regain full control on its territory;

(c) continue to seek support, bilaterally and internationally, in particular through international organisations, for all measures taken against the illegal regime, since the Contracting States are required to secure human rights protection throughout their territory; and

(d) refrain from lending such support to the rebel regime as could be interpreted as clear acquiescence in its exercise of authority. Questions about the efficacy of stricter measures like an economic blockade, for example, to ensure the protection of human rights in the short term, or the usefulness of economic, cultural and other cooperation to resolve the situation, are matters of political evaluation and diplomacy, to which the Court has cautiously tried to avoid giving an answer.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION

OF JUDGE Sir Nicolas BRATZA JOINED BY JUDGES ROZAKIS, HEDIGAN, THOMASSEN AND PANŢÎRU

A. Applicable principles

(i) where as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – a State exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. Such control may be exercised directly, through its own armed forces, or indirectly, through a subordinate local administration (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), pp. 23-24, § 62). Where a State exercises effective overall control of a territory, its responsibility cannot be confined to the acts of its own soldiers or officials – whether or not those acts are authorised by the high authorities of the State – “but must also be engaged by virtue of the acts of the local administration which survives by virtue of [the] military and other support” (see Cyprus v. Turkey, § 77). Further, when such effective control is found to exist, responsibility is engaged even if no detailed control is exercised over the policies and actions of the local administration (see Loizidou (merits), pp. 2235-36, § 56);

(ii) where a State, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of the territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that government (see Banković and Others, § 71).

I am unable to accept that in such a situation a State's responsibility for a violation of the Convention rights of individuals within the territory may be engaged merely because of a failure on its part to establish that it had made sufficient efforts on the legal or diplomatic plane to guarantee those rights. In the specific context of the present case, the responsibility of a State in respect of the wrongful detention of persons detained within territory outside its effective control cannot in my view depend on whether at any particular point of time the State is, in the estimation of the Court, making sufficiently concerted efforts to secure their release. Nor can I accept an interpretation of the Convention which would require the Court to make an assessment, in a complex and fluctuating international situation, as to whether particular legal or diplomatic measures would be effective to restore constitutional rule within the territory, whether such measures were in practice possible and whether they were adequately implemented by the State concerned.

B. Application of the above principles in the present case

(i) During the conflict in 1991-92, forces of the 14th Army (after 1 April 1992, the Russian Operational Group – ROG) stationed in Transdniestria fought with and on behalf of the separatist forces within the territory and voluntarily transferred to them, or allowed to be seized by them, large quantities of armaments.

(ii) Throughout the conflict, the leaders of the Russian Federation provided political support to the Transdniestrian separatists, inter alia, through their public declarations.

(iii) The applicants were arrested in June 1992 with the direct participation of soldiers of the 14th Army/ROG; the first three applicants were detained in the garrison headquarters of the 14th Army/ROG where they were severely ill-treated; and the applicants were subsequently surrendered by the army authorities into the charge of the separatist police in the knowledge of the offences of which they were suspected and the likely consequences for the applicants of their surrender to the illegal and unconstitutional regime.

(iv) Following the ceasefire agreement of 21 July 1992, the Russian Federation continued to provide military, political and economic support to the separatist regime within the territory and thereby ensured its continued survival.

(v) In the period after ratification of the Convention, the Russian Federation, through its continued stationing of troops on Moldovan territory in breach of its undertaking to withdraw, combined with its economic, financial and political support for the illegal Transdniestrian regime which it had helped to establish, has continued to enable the regime to survive and to exercise authority and control within the territory.

2. Moldova

During the course of the hostilities themselves, the constitutional authorities of Moldova, confronted as they were by forces which were superior in numbers, weaponry and fighting strength, were incapable of re-establishing control over the Transdniestrian territory. Moreover, as is noted in the judgment, from the outset of hostilities the Moldovan authorities not only rejected the separatists' unilateral declaration of independence but publicly complained of the aggression against Moldova, calling for international support. Even after armed hostilities had ceased, the Moldovan authorities had no practical possibility of re-establishing constitutional rule within the territory, being confronted by a regime which was supported militarily, politically and economically by the Russian Federation. There is nothing to suggest any acquiescence on the part of those authorities in the control exercised within the territory by the unlawful separatist administration; on the contrary, as the evidence shows and as the judgment points out, the authorities continued to denounce the regime and to assert their sovereignty over the territory both internally and internationally. Thus, for example, in 1994 Moldova adopted a new Constitution which provided, inter alia, for the possibility of granting a certain degree of autonomy to Transdniestria; in the same year, Moldova signed with the Russian Federation an agreement for the total withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory within a three-year period.

(a) Responsibility from September 1997

(a) an alleged reduction in the number of attempts by Moldova to assert control in Transdniestria and the limiting of those attempts to diplomatic activity;

(b) the development of administrative, economic, political, security and other cooperation between the Moldovan and Transdniestrian authorities; and

(c) a reduction in the measures taken and efforts made by Moldova to secure the applicants' rights. It is convenient to address in turn each of these factors, none of which in my view, seen either individually or collectively, is such as to justify a finding of State responsibility on the part of Moldova.

(b) Responsibility after May 2001

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES

I would first like to reiterate the view which I expressed in Assanidze v. Georgia ([GC] no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II) as regards the notion of “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, dealt with in paragraphs 310 to 314 and 319 of the judgment in the present case.

“To my mind 'jurisdiction' means actual authority, that is to say the possibility of imposing the will of the State on any person, whether exercised within the territory of the High Contracting Party or outside that territory. Therefore, a High Contracting Party is accountable under the Convention to everyone directly affected by any exercise of authority by such Party in any part of the world. Such authority may take different forms and may be legal or illegal. The usual form is governmental authority within a High Contracting Party's own territory, but it may extend to authority in the form of overall control of another territory even though that control is illegal (see Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310), notably occupied territories (see Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV). It may also extend to authority in the form of the exercise of domination or effective influence through political, financial, military or other substantial support of a government of another State. And it may, in my opinion, take the form of any kind of military or other State action on the part of the High Contracting Party concerned in any part of the world (see, by way of contrast, Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, cited in the judgment).

The test should always be whether the person who claims to be within the 'jurisdiction' of a High Contracting Party to the Convention, in respect of a particular act, can show that the act in question was the result of the exercise of authority by the State concerned. Any other interpretation excluding responsibility of a High Contracting Party for acts resulting from the exercise of its State authority would lead to the absurd proposition that the Convention lays down obligations to respect human rights only within the territory under the lawful or unlawful physical control of such Party and that outside that context, leaving aside certain exceptional circumstances (the existence of which would be decided on a case-by-case basis), the State Party concerned may act with impunity contrary to the standards of behaviour set out in the Convention. I believe that a reasonable interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in the light of its object must lead to the conclusion that the Convention provides a code of behaviour for all High Contracting Parties whenever they act in exercise of their State authority with consequences for individuals.”

I wish to expand on my aforesaid position by adding that a State may also be accountable under the Convention for failure to discharge its positive obligations in respect of any person if it was in a position to exercise its authority directly or even indirectly over that person or over the territory where that person is.

In the light of the above and the facts and circumstances of the case as set out in the judgment, I agree with the majority that the applicants come within the “jurisdiction” of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 and that its responsibility is engaged with regard to the acts complained of. As rightly pointed out in the judgment, it has been proved “that the 'MRT', set up in 1991-92 with the support of the Russian Federation, vested with organs of power and its own administration, remains under the effective authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence, of the Russian Federation, and in any event that it survives thanks to the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian Federation” (paragraph 392 of the judgment).

However I disagree with the majority that the applicants come under the “jurisdiction” of Moldova and that it is responsible for failure to discharge its positive obligations to take sufficient effective and appropriate measures to secure the applicants' Convention rights. There is nothing to show that Moldova actually had any direct or indirect authority over the territory where the applicants were detained or over the applicants themselves. Moldova was in no way responsible for the illegal detention of the applicants or for the continuation of such detention. There is nothing to show that Moldova acquiesced in or encouraged the existence of the illegal regime which at all material times (with the support of Russia as already explained) exercised actual authority in the area where the violations occurred and where the applicants were detained.

None of the factors set out by the majority in support of their conclusion that Moldova had jurisdiction over the applicants could possibly, in my opinion, be considered as amounting to an exercise or avoidance of exercising effective authority in respect of the applicants. In this respect I also associate myself with the approach of Sir Nicolas Bratza as set out in paragraphs 15 to 26 of his partly dissenting opinion.

In any case, to conclude that there is “jurisdiction” over certain persons for the purposes of the Convention simply because the government concerned has failed to take judicial, political, diplomatic and economic measures or any other of the measures cited by the majority, with the object of securing the Convention rights of the applicants even though actual authority over these persons on the part of the government was lacking, would be stretching the concept of “jurisdiction” to an unrealistic and absurd extent. In other words it would, in my opinion, be a fallacy to accept that a High Contracting Party to the Convention has “jurisdiction” over any person outside its authority simply because it does not take the political or other measures mentioned in general terms by the majority. Such a position would in my view lead, for instance, to the illogical conclusion that all High Contracting Parties to the Convention would have jurisdiction and responsibility for violations of the human rights of persons in any territory of a High Contracting Party, including their own, but outside their actual authority (either de facto or de jure or both depending on the territory), merely by virtue of not pressing to secure the Convention rights in that territory through action against the State which does in reality exercise such authority over these persons. I believe that the interpretation of a treaty should avoid a meaning which leads to a result which is manifestly absurd.

In the Banković and Others decision (with which I personally disagree), the Grand Chamber of the Court found that the bombing of buildings in Belgrade resulting in the killing of sixteen civilians was an extraterritorial act outside the “jurisdiction” of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention responsible for such bombing and for that reason the relevant complaint of the relatives of the deceased was dismissed as inadmissible. It seems to me incomprehensible and certainly very odd for a High Contracting Party to escape responsibility under the Convention on the ground that the throwing of bombs from its aeroplanes over an inhabited area in any part of the world does not bring the victims of such bombing within its “jurisdiction” (that is to say, authority) while a failure on the part of such Party “to take all the measures in [its] power whether political diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures ... to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention to those formally [de jure] within its jurisdiction” but in actual fact outside its effective authority ascribes jurisdiction to that State and imposes on it positive duties towards them.

At all events, I believe that the authorities of Moldova have in fact done everything that could reasonably be expected from them in the particular circumstances of this case. It would be unrealistic and unfair to attribute to them any responsibility for the situation complained of by the applicants.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOVLER

(Translation)

“The frontier between the judicial and the political is not what it was. Nor are the foundations of legitimacy, still less normativeness, which is becoming plural and increasingly diffuse.” (A. Lajoie, Jugements de valeurs, Paris, PUF, 1997, p. 207)

I regret that I do not find myself among the majority and that, while I respect my colleagues' opinions, I have to express publicly, by virtue of Article 45 § 2 of the Convention, my deep disagreement with the Grand Chamber's judgment in the present case.

My disagreement concerns the methodology of the analysis, the way the facts are presented, the analysis of the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “responsibility”, and lastly the conclusions the Court has reached. I am therefore obliged to spend some time on each of those points.

I. Methodology of the analysis

This case provides an example of a situation in which “human rights become a policy” (M. Gauchet, La démocratie contre elle-même, Paris, 2002, p. 326). In view of the particular nature of the case, in which the applicants' situation is indissociable from an extremely complex geopolitical context, the Court finds itself in new territory, given the lack of applicable case-law. The Court's judgment in this case could have set a precedent for similar situations in other zones of conflict within the member States of the Council of Europe, including those which have joined recently. The historical roots of the conflict in which the countries of the region were involved and the “fragmenting-empire” effect are features which bring to mind conflicts such as the not-so-very distant Balkans or Caucasus have seen.

However, the Court (wrongly in my opinion) preferred to see the situation in terms of a Cyprus-type conflict, following its corresponding case-law and falling into the trap that that case-law represented. To my mind that was a methodological error. The superficial similarities between the present case and Loizidou are deceptive. The only point in common (to which I will return) is the source of the conflict, namely the prospect for a sizeable community of being attached to another country from which it is radically differentiated by its historical, economic and cultural ties. Hence the reactions and counter-reactions of the participants in the conflict, which took violent forms and led to human tragedies.

