CASE OF AL NASHIRI v. LITHUANIA

Application no. 31908/22 · Delivered 2026-07-07 · ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD003190822 · Languages: EN

← Strasbourg↗ HUDOC original
Application no.
31908/22
Delivered
2026-07-07
Respondent State
LTU
Conclusion
Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-2-b) Matter already submitted to another international procedure;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 2+P6-1 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Death penalty) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 - Abolition of the death penalty - {general});Violation of Article 3+P6-1 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman punishment;Inhuman treatment) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 - Abolition of the death penalty - {general});Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)
Convention articles
35, 35-2-b, 8, 8-1, 8-2, 6, 6-1, 2, 2+P6-1, P6-1, 2-1, 3, 3+P6-1, 46, 46-2, 41, 1
Original
HUDOC ↗
PresidentArnfinn BårdsenJudgeSaadet YükselJudgeJovan IlievskiJudgeLorraine Schembri OrlandJudgeOddný Mjöll ArnardóttirJudgeGediminas SagatysJudgeStéphane PisaniRegistrarAndrea Tamietti
Summary
Preparing…

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF AL NASHIRI v. LITHUANIA

(Application no. 31908/22)

JUDGMENT

Art 1 • Jurisdiction of respondent State for alleged Convention violations of a terrorist suspect’s right during the United States (“US”) Central Intelligence Agency extraordinary rendition operations • Responsibility capable of being engaged

Art 35 § 2 (b) • Art 3 (substantive and procedural) • Art 5 • Art 13 (+ Art 3) • Matter already submitted to another international procedure • Complaints substantially the same as those examined in an individualised manner by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

Art 8 • Interference with the applicant’s private and family life not “in accordance with the law” and without justification • Incommunicado detention and solitary confinement denying him contact with his family

Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Art 2 (+ Art 1 P6) • Art 3 (+ Art 1 P6) • Extraordinary rendition and transfer out of Lithuania despite real and foreseeable risk of a flagrantly unfair trial before the US military commission in Guantánamo and a real and serious risk of being subjected to the death penalty

Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Individual measures • Respondent State required to seek assurances that US authorities would not impose death penalty in respect of applicant following extraordinary rendition

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

STRASBOURG

7 July 2026

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Al Nashiri v. Lithuania,

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,

Saadet Yüksel,

Jovan Ilievski,

Lorraine Schembri Orland,

Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,

Gediminas Sagatys,

Stéphane Pisani, judges,

and Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 31908/22) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Saudi Arabian national of Yemeni descent, Mr Abd Al Rahim Hussein Al Nashiri (“the applicant”), on 20 June 2022;

the decision to give notice to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) of the application;

the decision to grant priority treatment to the case under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 16 June 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

THE FACTS

Preliminary Considerations regarding the establishment of the facts

Preliminary remarks on Evidence before the court

Background to the case

Terrorist attacks of which the applicant has been suspected

East Africa Embassy bombings in 1998 and USS Cole bombing in 2000

MV Limburg bombing in 2002

The so-called “High-Value Detainee Programme”

Setting up the CIA programme “to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad

“4. [REDACTED] the Agency began to detain and interrogate directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial Agency interrogation of the first high‑value detainee, Abu Zubaydah, in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma. The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior Al’Qaeda high value detainees.

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

(1) Standard measures (that is, without physical or substantial psychological pressure): shaving; stripping; diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours); hooding; isolation; white noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing); continuous light or darkness; uncomfortably cool environment; restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain general health); shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position; water dousing; sleep deprivation (up to 72 hours).

(2) Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above): attention grasp; facial hold; insult (facial) slap; abdominal slap; prolonged diapering; sleep deprivation (over 72 hours); stress positions: on knees body slanted forward or backward or leaning with forehead on wall; walling; cramped confinement (confinement boxes) and waterboarding.

Expanding the use of the EITs beyond Abu Zubaydah’s interrogations

Conditions of detention at CIA “Black Sites”

(i) blindfolds or hooding designed to disorient the detainee and keep him from learning his location or the layout of the detention facility;

(ii) removal of hair upon arrival at the detention facility such that the head and facial hair of each detainee is shaved with an electric shaver, while the detainee is shackled to a chair;

(iii) incommunicado, solitary confinement;

(iv) continuous noise up to 79dB, played at all times, and maintained in the range of 56-58 dB in detainees’ cells and 68-72 dB in the walkways;

(v) continuous light such that each cell was lit by two 17-watt T-8 fluorescent tube light bulbs, which illuminated the cell to about the same brightness as an office;

(vi) use of leg shackles in all aspects of detainee management and movement.

“... the CIA detainees are in constantly illuminated cells, substantially cut off from human contact, and under 24-hour-a-day surveillance. We also recognize that many of the detainees have been in the program for several years and thus that we cannot evaluate these conditions as if they have occurred only for a passing moment ... .