However, even this Loizidou case-law has many lessons to teach us in that it can help us avoid hasty and simplistic conclusions. In his dissenting opinion in Loizidou, Judge Bernhardt, joined by Judge Lopes Rocha, pointed out: “[In] the present case ... it is impossible to separate the situation of the individual from a complex historical development and a no less complex current situation” (Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2242). Noting the failure of the negotiations aimed at the reunification of Cyprus, which had caused the applicant's situation to drag on, he asked: “Who is responsible for this failure? Only one side? Is it possible to give a clear answer to this and several other questions and to draw a clear legal conclusion?” (ibid.).

In another dissenting opinion in the same case, Judge Pettiti observed: “Whatever the responsibility assumed in 1974 at the time of the coup d'état, or those that arose with the arrival of the Turkish troops in the same year, however hesitant the international community has been in attempting to solve the international problems over Cyprus since 1974, ..., those responsibilities being of various origins and types, the whole problem of the two communities (which are not national minorities as that term is understood in international law) has more to do with politics and diplomacy than with European judicial scrutiny based on the isolated case of Mrs Loizidou and her rights under Protocol No. 1” (see Loizidou, cited above, pp. 2253‑54). The caution and wisdom of those words is entirely justified.

Unfortunately, in the present case the Court took the risk of examining on the basis of the isolated situation of the four applicants (since, unlike the position in Cyprus, no system for the reproduction of similar cases has come to light) a nexus of different problems: military (the judgment contains an analysis of the military aspects of the Transdniestrian conflict and a detailed calculation of weapons stocks worthy of headquarters staff), economic (assessment of the relations between partners who have been operating for decades in the same economic space), political (hard-to-verify quotations from “undated” statements by political leaders and military personnel). Admittedly, the Court was overwhelmed by the huge volume of contradictory information from the applicants, the three States who were involved in the proceedings and its own on-the-spot fact-finding mission; it performed an enormous and highly creditable task of selection. But the strictly legal questions (for example, what legal classification to give to the right of peoples to self-determination, within limits, or the first applicant's repeated calls to violence before he was arrested) have gone unanswered. In my opinion, that was a second methodological error, which led to a series of further errors.

II. Presentation of the facts

In such a complex and “sensitive” case as this, the detailed and objective presentation of the circumstances of the case plays a crucial role, since it determines how the case is to be prejudged, in the positive sense of that term. In my view, the general context of the case is presented summarily in a way that distorts the facts considerably. It is the point of view imposed by the applicants, for purposes that can be readily understood, which dominates. I can only single out a few facts, and the way they have been interpreted, which give false images of the true position.

The crucial difficulty in establishing the general context of the case is identification of the origins and main problems of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict. In fairly complicated and tricky cases such as Gorzelik and Others v. Poland ([GC], no. 44158/98, ECHR 2004-I) and Assanidze v. Georgia ([GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II), the Grand Chamber went back as far as the fourteenth century in order to analyse the Silesian problem (Gorzelik, § 13) and even the eleventh century to shed light on the status of Ajaria within Georgia (Assanidze, §§ 100-07). In the present case, what is left unsaid is more eloquent than what is said: a snapshot of the removal of part of Bessarabia from Romania on 28 June 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and of the transfer from Ukraine of “a strip of land on the left bank of the Dniester” in order to form Soviet Moldavia gives the impression that the history of this multi-ethnic region begins there (see paragraph 28 of the judgment) – all of this being in the form of a reference (and a very selective one, it has to be said) to an OSCE document. But the document cited, like any other historical overview, gives a more complete idea of the history of the region, which I recapitulate briefly below.

The Principality of Moldavia, which was created in 1360 after being detached from Hungary, fell in 1456 under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted for several centuries. In 1711 Prince (gospodar) Dmitri Kantemir (whose son, Antiokh, incidentally, was to become an eminent Russian writer and serve as Russian Ambassador in London and Paris) came to an agreement with Peter the Great concerning the protection of Moldavia, and it was in 1791 through the treaty signed following the war between Turkey and the Russo-Austrian coalition (whose forces were led by A. Suvorov) that Russia obtained control of the left bank of the Dniester, where a high proportion of the population were Slavs. In 1812, following a renewed outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, the Treaty of Bucharest incorporated in the Russian Empire the eastern part of Moldavia between the Prut and the Dniester under the name of Bessarabia. The southern part of Bessarabia is inhabited by Bulgarians and Gagauz (a Turkish-speaking Christian people). After the Crimean War (1854-56), Russia, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris (1856), ceded part of Bessarabia to the victor States. This territory was included in the Kingdom of Romania (created in 1859), but by the Treaty of Berlin (1878) Bessarabia was returned to Russia and Romania obtained Dobruja in compensation. In January 1918 Romania occupied Bessarabia and secured a vote from the local assembly in favour of its attachment to the Kingdom. At the same time, the Directory of Ukraine (at that time independent) proclaimed its sovereignty over the left bank of the Dniester (48% of the population at that time being Ukrainians, 30% Moldavians, 9% Russians and 8.5% Jews), and in 1924 a Moldavian autonomous republic was created there. After 1924 the USSR compelled Romania to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia (negotiations in Vienna), before occupying Bessarabia on 28 June 1940. That is the controversial history of the region which since 1940 has formed a Moldavian entity whose two halves each have their own historical, economic, cultural and linguistic particularities. Those particularities have not escaped the attention of informed observers: “Transdniestria, the majority of whose population is made up of Russians and Ukrainians, has always felt close to Russia, of which it was part for two centuries. When the USSR broke up, Transdniestria rejected the first independent Moldovan government's policy of union with Romania” (Libération, Paris, 1 August 2002).

As regards language and script, I do not wish to speculate on a very delicate problem and regret that the Court gives a rather simplistic account of the subject (see paragraph 28 of the judgment), and that brings me to two quotations. “The first known text in Romanian dates from 1521: it is a letter written by the boyar Neaşcu to the mayor of Braşov ... These texts, translated from Slavonic (the liturgical language of Orthodox Slavs but also of Romanians), were written in Cyrillic script. ... It was not until the nineteenth century however that the modern Romanian language was finally established, strongly influenced by French – a process some have referred to as 're-latinisation'. It was also at that time that use of the Latin alphabet took the place of Cyrillic” (source: Atlas des peuples de l'Europe Centrale, Paris, La Découverte, 2002, p. 137). As for the languages used, the 1978 Constitution of Soviet Moldavia enshrined “equal rights, including the right to use the national language” (Article 34) and “schooling in the national language” (Article 43) and provided: “statutes and other legislation ... shall be published in Moldavian and Russian” (Article 103) and “justice shall be administered either in Moldavian and Russian, or in the language of the majority of the population of the region” (Article 158).

I have added these historical digressions in order to reiterate the Court's position as expressed in the following dictum: “The Court considers that it should as far as possible refrain from expressing a view on purely historical questions, which it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate; however, it can accept certain historical facts which are a matter of common knowledge and base its reasoning on them” (see Ždanoka v. Latvia, no. 58278/70, § 77, 17 June 2004; see also Marais v. France, no. 31159/96, Commission decision of 24 June 1996, Decisions and Reports 86-A, p. 184, and Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX). But it turns out that the “historical facts” are considerably distorted in our judgment, and as a result, to my great regret, some of the reasoning is too.

Paragraphs 30 to 41 mention in no particular order the build-up to and development of the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict, stressing the military aspects, as if the major problem was the 14th Army and the equipment of DOSAAF (which, incidentally, was not a State body under the legislation in force). As a national judge I wish to point out that the break-up of the USSR in 1988-91 affected not only the fifteen Soviet Republics which proclaimed their sovereignty one after another (often referred to as the “parade of sovereignties”), but also territories within certain multinational republics such as Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya and so on. Moldova did not avoid this general movement, especially as the Moldovan Popular Front had proclaimed as its aim the union of Moldova in its entirety with Romania, the laws on language and the new flag mentioned in paragraph 29 being only the first step. Gagauzia, a Turkish-speaking region, proclaimed its sovereignty first, on 18 August 1990, followed by Transdniestria on 2 September 1990. This was not, in my opinion, the result of “resistance to Moldovan independence” (see paragraph 43 of the judgment), but rather resistance to the policy of refusing the right to self-determination. Let us not forget (and this is another of the things left unsaid in the judgment) that the first operation by the special forces of the Moldovan police, launched against “separatists” in Dubăsari on 12 June 1990, preceded the above proclamations, and therefore prompted them.

It is in that situation, in my opinion, that the Court should have sought the roots of the conflict, which had direct repercussions on the fate of the four applicants, rather than just in the declaration of 2 September 1990 concerning the creation of the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”, as paragraphs 30 to 34 of the judgment suggest.

Legally speaking, the declarations mentioned did not mean at that tumultuous time a declaration of separation (as evidenced by the presence of the word “Moldavian” in the title of the “MRT”), but a declaration of the desire to obtain greater autonomy, including the right to a referendum on continued allegiance to the State entity in the event of that entity proclaiming its union with a foreign State, a prospect which was perceived as a real danger. “The emergence in 1990 of the first autonomist movements, followed in August 1991 by the proclamation of independence, encouraged the adoption between Kishinev (Chişinău) and Bucharest of a plan for the integration of Moldova into Romania or its annexation. But that plan, which the Moldovans initially found attractive, was abandoned when, on 6 March 1994, in a referendum, to Bucharest's great displeasure, 95.4% of Moldovan electors voted against attachment to Romania. But, hostile to the idea of the Republic's independence, and even more so to the possibility of its attachment to Romania, the Slav populations living for the most part in Transdniestria, a 5,000 km² territory to the east of the Dniester, proclaimed their autonomy”, wrote Jean-Christophe Romer, a professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes européennes and the Ecole Spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr (J.-Ch.Romer, Géopolitique de la Russie, Paris, Economica, 1999, p. 63).

I would add to the above analysis that in February 1992 the 2nd Congress of the Moldovan Popular Front proclaimed Moldova, including the region of Transdniestria, an integral part of Romania, and that it was in March 1992 that the hostilities between the special police forces and the “separatists” began. On 19 June 1992 – a black day – came the beginning of the operation of the Moldovan special forces in Bender. The result: 416 deaths among the civilian population. It was only on 29 July 1992 that the first detachments of the Russian peacekeeping forces entered Tiraspol in accordance with the Russo-Moldovan agreement of 21 July 1992. I could continue to reconstruct the course of events, but I will stop there. I merely observe that the section on the “general background to the case” in the text of the judgment makes up for the absence of certain important facts by abundant quotations from political declarations reflecting a single approach to interpretation of the events. It is therefore not easy to find out where the truth lies. Once again, I deplore that fact.

I further regret that the Court did not take into consideration the fact that the events of 1992 (“pacification” operation by the central authorities, armed resistance by the rebels, transitional period just after the break-up of the USSR, etc.) constituted in reality a case of force majeure in which all the parties involved directly or indirectly in the conflict, including the 14th Army, took part.

I am also tempted to give my more finely shaded version of the armed conflict in 1991-92, as I think that the really abnormal size of this part of the judgment (see paragraphs 42-110), the sole aim of which is manifestly to demonstrate Russia's participation in the conflict and its military support to the separatists, is the result of the methodological error mentioned above. Even in the inter-State case of Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court was much more “economical” with this type of analysis, concentrating on the legal problems.

However, although I do not wish to make this text more cumbersome, I cannot ignore the “Cossack question”. The judgment repeats an assertion made by the applicants that “in 1988 there [were] no Cossacks in Moldovan territory” (see paragraph 60). I would just like to point out that as early as 1571-74 the Ukrainian Cossacks took part in a war of liberation to free the Moldavians from Ottoman domination and that free Cossacks had been living in Moldavia, Podolia and Zaporozhia for centuries (see, among other sources, Ph.Longworth, The Cossacks, London, 1969). The Cossacks were victims of Stalinist terror, but were rehabilitated by the Russian parliament's decree of 16 June 1992 as part of the rehabilitation of the peoples which had fallen victim to repression. It was only on 9 August 1995 that the President of the Russian Federation signed the Ordinance on the register of Cossack associations and on 16 April 1996 the Ordinance on civil and military service by Cossacks. Freedom of movement and the paramilitary nature of their organisation are well-known features of Cossack life. It may be said that these are merely details, but the devil is in the detail.

There are quite a few of these details in the text, including “undated” statements by the Russian Vice-President (see paragraph 137 of the judgment), an “undated” television appearance by the Russian President (paragraph 138), a television interview broadcast “on an unspecified date” (paragraph 145), and so on, notwithstanding the position stated by the Court in the following terms in paragraph 26: “In assessing both written and oral evidence, the Court has hitherto generally applied 'beyond a reasonable doubt' as the standard of proof required.” I am astonished that, contrary to the clarifying information supplied to the Court, paragraph 141 of the judgment reproduces (“takes as established”!) false information to the effect that Russia organised the election of 17 March 2004 “without the agreement of the Moldovan authorities”. The Russian Federation's electoral legislation provides for polling by Russian citizens abroad in ad hoc polling stations (and therefore not always in “fixed consular posts, operating as polling stations”) only with the agreement of the authorities of the State in question. I regret that the Court, whose judgments are studied everywhere in the minutest detail, has in many places failed to apply the criterion formulated in paragraph 26.

It is also a pity that in setting out the general background to the case the Court has not always followed the principle it established itself in Ireland v. the United Kingdom as follows: “In the cases referred to it, the Court examines all the material before it, whether originating from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material proprio motu” (judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64, § 160).

For example, I regret that the Court has carefully avoided making any mention in its judgment of the activities of the “Bujor” group and the applicants before their arrest (except in paragraph 216, referring to the judgment of 9 December 1993). But the documents supplied to the Court are eloquent on that point. In an interview which appeared in the Leningrad periodical Smena on 6 December 1990, Mr Ilaşcu gave details of the notorious “Directive no. 6”. “We have two blacklists”, he said. “In the first there are 23 names, the whole of the leadership of the so-called Republic of Transdniestria. In the second there are 480, the members of their Second Congress. Serious preparations have been made for their physical liquidation.” The conclusion was: “We have politicians who must always remain clean, but someone has to do the dirty work.” From statements of the type “we are capable of organising a huge bloodbath” to concrete acts was only a short step. The names of the victims of those acts are known, as are the names of their widows and orphans. It is not by chance that the eminent specialists mentioned in paragraph 286 of the judgment proposed that the applicants should be retried in a neutral country, as did the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in fact, who did not exclude “a possible new trial of Mr Ilie Ilaşcu in a neutral place” (SG/Inf(2000) 53, 19 January 2001). What is the point of all the United Nations resolutions on the prevention of terrorism? Unfortunately the Court has given no reply to these questions, but it refused the request of one of the widows, Mrs Ludmila Gusar, to give evidence to the Court (see paragraph 8 of the judgment).

III. Analysis of the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “responsibility”

But I regret even more deeply the fact that an opportunity has been missed to apply to a situation not hitherto considered a finer analysis of the concepts of “jurisdiction” and “responsibility”. Not claiming to be entitled to the last word as custodian of the truth, I would nevertheless like to explain how I see the problem.

My initial position, which I expressed in the vote on admissibility on 4 July 2001 (and which I still hold), was that the Court should declare the application inadmissible ratione loci and ratione personae as regards Russia, while recognising Moldova's jurisdiction over Transdniestria, but at the same time noting that it did not have de facto control over the region, at least at the time when the applicants were arrested.

The Court could have gone on from such findings to reach the finding of a “legal vacuum” or “lawless area” to which the Convention provisions are inapplicable de facto. That idea is neither absurd nor new. The “motion for a recommendation” entitled “Lawless areas within the territory of Council of Europe member States” presented by Mr Magnusson, a Swedish member of the Parliamentary Assembly (backed by a number of his colleagues), included the following passage:

“The Assembly feels compelled to admit, however, that there are a number of areas within the territory of certain member States where the European Convention on Human Rights and other human rights protection instruments do not apply in practice.

This has become clear firstly from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, some of whose judgments have not been executed; examples are the Loizidou v. Turkey case, concerning the northern part of Cyprus, and the Matthews v. the United Kingdom case, concerning Gibraltar.

In addition, 'lawless' areas have developed in separatist regions such as Chechnya, Transnistria, Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh.”

In a sense, the territorial reservation made by Moldova on ratifying the Convention pleads in favour of recognising the existence of a “legal vacuum” in the region, a kind of “black hole” in the European legal area, especially as such a finding could be accompanied by recognition that Moldova does not have de facto control over the territory concerned. I am pleased to be a member of the majority on that point at least, namely that Moldova has jurisdiction, even if only in the limited terms of “jurisdiction ... as regards its positive obligations” (point 1 of the operative provisions).

Nevertheless, I consider that the preponderance of the territorial principle, where “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention is concerned, applies fully to Moldova, its responsibility and its obligations towards the applicants, even if these are limited de facto (see paragraph 313 of the judgment). In any case, Transdniestria is not a no man's land or terra nullius in international law terms: the international community continues to regard Transdniestria as an integral part of Moldova. The very fact that Moldova made a reservation in respect of Transdniestria when it ratified the Convention proves that in the long term it has not discharged its obligations towards that territory. To accept the opposite would be to present a priceless gift to all the separatists in the world by enabling them to say that for the first time an international court had recognised that part of a State's territory was outside the jurisdiction of the central authorities. I only regret that the majority held Moldova responsible only from 2001 onwards, in spite of the established fact that after 1994, and especially after it joined the Council of Europe in 1997, Moldova did not take any steps whatsoever to secure the applicants' retrial or release. In that respect I agree with most of the arguments in the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Casadevall and the colleagues who joined him.

The problem of “extraterritorial” jurisdiction is much more complex. I firmly believe that the Court should follow the traditions of the “case-law of concepts”, in other words start from the idea that the essential concepts of contemporary positive law have been established by generations of jurists and should not be called into question except in exceptional cases. That was the Court's unanimous position in Banković and Others: “The Court is of the view, therefore, that Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case” (Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, § 61, ECHR 2001-XII). The Court went on to say that it needed to be “satisfied that ... exceptional circumstances exist in the present case which could amount to the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State” (loc. cit., § 74).

What exceptional circumstances could justify such a conclusion in the present case?

The Court, in my humble opinion, has chosen the easy way out by applying in its judgment criteria laid down in another exceptional case, the difficult-to-ignore Loizidou case, and drawing from that precedent the following, too vague, conclusion: “The Court has accepted that in exceptional circumstances the acts of Contracting States performed outside their territory, or which produce effects there, may amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention” (see paragraph 314 of the present judgment). The first criterion for identifying such “acts” to be found in Loizidou is the occupation through targeted military action of the territory of the other State. But that was not the case here, where the Soviet military forces had been stationed in the region for decades.

Even supposing that there was a “military action” such as there was in Cyprus, Judges Gölcüklü and Pettiti were absolutely right in seeking to separate “responsibility” from “jurisdiction”: “While the responsibility of a Contracting Party may be engaged as a consequence of military action outside its territory, this does not imply exercise of its jurisdiction” (see Loizidou (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, p. 35). The two concepts are to an extent autonomous in relation to each other, though it might be objected that the distinction is academic.

Why has the Court neglected this very important difference of meaning in the present case, and not filled in a gap in its case-law, given the lack of a valid criterion applicable to extraterritorial jurisdiction? In my view it was in order to reach more direct conclusions via the concept of responsibility (see paragraphs 314-17 of the judgment). It is jurisdiction (territorial or extraterritorial) which is a primary concept, responsibility being derived from jurisdiction rather than the contrary. The Court has indirectly confirmed this subordination by holding that Moldova has jurisdiction but excluding its responsibility before 2001! But in seeking to determine whether the Russian Federation has jurisdiction, it preferred the opposite logic in holding that there is “jurisdiction” because there is “responsibility”.

Even if it is accepted that the question is whether a respondent foreign State's responsibility is engaged, it would be necessary to prove that the respondent State (a) continues to exercise its responsibility, the latter having been engaged through a subordinate local administration; and (b) continues to control the whole of the territory in question through a large number of troops engaged in active duties and exercising “effective overall control over that part of the island”, as noted in the preliminary objections in Loizidou. These two aspects were discussed in particular in paragraph 70 of the admissibility decision in Banković and Others, in which the Court emphasised this territorial aspect throughout the decision before concluding: “The Court is not persuaded that there was any jurisdictional link between the persons who were victims of the act complained of and the respondent States” (see Banković and Others, cited above, § 82).

In determining whether the Russian Federation was responsible for the acts complained of, the Court, referring to Cyprus v. Turkey, uses the notion of “overall control over an area outside its national territory” (see paragraph 316 of the judgment). I refer in that connection to the Court's assessment in Loizidou: “Turkey actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the 'TRNC'. It is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus ... that her army exercises effective overall control over that part of the island” (see Loizidou (merits), cited above, p.2235, § 56). If my memory serves me correctly, I learned during my initial military training that the term “active duty” presupposes control of roads and railways, surveillance of strategic points (telegraph/telephone posts), and control of stations, airports, frontiers, etc. Even without being a military strategist, anyone can compare the two situations: in one case 30,000 troops in a small territory inhabited by between 120,000 and 150,000 people, and in the other 2,500 officers and other ranks in a territory of 4,163 km2 with an 852 km-long border and a population of more than 750,000! Lastly, I come to the major difference, which is that there was no military invasion from outside the territory with the aim of establishing such control: the Russian troops, who had only just ceased to be Soviet troops (two-thirds of them originally hailing from the region), were caught out by events in the place where they had been stationed for many years without interfering in administrative matters. Those troops are not engaged in any “active duties” except guarding the weapons stocks and equipment due to be moved out.

As regards subordination of the local administrative authorities to the Russian authorities, the mere fact that those authorities have frequently prevented evacuation of the military equipment is revealing. After releasing one of the applicants under international pressure, the authorities of the “MRT” continue to hold the others in spite of the obvious interest of their presumed “guardian” in disposing of the embarrassing problem – if this is an example of an administration “subject to the authority of a foreign power”, it is a rather strange one.

The other argument pleading in favour of the Russian Federation's responsibility, according to the majority, is that the “MRT” was set up in 1991-92 with the Russian Federation's support. I am obliged to point out that the birth of the “MRT” was proclaimed on 2 September 1990, more than a year before the USSR broke up and Russia attained independence as a sovereign State. Here I am reminded of La Fontaine: “If it wasn't you, it must have been your brother. – I have no brother. – Well, it must have been one of your family anyway.” The Moldovan Government's argument that Russia, as the successor State to the USSR, assumes full responsibility for the acts of that State is invalidated by the international law rule that where the responsibility of a subject of law is engaged on account of the conduct of another subject of law its responsibility can only be indirect (Dictionnaire de droit international public, Brussels, 2001, pp. 996-97).

For that reason alone, unlike the position regarding the proclamation of the “TRNC”, Russia could not be responsible for that act. In addition, it has never recognised the “MRT” as an independent State. The treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova signed on 19 November 2001 is clear on that point: “The parties condemn separatism in all its forms and undertake not to lend any support to separatist movements” (Article 5 § 2). But the Court prefers to reproduce “undated” irresponsible statements by certain members of parliament and former politicians as “evidence” of political support.

The “evidence” of alleged economic support (see paragraphs 156-60 of the judgment) does not withstand verification. I compare below the findings in the judgment with the observations of an NGO, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG), which has analysed the situation in the region.

Exports of gas “on favourable financial terms” (see paragraph 156): According to the BHHRG, the cost of 1,000 m3 of gas supplied by Russia to Transdniestria in 2003 was 89 United States dollars (USD), the same price as gas supplied to Estonia (USD 36 for Belarus, USD 50 for Georgia).

“Transdniestria receives electricity directly from the Russian Federation” (see paragraph 157): According to the BHHRG, the electricity market is controlled by the Spanish company Union Fenosa, which produces electricity using the gas bought from Russia.
“The Russian firm Iterra bought the largest undertaking in Transdniestria, the Râbniţa engineering works” (see paragraph 160): In August 2003 alone, a single Liechtenstein company bought 15.6% of the shares in the factory.

It is the American company Lucent Technologies which controls all telecommunications, it is in Germany that banknotes are printed, it is the European Union which awarded the “Arc of Europe” prize to textile production by the Intercentre Llux company, and so on (source: British Helsinki Human Rights Group, Transnistria 2003: Eye in the Gathering Storm – www.bhhrg.org).