Nevertheless, we recognize that the isolation experienced by the CIA detainees may impose a psychological toll. In some cases, solitary confinement may continue for years and may alter the detainee’s ability to interact with others. ...”

The scale of the HVD Programme

Closure of the HVD Programme

Military Commissions

“4. The military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. Pp. 49.72.

(a) The commission’s procedures, set forth in Commission Order No. 1, provide, among other things, that an accused and his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding the official who appointed the commission or the presiding officer decides to ‘close’. Grounds for closure include the protection of classified information, the physical safety of participants and witnesses, the protection of intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities, and ‘other national security interests.’ Appointed military defense counsel must be privy to these closed sessions, but may, at the presiding officer’s discretion, be forbidden to reveal to the client what took place therein. Another striking feature is that the rules governing Hamdan’s commission permit the admission of any evidence that, in the presiding officer’s opinion, would have probative value to a reasonable person. Moreover, the accused and his civilian counsel may be denied access to classified and other ‘protected information’, so long as the presiding officer concludes that the evidence is ‘probative’ and that its admission without the accused’s knowledge would not result in the denial of a full and fair trial.”

The 2014 US Senate Committee Report

“Beginning with the CIA’s first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and ‘wallings’ (slamming detainees against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an ‘an open, nonthreatening approach’, or that interrogations began with the ‘least coercive technique possible’ and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu Zubaydah, for example, became ‘completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth’. Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khaled Shaykh Mohammad as evolving into a ‘series of near drownings’.

Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.”

“Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by CIA personnel.

Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.

Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause of psychiatric problems.”

“The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention facilities in the countries in which they served.

In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention facilities were taking place, the CIA told local government officials not to inform the U.S. ambassadors.”

“to encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government officials. The CIA Headquarters encouraged CIA Stations to construct ‘wish lists’ of proposed financial assistance to [phrase REDACTED] [entities of foreign governments] and to ‘think big’ in terms of that assistance”.

Identification of locations of the colour code-named CIA detention sites in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report by experts heard by the Court in Al Nashiri v. Romania and Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania

Summary of the Court’s findings as to existence of CIA secret detention sites, and the applicant’s situation in Poland and Romania

“Assessing all the above facts and evidence as a whole, the Court finds it established beyond reasonable doubt that:

(1) on 5 December 2002 the applicant, together with Mr Abu Zubaydah, arrived in Szymany on board the CIA rendition aircraft N63MU;

(2) from 5 December 2002 to 6 June 2003 the applicant was detained in the CIA detention facility in Poland identified as having the codename “Quartz”[3] and located in Stare Kiejkuty;

(3) during his detention in Poland under the HVD Programme he was interrogated by the CIA and subjected to EITs and also to unauthorised interrogation techniques as described in the 2004 CIA Report, 2009 DOJ Report and the 2007 ICRC Report;

4) on 6 June 2003 the applicant was transferred by the CIA from Poland on the CIA rendition aircraft N379P.”

“... [T]he Court finds it established beyond reasonable doubt that:

(a) On 12 April 2004 the applicant was transferred by the CIA from Guantánamo to Romania on board N85VM.

(b) From 12 April 2004 to 6 October 2005 or, at the latest, 5 November 2005, the applicant was detained in the CIA detention facility in Romania code-named “Detention Site Black” according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report.

(c) On 6 October 2005 on board N308AB or, at the latest, on 5 November 2005, on board N1HC via a double-plane switch the applicant was transferred by the CIA out of Romania to one of the two remaining CIA detention facilities, code-named Detention Site Violet and Detention Site Brown according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report.” The circumstances of the case

Restrictions on information about the applicant’s secret detention and his communication with the outside world

The applicant’s capture, transfer to CIA custody and secret detention before his alleged rendition to Lithuania

The applicant’s alleged rendition to Lithuania, his secret detention at Detention Site Violet and his rendition from Lithuania

“(TS //[REDACTED]//NF) Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on September 5, 2006366. In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having "anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,367 while others found no symptoms of either illness.368 He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his cell.369...

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

366 HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] (03I945Z SEP 06); [REDACTED] 1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] (051613Z SEP 06)

368 [REDACTED] 1502 (021841Z AUG 04); [REDACTED] 2709 (271517Z APR 06); [REDACTED] 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); [REDACTED] 2709 (271517Z APR 06);”

“6. CIA Torture Unredacted provides, without doubt, the most detailed public account to date of the RDI programme. It moves significantly beyond the findings of past investigations. This includes moving beyond the heavily-redacted executive summary of the Senate Select Committee[[4]] on Intelligence’s ‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’ (“Committee Study”), published in December 2014.
“22. Mr. al-Nashiri was captured in Dubai in mid-October 2002 and held in Emirati detention for the first month [p. 176].