Next argument: supplying arms to the separatists. The applicants assert (without giving any concrete evidence) that the 14th Army supplied weapons to the separatists, a fact which, in their opinion, engages the responsibility of the Russian Federation even more. Not being a specialist in the subject, I refer to a reliable source: “The organised looting of weapons began after the proclamation of Moldova's sovereignty on 23 June 1990 and had become a serious problem by the time of the break-up of the USSR in 1991 (there was a similar situation in Chechnya, Abkhazia and other places); 21,800 rifles, ammunition and even tanks were 'expropriated'. It was thanks to the efforts of the commanding officer of the 14th Army, General Lebed, that some of these weapons were seized and returned to the stores. An investigation was opened by the military prosecutor” (Commersant (a Russian newspaper), 21 July 2001). The region's industrial potential makes it capable of producing practically all types of conventional weapons; even today arms sales account for a large part of the region's income, as the Court mentions (see paragraph 161 of the judgment).

In the final analysis, I have not found in the factual material concerning the military, political and economic aspects any valid evidence capable of establishing a limited or continuing intervention by Russia in favour of Transdniestria, or proof of the “MRT”'s military, political or economic dependence on Russia.

In my heart of hearts, I regret that there is no evidence of what is now called “humanitarian intervention”, a more noble form of the military interventions of the past. I wish to be absolutely honest about Russia's responsibility in this respect. I am convinced that it was responsible for not intervening more energetically in 1992 to protect the civilian population and prevent the loss of more than 850 lives (including the use of political and diplomatic means to dissuade the Moldovan authorities from conducting a punitive military expedition against their own population). Where other powers do not hesitate to hoist the flag of humanitarian intervention in order to establish what has been called “the new military humanism” (see: N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism, Lessons from Kosovo, L, 1999), the Russian authorities of the time preferred a wait-and-see approach, leaving some of their soldiers and officers (mostly originating from the region concerned) to decide alone what was the right thing to do, which meant whether or not to defend their families.

I therefore propose to answer an obvious question: as a subject of international law, was Russia really capable in practice of assuming its responsibilities in the “MRT”, that is to say the task of solving problems or dealing with a systematic situation? To assist in finding the reply, I refer to Ireland v. the United Kingdom (cited above, p.64, §159) : “A practice incompatible with the Convention consists of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system; a practice does not of itself constitute a violation separate from such breaches”. It is only where, behind a personal situation, systematic violations can be perceived that a foreign State's objective responsibility can be engaged; that is my reading of the judgment cited, especially as the applicants did not submit evidence of systematic violations of the same kind.

The other rule of international law confirmed by our case-law is that a State's extraterritorial responsibility is engaged to the extent that its agents exercise their authority over supposed victims or their property (see Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission decision of 26 May 1975, Decisions and Reports 2, p. 150). Did that really apply to the four applicants outside the brief period of their arrest in 1992?

Apart from the factual aspects, account has to be taken of the legal aspect of the question of a State's international responsibility.

I refer to a document of paramount importance: Resolution 56/83 adopted on 12 December 2001 by the United Nations General Assembly entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, the result of a number of years' work by the International Law Commission (ILC). In referring to the work of the ILC, paragraph 320 of the judgment raises the problem of a State's responsibility on account of a violation of an international obligation, emphasising in paragraph 321 “continuing violations” in the light of Article 14 § 2 of the resolution. But Article 13 of the same document states: “An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”

That rule quite obviously confirms the ratione temporis rule in our own case-law. In other words, before establishing the continuing nature of a violation (in our case, the arrest and pre-trial detention of the applicants), it is advisable to make sure that the alleged violation does not fall outside the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis.

On the subject of the ratione temporis rule, one of the pillars of the European Court's case-law, I very much fear that it will be shattered by the construction put upon the term “jurisdiction” in the present judgment in the following passage: “The Court considers that on account of the above events the applicants came within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, although at the time when they occurred the Convention was not in force with regard to the Russian Federation” (see paragraph 384).

Indeed, as neither Moldova, nor still less Russia, had ratified the Convention at the material time (1992), they cannot be accused of breaching an international obligation by which they were not yet bound. Consequently, neither Article 14 (extension in time of the breach of an international obligation) nor Article 15 (breach consisting of a composite act) of the resolution mentioned is applicable, contrary to what the Court says in its judgment (see paragraph 321).

On the other hand, a different provision of the work of the ILC is to my mind entirely applicable to consideration of alleged Russian responsibility, as it confirms the force majeure hypothesis:

“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.” (Article 23 § 1)

My question is: did the very height of a civil war constitute a situation of force majeure within the meaning of Article 23 as cited above, given that the respondent State, the Russian Federation, did not provoke the situation for the simple reason that it did not yet exist as a subject of international law?

In my opinion, the Court cannot derogate from the rule confirmed by the Commission's opinion in Ribitsch: in determining whether the responsibility of a respondent State is engaged, the Court applies the provisions of the Convention on the basis of the objectives of the Convention and in the light of the principles of international law. The Commission went on to say: “The responsibility of a State under the Convention, arising for acts of all its organs, agents and servants, does not necessarily require any 'guilt' on behalf of the State, either in a moral, legal or political meaning” (Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, opinion of the Commission, p. 37, § 110).

IV. Violation of Article 34 of the Convention

As regards the finding of a violation of Article 34 by Moldova and Russia, I just wish to say that I am shocked by the use of a stolen document (or a bought one – it makes little difference) – a diplomatic note. I am embarrassed to have to point out that it is an elementary principle in all judicial proceedings that evidence obtained unlawfully cannot be taken into consideration. Encouraging breaches of the confidentiality of diplomatic correspondence, contrary to the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations, and especially Article 24 thereof which states that the archives and documents of diplomatic missions “shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be”, by a complicit quotation (see paragraph 278 of the judgment) and by taking the content into consideration (see paragraph 481 of the judgment) seems to me to be unworthy of a European judicial body.

Confidential consultations are a normal practice in international relations – indeed, a practice endorsed by the Russo-Moldovan treaty of 19 November 2001, Article 3 § 1 of which provides: “Being firmly committed to ensuring peace and security, the High Contracting Parties will hold regular consultations on major international problems and on questions of bilateral relations. Such consultations and exchanges of views will embrace ... questions of interaction within the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other European structures.” In addition, by producing a leaked diplomatic note the applicants were breaking the rule against abuse of the right of petition (Article 35 § 3 of the Convention) and thus making themselves liable to the known consequences in the Court's practice. Unfortunately, they suffered no such fate. As the immortal La Fontaine put it: “Someone told me. I must have my revenge.”

V. Application of Article 41 of the Convention

As regards the sums awarded to the applicants, especially the first applicant, who has been free since 2001, the Court in my opinion has gone beyond the previous limits for sums awarded in the event of the finding of violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, even in the most horrifying cases. Having already recently crossed the established threshold in Assanidze (cited above), in which it generously awarded the applicant 150,000 euros “in respect of all the damage sustained”, the Court has now gone further in the present case, perhaps on account of the length of the applicants' detention. Be that as it may, what I object to is that, while holding that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court thought it necessary to mention the subject of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, observing in paragraph 489 of the judgment: “The Court does not consider the alleged pecuniary damage to have been substantiated, but it does not find it unreasonable to suppose that the applicants suffered a loss of income and certainly incurred costs which were directly due to the violations found.” That argument is unconvincing in my opinion and even dangerous for the future case-law, as it imprudently opens Pandora's box.

VI. Is the judgment enforceable?

Lastly, I realise the objective impossibility for the second respondent State of enforcing the Court's judgment to the letter, going over the head of sovereign Moldova, particularly in order to put an end to the applicants' detention. (I voted “for” on point 22 of the operative provisions in the light of all the possible approaches.) It will be still more difficult to take general measures, as required by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. In Drozd and Janousek, the Court said: “The Convention does not require the Contracting Parties to impose its standards on third States or territories” (Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, judgment of 26 June 1992, Series A no. 240, p. 34, § 110). When that is translated into the language of international law, it surely means that neither the Convention nor any other text requires signatory States to take counter-measures to end the detention of an alien in a foreign country – the United Nations Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Resolution 26/113 of 9 December 1981) is still in force. Unless, on reading our judgment, people welcome the appearance right in the heart of old Europe of a new condominium like the New Hebrides. But I very much doubt that that would be a desirable development.

Case of Ilaşcu, Ivanţoc, Leşco and Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and Russia

(Application no. 48787/99)

Judgment (Annex)

Strasbourg, 8 July 2004

CASE OF ILAŞCU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA

(Application no. 48787/99)

JUDGMENT

ANNEX

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS BY THE WITNESSES BEFORE THE COURT'S DELEGATES

STRASBOURG

8 July 2004

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

Page

18. Witness X.

21. Witness Y.

23. Witness Z.

38. Ion COSTAŞ

The applicant's family, who were in Tiraspol for a few days, were sleeping. The applicant went to lock the door of the house, which was unlocked. The door then suddenly opened and five or six soldiers broke in and hit him in the face with the butt of a gun and tied his arms behind his back. He was then taken out and put in a Volga car. When taken out, he saw that in the courtyard and around it there were two armoured vehicles at the end of the street and around 50-60 soldiers led by a colonel accompanied by a lieutenant-colonel, whose name was, the applicant learned later, Vladimir Gorbov. The applicant also recognised among the people who started to search his house a certain Victor Gushan from the Transdniestrian secret services. The applicant claims that he had no arms or explosives in his house. When the applicant's wife asked them why they had arrested the applicant, Mr Gushan said it was because the applicant was the leader of the Popular Front of Moldova, and as they were at war with Moldova the applicant was considered to be dangerous and had to be detained.

During his detention there, the applicant saw only Mr Godiac and Mr Ivanţoc. One day, the door of his cell opened and Ivanţoc was asked by Gorbov, Bergman and the other investigators to identify him, which he did. The applicant did not know Mr Ivanţoc at that time, but Mr Ivanţoc certainly knew him as he was the leader of the Popular Front.

There he was subjected to very harsh treatment. He was beaten many times. He was given bread and tea to eat, with cornmeal at lunch. He was also frequently put in a punishment cell. The applicant weighed 95 kilos when arrested and only 57 kilos six months later. He was not allowed to see his family on a regular basis or to receive parcels. Food parcels sent to the applicant were sometimes destroyed. Every visit had to be approved. Sometimes approvals were not granted, sometimes they were granted but when his wife reached the gates of the prison she was not allowed to see him. He was not allowed to write, so that he had to use other means to send messages out of prison. As he wanted his mother to come and visit him, he was told that he should write a special request to Mr Smirnov. The applicant refused, because he did not recognise the “MRT”, and so he was not allowed to see his mother, who died while he was in prison.

He had no access to information. He was alone. No one else was present when he exercised in the evening. He ate on his own in the cell. He was even forbidden to talk to the guards. He could only speak to the secret service people and to Mr Golovachev. He had no access to daylight or even to an electric lamp.

The treatment in the Tiraspol Prison was sometimes better, sometimes worse than in the Hlinaia Prison.

During the same period there was also an incident in which he was ill-treated by Mr Gusarov and some people from the secret services. He asked why he was subjected to such rigorous searches, but was dragged out of his cell and hit with the butt of a gun. One of the secret service men stuck a gun in his mouth, broke his teeth, and threatened him that there would be more of the same if he pursued his application with the European Court. Mr Ivanţoc was subjected to the same treatment by Mr Gusarov.

He was put into a car with Mr Shevtsov. When they came to territory controlled by Chişinău the applicant was handcuffed to two soldiers. He was taken to the presidential palace in Chişinău, and then to the Ministry of Security. Mr Shevtsov took out a paper declaring that the detainee Ilaşcu had been transferred to the authorities of Moldova. He told the applicant that the sentence of death was still valid and that he did not want to see him again. The applicant was then taken to the office of the Minister of Security of Moldova and questioned.

The Fourteenth Army participated in the aggression against Moldova, it supplied arms to the Transdniestrian forces – machine guns, tanks, armoured vehicles, guided rocket systems. There is only one armed headquarters force in Transdniestria, and that is the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army. Shots were fired from there towards the battlefields. General Lebed fought against Moldova, but he saved the applicant's life, as he refused to deliver the applicant to the Transdniestrians who came to get him, after losing lives on the battlefield.

The Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria had taken the whole Fourteenth Army under its authority. General Lebed was even elected as a Member of the Transdniestrian Parliament. Russian staff from the Fourteenth Army were leading the military operations and members of the Transdniestrian armed forces were involved only symbolically. When General Iakovlev was arrested before the conflict and taken to Chişinău, it was on suspicion of having armed units in Transdniestria with weapons from the Fourteenth Army. The applicant was told by Mr. Leşco, who worked in a factory, that arms had been brought to the factory by the Fourteenth Army to arm the workers there.

All along the Russian Federation has been maintaining Transdniestria. It supports the Transdniestrian regime militarily, politically and economically. It supplies natural gas free of charge to Transdniestria, it has given Transdniestria 70 to 80 million US dollars of credit, it has kept its markets open for Transdniestria. Mr Smirnov has received military medals from Russia. The Russian Federation protects this illegal regime, even in the proceedings in Strasbourg. The applicant considers that this is not an ethnic conflict, but a political conflict. The territory of Transdniestria is under the control of the Russian Federation.

When the witness saw her husband in the militia building, Starojouk was also there, in a separate office. The witness did not know if Ilaşcu was there as well. She did not know Ilaşcu personally. When she saw her husband for the first time he had done nothing but eat, wolfing down half a chicken, and he had drunk a lot of water. He said that they had not given him anything to eat or drink.

The witness's husband told her that when he was in the Commandatura of the Fourteenth Army it was the militia men who had the keys to the cell. The attack on him had occurred when the guards got drunk with three soldiers. The guards gave the soldiers the keys for some reason. It was then that the soldiers broke into his cell, assaulted him and tried to rape him.

Her husband has never said anything much about medical treatment in prison. He had a pancreatic crisis when the witness was there once. He was foaming at the mouth. She had to wait all day for any kind of treatment to arrive. In the end a doctor came and said that he needed an operation, otherwise he would die. He was made to walk with handcuffs and manacles on, despite his condition. The doctor gave the witness a list of medicines to get. The operation had been a success. He was manacled to the bed in hospital, despite being on an intravenous drip. The witness was allowed to visit him in hospital once a day but there were four armed guards present all the time. His stay in hospital had lasted two weeks.

The witness met him in the office of the investigating offices, in the presence of three or four other people. It was a short meeting and it had been impossible for them to communicate properly. It was many weeks before the witness could send him a food parcel.

The OSCE mission visited her husband in prison after these representations in 1999.

Then he was administered drugs. He was delirious; he imagined things. His psychiatric problems resulted from his beatings.

The guards at the Commandatura, like everything there, were under the control of the Fourteenth Army. The special forces and marines all had Russian insignia on their uniforms. It was the Russian special forces and marines who beat them up saying that they were Romanian peasants. They had Russian emblems on their uniforms. The applicant thought that they were Russian marines because they had the berets and shirts of marines with Russian emblems on them.

The worst ill-treatment he suffered was at the Commandatura. It was total savagery.

He stayed at the Commandatura until the beginning of August and then he was taken back to the basement at the pre-trial detention centre.

He received no medical visits from local doctors. When the applicants met their wives, they would ask for Chişinău doctors to come; and then they were visited a few times. Professor Ţîbîrnă saw the applicant in 1996 when he had chronic pancreatitis. Doctor Leşanu also came to see him. He complained to these doctors about the prison conditions but not about any ill-treatment after the trial. His colleagues were held in separate cells, so he cannot confirm or deny that they were ill-treated. It was in 1992 and 1993 that all the applicants were ill-treated.

He had have received regular visits from his family. Lately he has been receiving parcels; in the beginning there were many more restrictions. It depended on how the prison administration felt.

The guards at the militia building told him that they came from various cities in Russia. They had uniforms, but with no insignia on them.

The applicant saw Starojouk and Gorbov. They interrogated him. They did not wear masks when interrogating him. They did not interrogate him about any links with Ilaşcu and the Popular Front. They simply wanted him to admit that he was part of the so-called Ilaşcu group and to confirm what they said. He was not a member of any political party, but he did not want to fight on the Transdniestrian side. He had been a soldier in Afghanistan. He had never met Ilaşcu. There were no Transdniestrian military forces in Transdniestria then, the only ones there being Russian. They were the ones who had beaten him. He was beaten by military men who wore masks, so he did not know who they were.

He was not visited by a lawyer at all during the investigation, only after.

In 1995 the applicant was visited by Professor Ţîbîrnă accompanied by Doctor Leşanu, in Tiraspol. In 1999 he was transferred to Hlinaia Prison, where the regime was harsher. He had no medical treatment there. He contracted tuberculosis in 1999. He had been offered medical treatment provided that he asked for a pardon. If he had done so he would have been transferred to a medical unit, but he refused.

He was born in the territory of Soviet Moldova and has a Soviet passport, with a paper in it saying that he is a citizen of the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”.

No restrictions on language are applied. Thus, Mr. Petrov-Popa could receive letters or newspapers in Romanian. Mr Petrov-Popa has never complained about the conditions in his cell. He was the one who asked to go back into his present cell. Petrov-Popa has never asked for a visit by a lawyer.

The witness had heard about the rumours that Iakovlev had been released in exchange for the release of 23 Moldovans detained by the Transdniestrians. Indeed, the Moldovan authorities were detaining about 40 Transdniestrians and an exchange had taken place. But this had nothing to do with Iakovlev. The witness was not aware of any pressure from the Russian Government to release him. He knew that General Stolyarov came from Moscow to Chisinău to seek his release, as he had received the report concerning Iakovlev.

The Prosecutor General's Office did not contact the Russian prosecution authorities directly, although there was an agreement to that effect between the Moldovan and Russian authorities.

The witness knew that the Ministry of the Interior had orders to cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior of Transdniestria in order to improve the fight against crime - to return to the other side of the river persons suspected of serious crimes. But there was no formal extradition as such, since it concerned persons on the territory of the same State. But unofficially it did go on. As regards extradition in general, previously it was done by decision of a prosecutor. Now the legislation had changed and what was required was a decision by a court.

There was no official agreement between Moldova and Transdniestria to exchange people when the witness was Prosecutor General in 1998 and 1999. To his knowledge, no such agreement had ever been made. The transfer of persons between Moldova and Transdniestria was organised by the Ministry of the Interior. There were some cases of persons committing crimes in Transdniestria being transferred from Moldova to Transdniestria. Officially this was not done, but unofficially the two police forces would cooperate and would transfer these people. For example, in 1995 there was a case brought against the police commissioner in Dubăsari, and he was extradited to Transdniestria.

18. Witness X.

There was a meeting of the Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian Ministers in which the witness participated. There was a possibility of a resolution of the situation in 1992. Romania supported the position of Moldova. But the formula proposed for the resolution was torpedoed when the Russian secret services provoked the incidents in the town of Bender, which wrecked the negotiations and ended the role of the observers. The military defeat of Moldova was sealed in July 1992 when the Russian President Yeltsin and the Moldovan President Snegur signed an agreement in order to stop the conflict. The agreement was only signed by these two Presidents. The conclusion to be drawn was that the Russian Federation was the other party in the conflict; it controlled the region, and it had the resources to stop the conflict after the military defeat of Moldova. The formula of “peace-keeping” was imposed by Russia. The conflict also saw the participation of the illegal troops of the Transdniestrian regime. As a result of the conclusions reached in the Control Commission set up under the Yeltsin/Snegur Agreement, the separatist regime was strengthened.

The witness was present in person in the spring of 1992 at the interrogation of a young man from Rostov on Don, who had been taken prisoner by the constitutional Moldovan military forces. He admitted that he had been sent to Moldova to protect the Russian land in Transdniestria. The witness had interviewed a former KGB official who was serving in Tiraspol in 1991. This officer told the witness that a Russian counter-intelligence division (GRU) had arrived in Tiraspol and that he intended to leave Tiraspol because he knew that trouble and bloodshed were coming. The Fourteenth Army was left under Russian control, so that Russia would have a reason to intervene.

The scenario used in Transdniestria had been used before in Abkhasia and South Ossetia, but had failed in the Baltic States. The political process in Moldova on the break-up of the Soviet Union, with a delay of one year, followed that of the Baltic States. The result was a situation where public organisms were no longer controlled by the Communist Party. But the end story was different here. The Baltic States had managed to avoid separatism. In the Baltic States there were the same attempts by the Antiufeev group to undermine constitutional authority. Antiufeev, who was now a Minister in the Transdniestrian separatist Government had escaped from Latvia. In an interview he said that he had been sent to Moldova by the Soyuz Group in the Soviet Parliament, headed by Mr Lukyanov. He was offered Abkhasia or Transdniestria. He chose Transdniestria because there was no language problem. He was sent to another State to fight the established constitutional order, as he had done in Latvia. He and Oleg Gudymo, his deputy, are Russian citizens. He is included in the Duma electoral lists as a supporter of Stalin “black” candidates. These candidates were not elected, but it is informative that Antiufeev is part of that tendency.

If the Fourteenth Army withdrew, this would lead eventually to a solution of the problem. No military equipment had been withdrawn recently. The date for the complete withdrawal had not been respected, and the new one would not be either. There was a statement on the web site of the Russian Duma to the effect that members of the Duma were requested to refrain from making declarations on Transdniestria because of the case pending before the European Court of Human Rights, since such declarations could damage the situation in the case.

There was also a debt of seven hundred million dollars owed by Transdniestria to Russia for gas consumed, according to the representative of the company supplying gas, Gazprom. The Russian State had supplied gas free of charge to Transdniestria for eleven years. It had done this in order to support the illegal regime there, indeed to permit its economic survival.

As regards political support, one could cite the declarations of the Russian Vice-President, Mr Rutskoi, in Moscow in 1992 and on visiting Tiraspol. A committee of the Russian Duma had been set up to help solve the problems in the Transdniestrian Region – with no mention whatsoever of the fact that this was an illegal regime in Transdniestria. One could also cite the memorandum signed in Moscow in 1997 by President Lucinschi of Moldova and Smirnov for the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria”, and countersigned by President Yeltsin for the Russian Federation and President Kuchma for Ukraine, which recognised the legal validity of the Transdniestrian authorities in the negotiation process.

President Yeltsin possibly did not give any direct orders. But it could not be denied that there had been military, economic and intellectual support. The rebels in Transdniestria had at their disposal a very well-equipped army.

Before the presidential declaration was signed, it was the task of Alexander Rutskoi, the Russian Vice-President, to come to Chişinău to negotiate a settlement. The draft agreement he negotiated was then signed in Moscow. On the Moldovan side the main negotiators were the Prime Minister, namely Valeriu Muravschi, the Speaker of the Parliament and the witness himself.

What the Moldovan side wanted was an end to the conflict, a cease-fire, and that they obtained. They also supported, in the drafting of the document, the introduction of peace-keeping forces in Transdniestria from Russia, as they wanted them to influence Smirnov in Tiraspol.

During the witness's time as President, there had been contacts with Transdniestria, sometimes good, sometimes bad. The Moldovan view was that negotiations were better than conflict. The participants were the witness himself, Mr Smirnov, the Speaker of the Moldovan parliament, Mr Diacov, and Mr Lucinschi. On the Transdniestrian side, there was also their so-called Prime Minister and other Ministers and Departments when particular items came up on the agenda – for example post, customs and media. Most of the time, the Moldovans met their demands, especially on economic issues, because otherwise ordinary commercial enterprises, the working people and the peasants would have suffered. There were no representatives from the Fourteenth Army there as a party. There were mediators present at all meetings – from Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.

If the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria had taken so long despite previous agreements, it was because this must have been the wish of the Russian Federation. The withdrawal of their troops had been stipulated in various documents. On the entry of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe, this was one of the conditions. At the Istanbul summit the withdrawal was to be terminated at the latest by the end of 2002. Now it was to be the end of 2003. This delay was probably the result of influence by politicians who were dragging their feet at the request of the Transdniestrian side until a final settlement had been reached.

The witness had signed documents giving greater local authority to Transdniestrian authorities within the territory of Moldova but these did not imply recognition of the regime. For example, documents concerning customs stamps did not involve official recognition of the illegal regime. Solutions to practical problems were sought, as the Moldovan authorities did not want to create an economic blockage. They recognised Transdniestria as an “area” and needed to coordinate services.

The witness had no problems in going to or from Transdniestria, he was never stopped or humiliated.