IV. CONCLUSIONS

a. The CIA facility referred to as DETENTION SITE VIOLET in the Committee Study has been established as certain to have been in Lithuania; and

b. Mr. al-Nashiri was held in secret detention at DETENTION SITE VIOLET from 6 October 2005 until 25 March 2006.”

“3. In fact, my statement refers to his detention in only five facilities: (1) Morocco; (2) Guantanamo Bay; (3) Romania; (4) Lithuania; (5) Afghanistan. Although, ..., there were two facilities in operation at Guantanamo Bay, I have not suggested that he was held in both, and there is no evidence to suggest that he was held in both. Indeed, when discussing the specific period that al-Nashiri was held at Guantanamo Bay, the Senate report (pp. 140-141) refers to ‘the five CIA detainees [of whom al-Nashiri was one] then being held at a CIA detention facility [singular] at Guantanamo Bay.’

II. CABLE 2709

...

III CABLE 3910

“... [I]n respect of Mr Al Nashiri, it is stated explicitly and unredacted in the Senate Report that from June 2003 Al Nashiri was moved to five different detention facilities before his ultimate transfer to Guantánamo Bay in September 2006. This provides us with a precise timeframe, June 2003 to September 2006, and it provides us with a precise number of transfers which we then have to correlate with his interrogation schedule and the available flight data to determine where he was held. It is on that basis that we have been able to arrive at the conclusion that he was transported from Poland first to Morocco, then onwards to Guantánamo Bay, then onwards to Romania, to one further site, and with a high degree of probability, Lithuania, before being transferred back to Afghanistan as no. 5, and finally to Guantánamo Bay. There are very limited possibilities as to where the CIA could take its detainees because it always maintained a very small range of sites, and because the planes are the same, they operate upon systematic methodologies, notably dummy flight planning, switching of aircraft and all the other tactical elements described. One can narrow down that probability to a certitude, with the right rigour of investigation, and it is that which we have applied to arrive at these conclusions, which have subsequently been validated in the official record.

...

There are two known and documented junctures at which CIA detainees at the ‘black site’ in Romania were removed from Romania. The first of those, I illustrated with my last set of graphics, on 5 and 6 October, which took detainees from Bucharest, Romania via switching of aircraft in Albania, to Vilnius, Lithuania. The second took place on 5 November 2005, within three to four days of the Washington Post’s report, and at the insistence of the Romanian authorities, which took detainees via Amman, Jordan to Kabul, Afghanistan. We know that at 1 January 2006 there were only two CIA detention sites in active operation, that much is stated in the Senate Report. Those were the sites known as ‘Violet’ and ‘Orange’: the former, ‘Violet’, in Lithuania, the latter, ‘Orange’, in Afghanistan. And so Al Nashiri, in all likelihood and without any other information to refer to, was taken to one of those two destinations on one of those two flights. Based upon my earlier rationale about the five different facilities in which he was held, I would aver that it is more likely than not that he was taken from Romania to Lithuania on 5 and 6 October 2005 and was held there until onwards transfer in March 2006 to Afghanistan and subsequently on to Guantánamo Bay. That would, logically, complete the number and nature of detention experiences chronicled in the Senate Committee Report and other documents released by the United States.”

Dr Black stated:

“ ... [T]here are two possibilities, and I believe only two possibilities: one is that [the applicant] left [Romania] in October 2005, on 5 October 2005, and the other is that he left on the 5 November 2005. If the flight on 5 October 2005 was a dual flight, it was a kind of a two-plane switch that took prisoners from Romania into Lithuania, and the flight the following month in November 2005 was again a two-plane switch that took prisoners from Romania into Afghanistan. I think there is an indication in the data that we have, based on the Senate Report, that Mr Nashiri was taken to Lithuania, which should mean he was taken in October rather than November, but it is, I would not say it is a hundred per cent clear, unambiguous. I would say it is an indication that seems probable. There is no doubt that the flight in November signalled the end of the Romanian site, I mean it came, I do not know, 72 hours after the existence of the site had been revealed in The Washington Post, the government had demanded the site shut down, the Senate Report is very clear that at that point everyone who was remaining in Romania was shipped out to Afghanistan, so at that point, after the 5 November 2005, the CIA ‘black site’ programme was operating only in Lithuania and in Afghanistan.”
“Our analysis of redactions in the Committee Study has enabled us to identify the location from which many of the CIA station cables were sent. Cable traffic between CIA Headquarters and individual stations form the primary evidential material in the Committee Study, with thousands of individual references throughout. Importantly, it is the cables from the stations back to Headquarters which provide the detailed accounts of prisoner transfers, detentions and torture, and identifying the location of these provides a crucial window into the programme as a whole. Cable references in the Committee Study have three parts. First, there is the locational data, which we call the ‘originator ID’, identifying the site from where the cable was sent. Cables from the US mainland have this identifier shown (e.g., HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, ALEC), but those of all cables from field stations are redacted. Second, there is what we call the ‘cable ID’. This is a unique identifier for each cable, and tends to be 4‑6 figures in length. In this case, cable IDs from the US are all redacted, whereas those of cables from field stations are not. Third, cables have a date-time stamp, in the format ‘(ddhhmmZ MTH yy)’. ‘Z’ here stands for ‘Zulu time’ (Greenwich Mean Time, GMT). For example, a cable with date-time stamp (040952Z SEP 04) would have been sent at 09:52 GMT on 4 September 2004. Most cable references in the Committee Study have their date-time stamp unredacted, although some are redacted in part or in full.

...

Crucially, the redacted originator IDs are of different lengths, depending on the field stations from which they came. Thus, all cables from the black site referred to in the Study as DETENTION SITE GREEN have originator IDs of the same length as each other, and this length is different to the IDs of cables from DETENTION SITE BLUE. With this observation as a starting point, we have measured the length of redacted originator IDs for each of the hundreds of cables referenced in the Study. This has enabled us to build our CIA Cable Database. Here, each record relates to one reference of one cable in the Committee Study, and has a number of fields: the length of the redacted originator ID; the (unredacted) cable ID; the (mainly unredacted) date-time stamp; the location of the cable reference in the Study; and the content which the cable supports as a footnote. Once this dataset was built, we could order chronologically all cables with the same length of originator ID. When this happens, the cable IDs are also ordered sequentially, confirming the coherence of each cable series. Using this approach, we have built a number of cable series, and connected these to particular locations (through triangulation with other data concerning the location of where particular events took place).”

“The following specific cables are the first and last in each series which document al-Nashiri’s presence at particular black sites, thus confirming the dates and locations during his period of secret CIA detention. Possible values for the redacted dates in the first two cables can be suggested according to their place in the relevant cable series, as well as through triangulation with flight data and other documents (see below).

Afghanistan 29768 ([redacted] NOV 02)

DETENTION SITE GREEN 11293 ([redacted] NOV 02)

DETENTION SITE GREEN 11357 (021242Z DEC 02)

DETENTION SITE BLUE 10030 (111541Z DEC 02)

DETENTION SITE BLUE 11701 (191640Z MAY 03)

Morocco 1756 (190800Z SEP 03)

Guantánamo 1091 (031835Z NOV 03)

Guantánamo 1630 (271440Z MAR 04)

DETENTION SITE BLACK 1202 (231644Z MAR 04)

DETENTION SITE BLACK 3051 (301235Z SEP 05)

DETENTION SITE VIOLET 3910 (241852Z JAN 06)

DETENTION SITE BROWN 1029 (291750Z JUN 06)

DETENTION SITE BROWN 1242 (050744Z SEP 06)

This analysis is powerful, especially when other findings confirm the locations of the black sites (see below). This allows us to independently confirm that al-Nashiri was held at black sites in Afghanistan, Thailand, Poland, Morocco, Guantánamo Bay, Romania, Lithuania and Afghanistan again, as well as identify the dates on which he was in each country.”

“Our account of the torture programme has been built up through multiple triangulation of a range of sources. For example, analysis of the redactions in the Committee Study can often reveal the date of an individual’s transfer to CIA custody, while the CIA Cable Database can reveal the location to which he was first brought. This can be matched with flight data, which might confirm a flight into the black site location by a known CIA rendition aircraft on the date in question. Billing documentation can confirm that the flight was undertaken pursuant to the overall contract with the CIA, and provide confirmation of where the prisoner was before transfer to CIA custody. With the entry date for that prisoner confirmed, the range of possible exit dates is narrowed (as are the entry date ranges for other prisoners, given the chronological relationship between individuals’ entry into the programme). This can then often be matched with witness testimony by the prisoner, or information in declassified documents, which independently confirms a particular exit date. Again, flight data on that date may include a flight by a known CIA rendition aircraft, leaving from a known black site location, suggesting that this was the individual’s final detention location while in CIA custody.”

The ruling of the military commissions, the applicant’s transfer and conditions of his detention

“jj. ...In June 2005, the Chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK suspended debriefings of the [applicant] because it was rare for the [applicant] to recognize any photographs being shown to him and the repeat debriefings often caused outbursts. In July 2005, the CIA was concerned that the [applicant] was depressed, uncooperative, and on the “verge of a breakdown.

kk. In late 2005 the Accused was then rendered to DETENTION SITE VIOLET (Location 8), which also included solitary confinement and bright lights. There were no EITs, as Mitchell and Jessen concluded physical pressures were no longer necessary because the contract could be maintained with emotional and psychological coercion.”

Detention Site Violet in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report

“[REDACTED] In a separate [from country hosting Detention Site Black], Country [name blackened], the CIA obtained the approval of the [REDACTED] and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before informing the U.S. ambassador. As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country [REDACTED]’s [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] probably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility. After [REDACTED] delayed briefing the [REDACTED] for [number blackened] months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the arrival of CIA detainees. The [REDACTED] Country [REDACTED] official outside of the [REDACTED] aware of the facility, was described as ‘shocked’, but nonetheless approved.