As to Mr Ilaşcu, the witness met him when he went into politics. After Mr Ilaşcu was released they met once, in Chişinău. He once telephoned to the party's headquarters and left his telephone number, but he had no more contact with him.

Guennadi Iakovlev, who was the ideologist of the separatist movement, said in a newspaper article on 18 June 1992 that the Fourteenth Army and the Transdniestrian people were united. In the Tiraspolkaya Pravda, on 2 September 1992, Smirnov said that the Transdniestrian Republic survived only thanks to Russia and the Fourteenth Army.

The witness heard of Mr Ilaşcu on 5 May 1993, when the so-called trial opened in Tiraspol. The witness organised a meeting on 6 May in Chişinău to support his group. He knew from the newspapers of Mr Ilaşcu' activities in Tiraspol, but never discussed with him Order No. 6 or his activities in Tiraspol.

In October 1994 Moldova signed an Agreement with the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of Russian military units from Moldovan territory. The Moldovan parliament ratified that Agreement. The Russian parliament has never ratified it; moreover it has been taken off the agenda of the Russian parliament.

The Moldovan parliament supported Yeltsin during the coup in Moscow. In September 1991 Yeltsin sent Mr Nikolay Medvedev, together with a group of colleagues, to act as mediators. The Moldovan authorities rejected this initiative because they considered that the problem was an internal issue and that it was not up to the Russians to intervene. But Mr Medvedev went to see the witness and told him that the treaty between Moldova and Russia would not be ratified until the demands of the MRT were accepted by Moldova.

21. Witness Y.

When President Snegur and the Prime Minister, Andrei Sangheli, were in Moscow, they raised the issue of the Ilaşcu group many times. There were personal meetings between Yeltsin and Snegur, one to one, in which the issue was raised by Mr Snegur. The witness was the person responsible for preparing the press releases relating to these meetings. For example, on 15 May 1993 the issue of the Ilaşcu group was raised; it was said that, for both sides, action would be taken to secure the release of this group as soon as possible.

However, the talks between Moldova and the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova did not include the issue of the Ilaşcu group. The main problem for the Moldovan side in the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops was that the Russian side was insisting on a synchronisation of the withdrawal of the Russian Army with the final resolution of the Transdniestrian problem. For Moldova, these were two distinct processes, with no link between them. The Moldovan party was aware that, theoretically speaking, if there were such a link, there was a risk that the Transdniestrian conflict would not be solved: any party which might have had an interest in keeping a Russian military presence in Moldova would then have worked to ensure that the Transdniestrian issue was never settled. This point of view was conveyed to the Russian counterpart in the negotiations. However, the Russians insisted on the synchronisation formula and, unfortunately, this went into the final document.

Failure to solve the overall problem gave the Russians the excuse to keep their Army there. And it was they who controlled the possibility of settling the dispute.

The synchronisation formula was proposed by the representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was expressly included in the press release at their request. When Moldova proposed that the press release include mention of both sides being interested in the release of the Ilaşcu group, the Russians agreed on condition that the synchronisation formula also be put in. Subsequently, the Moldovan authorities realised that they had made a big blunder in accepting the synchronisation formula.

The release of the Ilaşcu group was a political problem. The Transdniestrian regime was keeping the remaining applicants in prison as a bargaining chip. They wanted to derive benefit from any decision to release the prisoners. Moldova had done all that it could. The constitutional authorities of Moldova were not responsible for what had happened to the Ilaşcu group. The families of the applicants approached the authorities regularly, and they obtained from the Moldovan authorities political, medical and other support.

23. Witness Z.

At the time of the referendum about joining the Soviet Union in 1991, and continuing until March 1992, General Iakovlev, former Commander of the Fourteenth Army, started to transfer weapons and munitions, and this coincided with the arrival of the Cossacks. This transfer of munitions was made in particular to the Transdniestrian Guard, which became the Ministry of Defence of Transdniestria. All units, including the Cossacks, were equipped with automatic weapons, machine guns, armoured cars, and so on. An engineer's battalion from Parcani openly joined the Transdniestrian side. Eighteen T-74 tanks were given as a gift to the Transdniestrian side.

The witness stated that he was in possession of a great deal of information on the quantity of arms actually transferred. After the war the process continued. This was done through resolutions of the Russian and Transdniestrian Governments. The Russian Prosecutor General inspected the Russian Army.

The witness pointed out that there was archive evidence, in the form of television film, which showed clearly that the main tanks that took part in the assaults were flying Russian flags. Some of these tanks were indeed flying two flags, the Transdniestrian as well as the Russian flag.

It was never intended to include the Ilaşcu group in an operation involving the exchange of Iakovlev for the 30 policemen, since Iakovlev's release had occurred before Mr Ilaşcu's arrest.

The issue of the Ilaşcu group was nevertheless raised by the Moldovan authorities in the context of an exchange of prisoners. During the armed conflict Moldova captured a number of prisoners. But the Moldovan proposal for an exchange was rejected point blank when the issue of the Ilaşcu group was raised. This was so at all levels. Moldova was unable to secure their release despite all efforts. The separatist regime needed a justification for the accusation that Moldava was involved in terrorist acts, and the Ilaşcu trial provided a smokescreen for their own terrorist acts committed through mercenaries.

The Control Commission was initially composed of a Russian delegation, a Moldovan delegation and a Transdniestrian delegation. Later they were joined by delegations from the OSCE and the Ukraine. The Control Commission was intended to deal with all the problems arising from the conflict – for example compensation for damage, withdrawal of troops and so on. Some problems were solved. Later, because of Russia's inertia and different strategy, the Russian military forces stayed on. Where there used to be a Russian peace-keeping force, now there were Russian military forces. And, as the OSCE had confirmed, the Transdniestrians now produced missiles and military equipment.

Goncharenko requested that people who had fought against the legal, constitutional forces of Georgia be decorated. These were similar conflicts involving separatist, Russian-speaking rebels, supported by Soviet and later Russian troops. Russia had a record of being responsible for providing military support to these illegal paramilitary forces.

Russia provided peace-keeping troops but imposed certain conditions. The Russian/Moldovan Agreement was drafted in Moscow and Moldova was not able to introduce anything important, as it had wished, for instance, on the notion of state independence, sovereignty, etc. This Agreement was only a military tool for a certain time, but three months later, in September 1992, Moldova stated that this Agreement had been implemented and that there was a need to organise further negotiations leading to other conventions that would ensure peace.

The witness knew Olga Căpăţînă, he knew that she was a civil activist. She was involved in the League of Wives and Mothers of Soldiers who died in Afghanistan. The witness had no information about her involvement as an intelligence agent during the conflict. But anyway he did not know who were the individual agents working in the field.

But support was given by Russia to ethnic Russians in Transdniestria. The Cossacks came to Transdniestria because they had been let out of prison. There were long convoys of weapons being transported to Transdniestria. The Moldovan Ministry of Security sent agents to work in Transdniestria and the Fourteenth Army. That was quite normal, having regard to the situation. At the time, Moldova had documentary evidence, received through agents, to show that after April 1992 the Fourteenth Army was helping the rebels with arms and in other ways. General Netkachev admitted that Transdniestrians were using lorries to get access to the armament stores through minefields.

General Lebed openly said that he was pursuing a policy of “active defence”. They, the Russian soldiers, fired shots towards the town of Tighina (Bender).

It was not possible for the Transdniestrians to seize tanks. Lebed was permanently there. The order came from Moscow and Lebed had to implement it.

In December 2002 the investigation was suspended. A criminal investigation was also opened in 2000 in respect of the governor of Hlinaia Prison for unlawful deprivation of liberty, but that investigation had also been suspended because it was impossible to carry out any real investigatory work.

The witness was of the opinion that the proceedings instituted against the judges and prosecutors under Articles 190 and 192 of the Criminal Code were incorrect. It would have been more appropriate to investigate under Articles 116 § 2 and 207 for usurpation of the identity of an official person and unlawful imprisonment, as was done in regard to the investigation launched against the governor of Hlinaia Prison.

The witness did not know the Prosecutor General of Transdniestria, he had never had any telephone contact with him.

The witness was not aware that the offences with which the prosecutors and judges were charged (under Articles 116 and 207 of the Criminal Code) were considered to be time-barred according to the Public Prosecutor Iuga's decision of August 2000.

The witness was of the opinion that if the Tiraspol prosecutors or judges involved in the Ilaşcu trial travelled to the right bank of the Dniester, a criminal investigation under Article 207 of the Criminal Code could be launched against them despite possible problems of prescription.

Persons can be convicted in absentia if there is sufficient evidence to confirm their guilt. If these persons went abroad, for example, to Russia, then it would be possible to ask the Russian authorities to extradite them to Moldova. Colonel Golovachev, the Governor of Hlinaia Prison, was informed of the opening of the investigation against him and summoned to Chişinău through the Prosecutor's Office in Tiraspol.

The witness had not had the opportunity to question Mr Ilaşcu when he came to Chişinău after his release, on 5 May 2001, since he had taken up his duties as Prosecutor General only on 18 May and, on 10 May 2001, Mr Ilaşcu had received the highest order of Romania, “The Star of Romania”.

The discussions concerning release continued after 1996. Smirnov would say “yes”, and then “no”. The final decision was taken in spring 2001. Previously, on 16 May 2000 at one meeting between President Lucinschi and Smirnov, the Moldovans again asked Smirnov about Mr Ilaşcu. Smirnov said he could not agree on a release, pure and simple, but could agree to the re-examination of the case by a court of a different State. That led to a number of subsequent initiatives. For example, Moldova asked Ambassador Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission, to use the good offices of the OSCE to raise the possibility of referring the Ilaşcu case to a court of a different State. Following an address made by Ambassador Hill in Vienna, Switzerland, Poland and Hungary agreed to the possibility of the Ilaşcu case being tried in one of their courts. Ambassador Hill discussed the possibility with the representatives of Switzerland. Discussions were initiated by the witness himself with the Ambassadors of Poland and Hungary in Chişinău. They even went into discussing the technical details, such as the number of judges who should sit, which code of criminal procedure should be applied, who should be the prosecutor, who should support the Moldovan participants, and so on.

The Moldovan authorities continued at the same time to discuss with the Transdniestrian authorities the unconditional release of Ilaşcu and his group. Mr Voronin and Mr Hill made separate appeals. There was a request for a trial of the case by the Polish courts. These appeals were sent by the witness to the Transdniestrian authorities. Finally, on 12 April 2001, the Transdniestrian authorities agreed to proceed with an unconditional release, and not one mediated through a foreign court. Discussions took place as to the technical details of the release. On 16 April the witness went to Tiraspol by car in order to bring back the detainees to Chişinău, but the Transdniestrians refused even though there was an agreement. The witness met all the members of the group in the prison in Tiraspol, together with a representative of the OSCE. On this occasion the Transdniestrians were saying that they were ready to release all the detainees.

When, on 5 May 2001, only Mr Ilaşcu was released, and not all the applicants, this was a big surprise for the Moldovans. They received a letter from Smirnov informing them of the release.

As to why the Transdniestrians refused to release them all, Moldova had to negotiate to settle the problem of the Transdniestrian region. The Moldovan authorities could not refuse to talk to unconstitutional bodies. At the same time a criminal investigation was opened against the judicial officials who had taken part in the illegal trial in Transdniestria against the Ilaşcu group. But at that time, the Moldovans were convinced that all the applicants would be released.

Following the failure to release the others, this issue was raised at all meetings with the Transdniestrians when the witness headed this Commission. There was another appeal signed by the witness and by the then Minister of Justice, Mr Morei.

The witness had a discussion with President Snegur at the relevant time on this issue, and then a lunch with the Transdniestrian authorities who were constantly asking for this criminal investigation to be annulled. It was discussed at the level of the leadership of the prosecuting authorities on both sides. It was stipulated as one of the conditions for the settlement of the status issue in general. But the legal and political considerations were different and separate. The witness was of the opinion that what the Transdniestrian prosecutors and judges had done was unconstitutional and that they should be brought to justice. The status of Transdniestria is still the subject of discussion on the basis of a draft instrument. This discussion embraced the general question of criminal liability not just that of the persons involved in the Ilaşcu case.

The Moldovan authorities were aware of the request to resolve the problematic situation of the people involved in creating the conflict. The witness therefore found it difficult to say whether the decision of 16 August 2000 was a legal decision or one linked to a political decision. The draft instrument on status covered precisely this issue.