[REDACTED] By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still unused ‘holding cell’ in Country [REDACTED] was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees in the program and the CIA’s interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country. The CIA also offered $ [one digit number blackened] million to the [REDACTED] to ‘show appreciation’ for the [REDACTED] support for the program. According to a CIA cable however [long passage blackened]. While the plan to construct the expanded facility was approved by the [REDACTED] of Country [REDACTED], the CIA and [passage redacted] developed complex mechanisms to [long passage REDACTED] in order to provide the $ [one digit number blackened] million to the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] in Country [REDACTED] complicated the arrangements. [long passage REDACTED] when the Country [REDACTED] requested an update on planning for the CIA detention site, he was told [REDACTED] – inaccurately – that the planning had been discontinued. In [date REDACTED], when the facility received its first detainees, [REDACTED] informed the CIA [REDACTED] that the [REDACTED] of Country [REDACTED] ‘probably has an incomplete notion [regarding the facility’s] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is some sort of [REDACTED] center.”

“[REDACTED] In 2004, CIA detainees were being held in three countries: at DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country [REDACTED], at the [redacted] facility [REDACTED] in Country [REDACTED], as well as at detention facilities in Country [REDACTED]. DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [REDACTED] opened in early 2005.”
“In October 2005, the CIA learned that the Washington Post reporter Dana Priest had information about the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, [REDACTED]. The CIA then conducted a series of negotiations with The Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from publishing information on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

...

After publication of the Washington Post article, [REDACTED] Country [REDACTED] demanded the closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within [REDACTED two-digit number] hours. The CIA transferred the [REDACTED]| remaining CIA detainees out of the facility shortly thereafter.

...

[long passage REDACTED] In [REDACTED] Country [REDACTED] officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlier discussions with country representatives about how a detainee’s medical emergency would be handled. While the CIA understood the [REDACTED] officers’ reluctance to place a CIA detainee in a local hospital given media reports, CIA Headquarters also questioned the ‘willingness of [REDACTED] to participate as originally agreed/planned with regard to provision of emergency medical care’. After failing to gain assistance from the Department of Defense, the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees with acute ailments. Ultimately, the CIA paid the [REDACTED] more than $ [two-digit number redacted] million for the treatment of [name REDACTED] and [name REDACTED], and made arrangements for [name REDACTED] and [name REDACTED] be treated in [REDACTED]. The medical issues resulted in the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [REDACTED] in [five characters for the month REDACTED] 2006. The CIA then transferred its remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN. At that point, all CIA detainees were located in Country [REDACTED].

...

The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [REDACTED] was raised repeatedly in the context of the construction of the CIA detention facility in Country [REDACTED]. On March [REDACTED two-digit number], 2006 the CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country [REDACTED] ask Country [REDACTED] to arrange discreet access to a nearest hospital and medical staff.”

The applicant’s further transfers during CIA custody (until 5 September 2006)

The applicant’s detention at the US Guantánamo Bay facility and his trial before the military commission from 6 September 2006 to present

Hearing before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Trial before the military commission

Psychological and physical effects of the HVD Programme on the applicant

The section referring to the applicant reads as follows:

“... Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri’s unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including throwing his food tray, attempting to assault detention site personnel, and trying to damage items in his cell. Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his food and complained of bodily pain and insomnia. As noted, at one point, al-Nashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him rectally.

An October 2004 psychological assessment of al-Nashiri was used by the CIA to advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an ‘endgame’ for the program.

In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri’s ‘continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude’. Days later a CIA psychologist assessed that al-Nashiri was on the ‘verge of a breakdown’.”

Parliamentary inquiry in Lithuania

The Seimas investigation and findings

The following questions were posed to the CNSD:

(1) whether CIA detainees were subject to transportation and confinement on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania;

(2) whether secret CIA detention centres had operated on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania;

(3) whether State institutions of the Republic of Lithuania (politicians, officers, civil servants) considered issues relating to activities of secret CIA detention centres or transportation and confinement of detainees in the Republic of Lithuania.

“In 2002-2005, the aircraft which official investigations link to the transportation of CIA detainees crossed the airspace of the Republic of Lithuania on repeated occasions. The data collected by the Committee indicate that CIA-related aircraft did land in Lithuania within the mentioned period of time.

The Committee failed to establish whether CIA detainees were transported through the territory of the Republic of Lithuania or were brought into or out of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania; however, conditions for such transportation did exist.

...

The Committee established that the SSD had received a request from the partners to equip facilities in Lithuania suitable for holding detainees.

While implementing Project No. 1 in 2002, conditions were created for holding detainees in Lithuania; however, according to the data available to the Committee, the premises were not used for that purpose.