In Transdniestria thousands of criminal cases had been tried. There was a lot of politics bound up with the Ilaşcu case. The Transdniestrians had always said it was not a political case but an ordinary case of citizens who had committed murders and must therefore serve their sentences. Moldova has a different angle: if these people have committed illegal acts, then the case should be investigated and they should be tried by constitutional bodies. After the trial, the proceedings in the Ilaşcu case were examined by Professor Rzeplinski from Poland. In the light of his report, the Transdniestrians must have realised that they had made many procedural mistakes in conducting the prosecution and trial. But it was important for them to show that they exist as a State.

This whole problem is the subject of on-going discussions. Ten thousand civil cases have already been decided by the Transdniestrian courts. It is necessary to settle what will happen in those cases. It would be an unrealistic solution for them all to be reviewed afterwards. However, if a citizen living in Transdniestria does not agree with the decision taken by the Transdniestrian court, he or she should have the right to appeal to the constitutional Moldovan authorities in order to have the case reviewed.

Immediately after May 2000 when Smirnov said that he could agree to the review of the Ilaşcu case by another country, the Moldovan authorities contacted Hungary, Poland and Switzerland. Technical discussions with these countries took place. However, the release of Ilaşcu in 2001 put an end to the possibility of having the case as a whole examined by another court in another country.

The witness was indeed a member of the Commission on the negotiation of status headed by Mr Sturza. However, in meetings in which he participated, release of the remaining members of the Ilaşcu group was never raised as an issue.

Most of the corporate entities in Transdniestria prepare their customs documents in Tiraspol. When they want export permits, for example for textiles, they approach the authorities in Chişinău who will issue the appropriate documents. There are no constraints on corporate entities in Transdniestria coming to Chişinău for appropriate documents for exports to third countries. In Transdniestria, however, exports and imports are carried out without the authorisation of the constitutional Moldovan authorities. They frequently receive goods imported directly to Tiraspol. Some goods, such as textiles, can be exported to the European Union only after they have received a permit from the Moldovan Ministry of the Economy. This is because there are export quotas. This is not a customs procedure as such. It is a procedure for obtaining a permit from the Ministry of the Economy. The Customs Department has no control over this procedure.

Arms exports from Moldova come under the jurisdiction of the constitutional authorities of Moldova. A Government decision is needed. In fact, an inter-departmental Committee takes decisions as regards the export of, or other transactions in regard to, arms. The witness did not know what the procedure used by the authorities in Tiraspol was.

Arms were exported from Tiraspol via Ukraine directly to other countries, because Chişinău was unable to exercise control at the Ukrainian border.

As to the security of the airport, the ground used for the landing and take-off of heavy aircraft and helicopters of the Russian forces is protected by the Russian forces. The territory of the aerodrome is nevertheless open, so the Transdniestrians, if they wanted, could interfere. However, they do not interfere and similarly the Russian forces do not interfere with the way the Transdniestrians use their part of the airport.

Withdrawal to Russia was usually done by train and only in exceptional cases by air. The last time equipment was taken away by air was in 1996 for anti-tank ammunition. Some items were destroyed on the spot, like armoured vehicles and air-defence complexes. A prototype destruction method for a given type of combat material is agreed with the OSCE experts, and thereafter OSCE closely monitors this process. The destruction is performed in a way that excludes any possible future use or reconstruction. 108 tanks were destroyed in 2002 and currently air-defence systems were being destroyed.

The witness stated that at the time of giving evidence, there were three vehicles detained illegally by the Transdniestrian authorities.

The witness did not know anything about General Lebed's election to the Transdniestrian parliament in 1993. After Tiraspol he was appointed Secretary of the Security Council in Moscow.

The cooperation with Moldova is done within the CIS framework, under the military cooperation agreements. The witness declared that he had regular meetings and telephone contacts with the Moldovan authorities - the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of Staff and the President. He had never met Smirnov, however.

The Moldovan and Transdniestrian forces were responsible for monitoring and preventing actions by destructive forces from their respective sides. In 1992-1993 the tasks of the PKF were different: to stop the armed conflict, to separate the combatants, to take away the arms and help to restore order. At present they were maintaining peace and monitoring the implementation of the agreements.

The witness was the President of the court, and the only judge. The place of the second garrison judge remains vacant. The witness was dealing with administrative, civil and criminal cases as well as military disciplinary offences. As a military judge, he was subordinate to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court - not to the ROG or their commanders, or to the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Justice.

The military court which existed in Transdniestria in the days of the Fourteenth Army was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation at the same time as the Army. Such courts are part of the legal system of the Russian Federation. As a Russian military court it has jurisdiction only over Russian citizens - servicemen of the ROG and non-military personnel. The court does not have jurisdiction over anybody else such as the local population, the Transdniestrian militia, etc. In case of theft of military property, for example, the court would have jurisdiction over a Russian citizen in service in Transdniestria, but if the suspected thief were a Transdniestrian person, that would be a matter for the local courts. In any event, the ROG's military court in Tiraspol would not have the means of dealing with such a situation. The witness stated that he had not come across any cases related to the theft or illegal transfer of ammunition or arms.

The witness stated that the Transdniestrian authorities prevented the free movement of the ROG's military personnel. For instance, he was himself one day stopped in his car when travelling to Kolbasnoye, and was prevented from getting there.

The witness's duties were to oversee compliance with the law in the ROG, and to investigate criminal offences committed by ROG military personnel, not those committed by local civilians. The witness had had no cases of theft, robbery or the illegal transfer of arms or equipment.

The only case involving any co-operation had occurred in 2002. A ROG soldier and some under-age civilians were suspected of beating up an elderly person, who had died. The law enforcement bodies in Tiraspol gave the witness some documents from which it appeared that one of the ROG's servicemen might indeed have participated. The witness carried out an investigation against that soldier and summoned some civilians as witnesses. So the ROG did have some minimal form of cooperation with the Transdniestrian law-enforcement bodies, which involved exchanging telephone calls and helping to locate witnesses.

As the witness did not lay any charges against those civilians, he did not institute proceedings against them, but the local prosecuting authorities did bring a case against the local suspects before the Transdniestrian courts. The witness was not aware of any other such instances of cooperation.

The witness's job was to oversee the law and order in the Fourteenth Army. The jurisdiction extended only to the military - previously of the Fourteenth Army, now of the ROG - not to civilians or the Transdniestrian militia. If there were an assault on a Russian serviceman by a Transdniestrian civilian, that would be investigated by the Transdniestrian prosecuting authorities. In practice the Transdniestrian authorities always acted on their own, and did not ask for Russian participation. The ROG's military prosecutors would normally investigate suspected connivance by military personnel, including circumstances where the actual theft had been carried out by civilians and, if there were sufficient evidence of connivance by military personnel, they would go ahead with a prosecution. In the event of theft of army property by the Transdniestrian militia with the connivance of Russian military personnel, the ROG military prosecutor could thus prosecute the latter but not the former. But no such facts had occurred in normal times. The ROG's military prosecutors investigated cases against servicemen when arms and equipment were taken from the Russian military, but only during a conflict. And during the 1991-1992 conflict there was in fact no supply of military equipment to outsiders by Fourteenth Army military personnel.

Therefore, Mr Chariev, the Transdniestrian prosecutor, made a request to the commander, General Lebed, to place the terrorists in the military premises for a while, in order to prevent public revenge. General Lebed refused permission. The witness, as prosecutor, inspected the guard-house (date not recalled). He noticed that in one wing there were three or four cells partitioned off and, instead of a ROG escort and guard, there were Transdniestrian police. There was also a separate entrance for access to the wing where the applicants were held. Mikhail Bergman told the witness that he had given permission for the terrorists to be held temporarily at the ROG guard-house, to protect their lives and health from the mob. The witness drew his attention to the fact that he had broken disciplinary regulations and directed that the guard-house be vacated immediately, which Mikhail Bergman refused to order. The witness then informed General Lebed about this, who became very angry with Mr Bergman. The witness went the next day to see Mr Bergman in order to use his powers to deal with the breach. But the cells had already been emptied. Therefore, the applicants were only kept there one or two days.

Bergman was wrong to allow the detention of these civilians in the Commandatura and their supervision and interrogation by the Transdniestrian militia. No disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Bergman, because this was a minor disciplinary infringement which was corrected almost immediately.

On 1 April 1992 President Yeltsin declared the Fourteenth Army in Moldova to be under Russian jurisdiction. After that the situation calmed down, and there were no more defections, or transfers of military personnel from Russia to Transdniestria. However, those servicemen who wanted to return to Moldova were free to do so.

Any person who wants the establishment or renewal of a Russian passport would have to go to the Russian Embassy. According to the Moldovan statistics there are more than a thousand Russian citizens residing in Moldova. But, those statistics do not cover Transdniestria. The DIT has never asked the Russian Embassy to give them such information, although the DIT enjoys good cooperation with the Russian Embassy and, whenever they want information, they send the Russian Embassy an official request.

The witness pointed out that at the time of giving evidence, according to Moldovan law, a person could only hold one citizenship. Consequently, if a Moldovan citizen took out the citizenship of another country, then they would be expected to send a request to the DIT for cancellation of their Moldovan citizenship. In exceptional cases, by virtue of a presidential decree, a Moldovan citizen could have dual citizenship. Only Moldovan citizens could work in the public service and be a civil servant.

A person possessing two passports would be offered a choice. But he or she would remain a Moldovan citizen until the choice had been made, despite having two passports at the same time.

Concerning the issue of a Moldovan identity document to Mr Ordin, a member of the Supreme Soviet of Transdniestria regarded as a danger to the national security of Moldova, the witness stated that the DIT issues documents without asking questions. An identity card as a citizen of Moldova is issued to any person who is permanently resident in Moldova.

38. Ion COSTAŞ

The witness became a General in the Soviet Army in 1984. He is a graduate of the Air Officers' Institute. He was a military pilot. He graduated from the Gagarin Military Academy in Moscow and served in the Far East and the Balkans.

From 24 May 1990 until 20 February 1992, he was the Minister of the Interior. Before that he was the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. After his period as Minister of Defence, he served as military attaché in Bucharest, from July 1992 until October 1993. Thereafter he withdrew completely from politics and never entered the public arena again. He was now a retired person living on his pension, and a reserve General.

The Transdniestrians had nine thousand militiamen trained and armed by officers of the Fourteenth Army. These officers were moved to the reserves and appointed commanders of platoons and battalions of the OSTK police. In addition, there were five to six thousand volunteers who came forward after an appeal was made on Russian television for fighters to go to Transdniestria to support the cause. These volunteers came from all over the Russian Federation. On top of this there were fifteen to twenty thousand soldiers. There were, therefore, at least thirty-five to forty thousand troops from the left bank who were opposed to the legal forces of the Republic of Moldova.

This is without talking about the arms and ammunition which were available on both sides. There were no tanks at all on the right side of the river - no artillery of the Grad-type, mobile missile launchers or heavy shells. On the left side of the river they had three battalions of Grad-type artillery, missile launchers and grenade launchers. They had aircraft from the DOSAAF Organisation and helicopters and tanks of the Fourteenth Army. Moldova had no tanks. General Lebed made available to the volunteers (the Cossacks, OSTK) whole stockpiles of ammunition situated on the perimeter of the East bank of the river.

There were no tanks, helicopters, missile launchers and the like available to DOSAAF in Soviet times. There was not much weaponry made available to that organisation; it was mainly for training.

The CIS, after it was set up, had armed forces, with a command led by representatives of the Russian Army. Marshal Shapashnikov was the Commander and also the Minister of Defence of the CIS. This Minister was appointed in accordance with a proposal made by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr Yeltsin. But there was also a Russian Minister of Defence at the same time, namely Pavel Gratchev.

All the top commanders of CIS troops were from Moscow, the others were Ukrainian and Russian Slavs.

Moldova did not ratify the military part of the CIS Treaty. Moreover, Moldova had no influence on the acts of the Minister of Defence of the CIS, Marshal Shapashnikov. It was during the conflict that the Fourteenth Army was transferred from the CIS to the Russian Federation.

The policy which he was pursuing was designed to keep Moldova and other republics within the Soviet Union, or at least within the sphere of direct influence of the former Soviet Union.