The persons who gave testimony to the Committee deny any preconditions for and possibilities of holding and interrogating detainees at the facilities of Project No. 2; however, the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and protection of the perimeter as well as fragmented presence of the SSD staff in the premises allowed for the performance of actions by officers of the partners without the control of the SSD and use of the infrastructure at their discretion.

...

According to the country’s top officials (Presidents of the Republic, Prime Ministers, and Speakers of the Seimas), the members of the CNSD of the Seimas were informed about the international cooperation between the SSD and the CIA in a general fashion, without discussing specific operations or their outcomes. The mention of wide-scale direct cooperation between the SSD and CIA was made only once, at a sitting of the State Defence Council (19 September 2001) when considering the issue of international terrorism and anti-terrorist actions and prevention, crisis management and the legal bases for all these. Transportation and detention of detainees were not discussed at the sitting of the State Defence Council of Lithuania. The CNSD of the Seimas was not informed of the nature of the cooperation taking place.

On the basis of the information received, the Committee established that when carrying out the SSD partnership cooperation Project No. 1 and Project No. 2, the then heads of the SSD did not inform any of the country’s top officials of the purposes and content of the said Projects.”

Criminal investigation in Lithuania

Proceedings before the Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

“Lithuania

...

“73. Under category III, the first key issue is whether the governmental authorities played a role in the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment that the source alleges Mr. al-Nashiri suffered or had substantial grounds to believe that the extraordinary rendition programme that they participated in involved torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

“Disposition

Regarding the United States: The deprivation of liberty of Abd al-Rahim Hussein al-Nashiri, being in contravention of articles 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 2 7, 9, 10, 14 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I, III and V.

Regarding Afghanistan, Lithuania, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates:

The deprivation of liberty of Abd al-Rahim Hussein al-Nashiri, being in contravention of articles 5, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is arbitrary and falls within categories I and III.

Follow-up procedure

(a) Whether Mr. al-Nashiri has been released and, if so, on what date;

(b) Whether compensation or other reparations have been made to Mr. al-Nashiri;

(c) Whether an investigation has been conducted into the violation of Mr. al-Nashiri’s rights and, if so, the outcome of the investigation;

(d) Whether any legislative amendments or changes in practice have been made to harmonize the laws and practices of the States concerned with their international obligations in line with the present opinion;

(e) Whether any other action has been taken to implement the present opinion.

Further developments

Dialogue with the United States authorities

“The government recognizes that torture is abhorrent and unlawful, and unequivocally adheres to humane treatment standards for all detainees. See Executive Order 13491. In the absence of direct authority interpreting [10 U.S.C.] Section 948r(a), the government took the position below that Section 948r(a)’s prohibition on admission of statements obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment applies only to the trial and sentencing phases of a military commission and not to pretrial proceedings. Since that filing, the government has reconsidered its interpretation of Section 948r(a) and, as a result of that review, has concluded that Section 948r(a) applies to all stages of a military commission case, including pretrial proceedings. In accordance with that conclusion, the government will not seek admission, at any stage of the proceedings, of any of petitioner’s statements while he was in CIA custody.”

Information provided in the context of the execution of the Court’s judgments in cases against Poland and Romania

“At the time of the Court’s judgment, the rules governing military commission proceedings allowed the introduction of coerced statements if “the use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent with the interests of justice”, thereby exposing the applicant to a risk of a flagrant denial of justice ([Al Nashiri v. Romania,] § 74).

However, in proceedings brought by Mr Al-Nashiri before the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the US Government indicated, in a brief submitted in January 2022, that it had reconsidered its position that the prohibition on admission of statements obtained through torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment applies only to the trial and sentencing phases of a military commission case. It conceded that this prohibition applies to all stages of such a case and stated that it would not seek admission, at any stage of the proceedings, of any of Mr Al-Nashiri’s statements while he was in CIA custody. During oral argument, the US Government also indicated that it would not oppose an order by the military commission to identify any further statements obtained by torture in the record. The circuit judge was satisfied with these representations and the US Government’s withdrawal of the evidence identified to have been made under torture, and dismissed the applicant’s petition on 2 September 2022.

In parallel proceedings, the military commission judge granted on 30 June 2022 the applicant’s motion to suppress from the file custodial statements made under torture by a third-party witness and reserved the issue of derivative evidence for a later stage, if such evidence was offered at trial.

More recently, the prosecution sought to admit incriminating statements made by Mr Al Nashiri to agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) in early 2007, after his transfer from CIA black sites. On 18 August 2023, the military commission judge decided to supress those statements on the ground that the US Government “has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the presumed taint from the prior years of physical and psychological torment was dissipated” when Mr Al Nashiri had made them. The prosecution appealed this ruling before the Court of Military Commissions Review, where proceedings are pending. At the same time, Mr Al Nashiri’s counsel filed a motion to exclude several pieces of evidence, including statements allegedly made by him from 2006 to 2009. This question is being examined by the military commission judge, who also set the dates for the applicant’s trial (from 6 October to 19 December 2025).”

Other developments

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

(i) for relevant domestic law and practice see §§ 212-219;

(ii) for international material, including international law see §§ 220-250;

(iii) for selected media reports and articles on the CIA rendition operations see §§ 251-263;

(iv) for international inquiries relating to the CIA secret detention and rendition of suspected terrorists in Europe, including Lithuania see §§ 264‑303.

THE LAW

THE APPLICANT’S COMPLAINTS

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

Incompatibility ratione personae of the application

“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] Convention.”
“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.”

The parties’ submissions

The Government

The applicant

The Court’s assessment

General considerations

The Court’s establishment of facts and assessment of evidence

Applicable principles deriving from the Court’s case-law

Preliminary considerations concerning the establishment of the facts and the assessment of the evidence in the present case

As regards the operation of Detention Site Violet in Lithuania

“(a) the CIA secret detention facility codenamed “Detention Site Violet” operated in Lithuania from either 17 February 2005, the date of the CIA rendition flight N724CL into Vilnius airport, or from 18 February 2005, the date of the CIA rendition flight N787WH into Palanga airport until 25 March 2006, when it was closed; and

(b) the closure was marked by the CIA rendition flight N733MA into Palanga airport, which arrived from Porto, Portugal and, having disguised its destination in its flight plan by indicating Porto, on the same day took off for Cairo, Egypt.” were already established, to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania after a thorough and meticulous analysis of extensive evidence in the Court’s possession (see §§ 498-532 of that judgment).

As regards the establishment of facts and assessment of evidence relevant to the applicant’s alleged rendition by the CIA to Lithuania, secret detention in Lithuania and transfer by the CIA out of Lithuania

“(c) On 6 October 2005 on board N308AB or, at the latest, on 5 November 2005, on board N1HC via a double-plane switch the applicant was transferred by the CIA out of Romania to one of the two remaining CIA detention facilities, code-named Detention Site Violet and Detention Site Brown according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report” (see paragraph 55 above).
“(c) on 25 March 2006 on board the rendition plane N733MA and via a subsequent aircraft-switching operation the applicant [Mr Abu Zubaydah] was transferred by the CIA out of Lithuania to another CIA detention facility, identified by the experts as being codenamed “Detention Site Brown” according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report.”
“(1) the applicant [Mr Al-Hawsawi] was rendered by the CIA to Lithuania either on 18 February 2005 on plane N787WH which arrived in Palanga from Rabat, Morocco or on 6 October 2005 on plane N787WH, which via an aircraft‑switching operation in Tirana, arrived in Vilnius from Bucharest, Romania;

(2) from 18 February or 6 October 2005 to 25 March 2006 the applicant [Mr Al‑Hawsawi] was detained in the CIA detention facility in Lithuania codenamed “Detention Site Violet” according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report; and

(3) on 25 March 2006 on board the rendition plane N733MA and via a subsequent aircraft-switching operation the applicant [Mr Al-Hawsawi] was transferred by the CIA out of Lithuania to another CIA detention facility, codenamed “Detention Site Brown” according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report, and identified by the experts as being located in Afghanistan.”

(a) on 5/6 October 2005 the applicant was transferred by the CIA from Romania to Lithuania on board the rendition plane N787WH;

(b) from 6 October to 25 March 2006 the applicant was detained in the CIA detention facility in Lithuania codenamed “Detention Site Violet” according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report; and

(c) on 25 March 2006 on board the rendition plane N733MA and via a subsequent aircraft-switching operation the applicant was transferred by the CIA out of Lithuania to another CIA detention facility in Afghanistan.

The applicant’s conditions of detention and treatment in Lithuania

The Court’s finding concerning the Lithuanian authorities’ knowledge of and complicity in the CIA HVD programme

“(a) the Lithuanian authorities knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory at the material time;

(b) the Lithuanian authorities, by approving the hosting of the CIA Detention Site Violet, enabling the CIA to use its airspace and airports and to disguise the movements of rendition aircraft, providing logistics and services, securing the premises for the CIA and transportation of the CIA teams with detainees on land, cooperated in the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its territory; and

(c) given their knowledge of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on their territory and their involvement in the execution of that programme, the Lithuanian authorities knew that, by enabling the CIA to detain terrorist suspects – including the applicant – on their territory, they were exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention.”

Conclusion concerning the Government’s objection ratione personae

“In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the respondent State must be regarded as responsible under the Convention for internationally wrongful acts performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 318; El-Masri, cited above, § 206; Al Nashiri v. Poland, cited above, § 452; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, cited above, § 449; and Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 241).”
“582. The Court has repeatedly held that the decision of a Contracting State to remove a person – and, a fortiori, the actual removal itself – may give rise to an issue under Article 3 where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would, if removed, face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to that provision in the destination country (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, §§ 90‑91 and 113; Series A no. 161; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 125, ECHR 2008; Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027/07 and 4 others, § 168, 10 April 2012; El‑Masri, cited above, §§ 212-214, with further references; Al Nashiri v. Poland, cited above, § 454; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, cited above, § 450; and Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 242).