When Lebed took over the Fourteenth Army, a substantial transfer of weapons occurred, including a lot of anti-personnel mines, to the separatists by the Fourteenth Army. Stockpiles of arms were moved from Kolbasna. In 1990, when he was the Minister of the Interior, the witness took part in a meeting with General Iakovlev, Commander of the Fourteenth Army and the Moldovan Prime Minister Muravschi. As regards the separatists, Iakovlev said that he had received specific instructions from the Russian Ministry of Defence to provide arms to the militia in Transdniestria. In reply to Mr Muravschi, who wanted to know if that was a warning, General Iakovlev said: “No, it is just a fact that 10,000 Kalashnikovs have been transferred to the militia for the defence of the Transdniestrian region.” General Iakovlev added that he had been given instructions to resist attempts by Moldova to bring the region under its control and not to allow Moldova to establish any such control.

The transfer of weaponry was therefore inevitable. Everything was well organised. Moldova had authoritative factual evidence, for example, from prisoners taken by the Moldovan forces, who admitted that this had happened. Moldova had also obtained documents from the Fourteenth Army showing that weaponry had been transferred to the separatists. At a certain moment, in May 1991, the then Commander of the Fourteenth Army, Netkachev, received instructions from the Minister of Defence in Moscow to call up reservists and to put the troops and military equipment into a state of combat readiness because Transdniestria was “Russian territory and ... we [Russians] must defend it by every means.” The witness had a meeting with General Netkachev who told him that reserve officers were leaving the Fourteenth Army to train the separatists.

The witness pointed out that civilians cannot lay mines; this specific task can only be performed by professionals with military training. After the conflict, Moldova asked for the help of specialists from the United States to clear mines from the territory of Transdniestria. Americans also trained Moldovan specialists to demine the minefields.

The Moldovan air force had Mig-29 aircraft combat. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was the President, President Snegur, and the General Staff was under General Creangă. The witness denied having spoken to Mr Plugaru on the telephone in relation to the use of combat aircraft, since Mr Plugaru was not on that level.

In particular, the applicants' lawyers put forward the case of V.C., who was born in 1968, arrested in the “MRT” in 1992 and transferred in 1993 to Astrakhan (Russian Federation) where he was sentenced by a Russian Federation court to fifteen years' imprisonment. The same year he was brought back to Transdniestria. Then in 1999 he was transferred again to a Russian Federation prison and he was finally transferred back to a Transdniestrian prison in 2002. A second example put forward was that of one R.C., born in 1973, who was arrested on 20 October 1992 in Astrakhan and transferred on 2 July 1993 to Tiraspol, Transdniestria, where he was convicted on 14 March 1996 by the “Supreme Court of the MRT”. On 27 November 1999 he was transferred to Moscow and on 8 December 1999 to Astrakhan. There he was convicted by a court of the Russian Federation and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. On 21 October 2002 he was transferred to a prison in Tiraspol.

In response to this information, the witness stated that he was not aware of that, and that he could not be, as he was only aware of transfers from or to the territory controlled by the Moldovan authorities. He was certain that those transfers were not effected through or with the authorisation of Moldovan institutions and assumed that they were arranged directly between the authorities of Transdniestria and those of the Russian Federation.

He was however involved in the discussions in 1991 until 1992 with the Transdniestrian leadership to resolve the conflict. But they said that they had their own armed forces and would do their own job, and the discussions came to nothing.

The relation between Russia and Transdniestria was very clear. According to the last statements by the President of the State Duma, Mr Selezniov, when he was in Chişinău, whatever happens in Transdniestria is intrinsically tied up with the Russian Federation.

However, the participation of the Fourteenth Army in the conflict was a well known fact. It was fully documented in the press. The tanks of the Fourteenth Army, in particular, were involved. The witness was not in the field, he did not see the military operations himself, so that he could not describe directly to what extent the Fourteenth Army participated, how many soldiers and so on. But it was quite clear that it happened; everyone knew about it.

If the Russian side had wanted the release of the Ilaşcu group, this would have happened.

The activities on the left bank were promoted and coordinated by the Soviet authorities. President Gorbachev sent his representative, Marshal Achrameyev.

Originally, the point of view of the Transdniestrian authorities was the same as that of the Moldovan authorities. When the Moldovan Republic was being created, no one talked of the infringement of the rights of these Russian-speaking people. But there were in this region other people who had separatist and other objectives. At the same time the Popular Front was creating conditions for Moldova to reunite with Romania. Moldova had to deal with this situation. Before the local administration of the illegal Transdniestrian regime was formed, of course the local authorities there were recognised. The central authorities worked with them; they participated in all the normal activities. After the separate regime in Tiraspol was created, the right bank ceased to recognise the local authorities on the left bank. However, in reality, the Moldovans were in contact with real people on the other side. The de facto situation was that they were the leaders of the region.

Concerning the recognition issue, it was difficult to adopt a strictly legal, formalistic approach, to the effect that since the lawfulness of the Transdniestrian regime is not recognised by the Moldovan Government or the international community, Moldova should not have any working contact whatsoever with them. This would mean that the conflict could never be resolved, but Moldova was concerned with helping real people.

Romania has interests in Moldova. Moldovans and Romanians are people of the same ethnic origin. Romania was involved in the Tighina (Bender) negotiations. The Romanian side always acted in an objective way, beyond reproach. The negotiations achieved a compromise. They brought back the local representatives to act as one State.

The witness started his career as a professional judge. For fifteen years he worked in the judicial system of Moldova. He was appointed as a judge 30 years ago. He was a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Criminal Court. From 1981, following his judicial career, he went to work at the former Supreme Soviet. He was Deputy Head of the Legal Department of the Secretariat of the Supreme Soviet. In 1991 he was dismissed from his office in Chişinău only because he was of Russian origin and he took the decision to go to Transdniestria. He was appointed Head of the Justice Directorate in Transdniestria. He worked less than a month there. Until December 1993 he worked in private business. From February 1994 until 1998 he was a Member of Parliament. From 1998 until 2001 he was the Ombudsman.

The fact that for a short while he was at the service of the separatist regime in Transdniestria has not been an obstacle for the witness in his subsequent career in Moldova, as Ombudsman, for example.

The witness took part in international meetings of Ombudsmen because he took the view that Moldova could not solve the problem internally. Moldova acceded to the Framework Convention on Minorities in 1996. In 1997 Moldova enacted the Law on the Status of National Minorities. The human rights situation in Moldova was discussed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, where it was said that a lot was being done in Moldova to ensure observance of human rights. The Government has a department on inter-ethnic relations. The minorities in Moldova are made up of 13% Ukrainian, 13 % Russian, 5% Gagauz, 4% Bulgarian and 3% Jewish. Over 35% of the population in Moldova is made up of ethnic minorities. In Transdniestria 40% are Moldovan, 28% are Ukrainian and 22% are Russian.

Mr Ilaşcu's release was the result of a political move; it did not follow from any measure by the legal authorities.

The Government did not have any realistic possibility of doing anything about the Ilaşcu case. It could not deal with it as a matter of priority. In 1997 the witness was nominated to act with the Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr Sturza, to deal with the Ilaşcu problem. There was a meeting between Mr Sturza and the so-called Minister of Justice of Transdniestria. This was a purely protocol meeting. It did not change anything. There were no relations afterwards. If the meetings had continued, the Ilaşcu problem would have been raised, but things did not happen that way.

As regards the victims of the alleged crimes, the witness's opinion was that the decision in this case would be linked to the settlement of the whole Transdniestrian problem.

Similar events occurred in the Gagauzian region. Parliament was summoned in order to settle the problem through peaceful means, but the Gagauzians and the Transdniestrians decided to set up their own power structures. Parliament thereupon declared these power structures unconstitutional. Consequently, as from August 1990 there were three regions in Moldova. After the Gagauzian situation was resolved, it was only Transdniestria which de facto was not under Parliament's authority.

The events in 1990 developed very fast. In October 1990 there was a march by volunteers to southern Moldova. This march was provoked by the proclamation of the Gagauz Republic in August of that year. It was all part of an attempt to instil fear in the country. Luckily, in the South there was no fighting or loss of life. The armed conflict was provoked by what happened in Dubăsari on 2 November 1990, and from then onwards it was practically impossible to stop developments.

In March 1992 the armed conflict flared up, first in Dubăsari and then in Bender. After that all the links of the negotiating process broke down. Parliament had no access to the left bank. There were no relations between official structures from 1992 onwards. It was only in 1994 that Parliament established a Committee for re-establishing contact between the official structures of Moldova and Transdniestria. The witness was a member of the Parliamentary Committee for the resolution of the Transdniestrian problem. This committee set up an investigative team to investigate what had occurred in 1992. In 1995 a few meetings were held with parliamentarians from Transdniestria. In 2000 yet again a special Committee for dealing with the Transdniestrian problem was created. A few meetings were held in 2001, but none in 2002 unfortunately. The witness stated that he had high hopes for the success of the initiative taken by the OSCE Mission, with the participation of the Ukraine and Russia. He welcomed the statement by President Voronin and the draft settlement that had been worked out.

The witness was of the opinion that there was no responsibility on the part of the Russian Federation for the events being considered by the Court. The relations between Russia and Transdniestria were tense. The administration of Transdniestria had never met the President or Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, whereas the Moldovan President and Moldovan Ministers had gone to Transdniestria.

From 1990 until 1992 he worked at the Military Department. From 1997 onwards he had not held any official posts.

It was no secret that the separatists received support from Odessa and Moscow. Moldova ceased to have control over the eastern part of the country from the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.

The Moldovan armed forces in 1992 comprised approximately ten battalions, that is, six thousand active troops on a permanent basis and that was the position until the end of the conflict. They were made up of troops from the Ministry of the Interior and the police, and there were three detachments of volunteer forces. That made a total of up to six thousand active troops. The Transdniestrian forces also numbered about six thousand. The Russian Fourteenth Army had about twelve to fourteen thousand troops.

The Moldovan armed forces did not have the kind of equipment that the separatists had. The Moldovan forces had one automatic weapon for every ten people in the beginning. They did not have proper units.

The Fourteenth Army provided the separatists with equipment and support. The officers of the Popular Guards came from the Fourteenth Army and the Fourteenth Army was supplying them with weapons.

The witness went to see Iakovlev who told him that the Transdniestrians had thousands of rifles. Under the guise of seizure, using children and women, large numbers of weapons were handed over. About 30 tanks were transferred, 32 armoured personnel carriers, 24 artillery weapons, mortars, anti-tank grenade launchers, anti-tank artillery and air defence units. The Commander of the Fourteenth Army, General Lebed, declared on television that he had personally called up and armed twelve thousand soldiers for the Transdniestrians and that he personally had made the existence of their armed forces possible. The operations of the Transdniestrian armed forces were carried out under the control of officers of the Fourteenth Army.

The tanks that appeared on the Dniester Bridge belonged to the Fourteenth Army. Tanks have numbers on them.

The witness stated that he had documents on the handing over of weapons to the separatists by the Fourteenth Army and added that perhaps the documents were still in the Ministry of Defence. One thing is a physical handover, a transfer. A formalised transfer on the basis of official documents is quite another thing. The separatists “seized” weapons from the Fourteenth Army by the use of women and children. The tanks which had been seized with the help of human shields were from the 183rd motorised infantry regiment and other units of the Fourteenth Army. Under the disguise of a seizure using a human shield of women and children, it was in reality a handover.

The weaponry and equipment in question could not have been part of DOSAAF property. DOSAAF did indeed have one million bullets, but only very light weapons. DOSAAF did not have any combat weapons at all.

The Moldovan troops did have an air defence, but there was no collective defence with the Ukraine and Romania. The Moldovan forces had to use Mig 29 airplanes for bombing. There were armed groups on the other side using artillery; it was not a police operation. There was only one solution - to bomb the bridge but not the residential quarters. The intention was to destroy the bridge in order to prevent tanks crossing it, and thereby to prevent heavy losses on the Moldovan side. This was in Tighina (Bender).

[1]. Information document of 10 June 1994 produced by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre on the subject of the Transdniestrian conflict. The document concerned, published in English on the Internet portal of the OSCE mission to Moldova, is entitled “Transdniestrian conflict: origins and main issues”.

Text from our archive (European Court of Human Rights, HUDOC). © Council of Europe / European Court of Human Rights. Reuse permitted with attribution; the Court's translations into languages other than English and French are not authoritative.