Where it has been established that the sending State knew, or ought to have known at the relevant time, that a person removed from its territory was being subjected to “extraordinary rendition”, that is, “an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”, the possibility of a breach of Article 3 is particularly strong and must be considered intrinsic in the transfer (see El-Masri, cited above, §§ 218-221; Al Nashiri v. Poland, cited above, § 454; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, cited above, § 450; and Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 243).

Again, that risk is inherent where an applicant has been subjected to “extraordinary rendition”, which entails detention “outside the normal legal system” and which, “by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is anathema to the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention” (see El-Masri, ibid.; Al Nashiri v. Poland, cited above, § 455; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, cited above, § 451; and Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 244).

In so far as any responsibility under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is responsibility incurred by the host Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment or other alleged violations of the Convention (see Soering, cited above, §§ 91 and 113; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 67 and 90, ECHR 2005‑I, with further references; Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, § 258; and El‑Masri, cited above, §§ 212 and 239).

The existence of the alleged risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the removal. However, where the transfer has already taken place at the date of the Court’s examination, the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, § 125, ECHR 2010; and El‑Masri, cited above, §§ 213-214, with further references; Al Nashiri v. Poland, cited above, § 458; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, cited above, § 455; and Nasr and Ghali, cited above, § 246).”

The Government’s objection under Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention in relation to the complaints under Articles 3 (substantive aspect), 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention

“2. The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that

...

(b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.”

The parties’ submissions

The Government

The applicant

The Court’s assessment

General principles

Application of the general principles to the present case

It follows that, the applicant’s complaints under both the substantive and procedural aspects of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, and Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 (see paragraphs 116-118 and 122 above) are inadmissible under Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

Admissibility

Merits

The parties’ submissions

The Court’s assessment

General principles

Application of the above principles to the present case

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

Admissibility

Merits

The parties’ submissions

The applicant

The Government

The Court’s assessment

Applicable general principles deriving from the Court’s case-law

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

(i) the military commission did not offer guarantees of impartiality or independence of the executive as required of a “tribunal” under the Court’s case-law;

(ii) it did not have legitimacy under US and international law resulting in, as the Supreme Court found, its lacking the “power to proceed” and, consequently, it was not “established by law” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1; and

(iii) there was a sufficiently high probability of admission of evidence obtained under torture in trials against terrorist suspects.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 and 3 OF THE CONVENTION taken together with article 1 of protocol no. 6 to the convention

Article 2 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. ...”

Article 3 of the Convention states:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention states:

“The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”

Admissibility

Merits

The parties’ submissions

The Court’s assessment

VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION

“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

Damage

Costs and expenses

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

Declares the complaints concerning Articles 6 and 8, and Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention read together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;

Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention read together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention;

Holds

that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 July 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Andrea Tamietti Arnfinn Bårdsen

Registrar President

[1] SERE stands for “Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape”.

[2] This information has been extracted from a ruling of the Military Commissions Trial Judiciary in Guantánamo Bay (no. AE 467CCC), issued by military judge Lanny J. Acosta, Jr. on 18 August 2023 (see paragraph 69 below).

[3] In the 2014 US Senate Committee Report referred to as “Detention Site Blue”.

[4] Referred to in this text as “the 2014 US Senate Committee Report”.

[5] Referred to in this text as the “2014 US Senate Committee Report”.

[6] Available in excel format at https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/unredacted/the-data.html (last accessed June 2026).

[7] See for example, U.S. Department of War (via Public) / Military Commissions Media Invitation Announced for United States v. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri Trial

(last accessed June 2026).

[8] Article 100 of the Criminal Code reads: “A person who intentionally, by carrying out or supporting the policy of the State or an organisation, attacks civilians on a large scale or in a systematic way and commits their killing or causes serious impairment to their health; inflicts on them such conditions of life as to bring about their death; engages in trafficking in human beings; commits deportation of the population; tortures, rapes, involves another in sexual slavery, forces someone to engage in prostitution, forcibly inseminates or sterilises a person; persecutes any group or community of persons for political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, sexual or other reasons prohibited under international law; detains, arrests or otherwise deprives a person of liberty, where such a deprivation of liberty is not recognised, or fails to report the fate or whereabouts of a person; or carries out the policy of apartheid, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of five to twenty years or by life imprisonment.”

[9] See Response of the US of 31 January 2022 in case no. 21-1208

https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Document.pdf

(last accessed June 2026).

[10] See for example the overview of the execution in Al Nashiri v. Romania

https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=004-50873 (last accessed June 2026).

[11] With reference to paragraph 64 above.

Text from our archive (European Court of Human Rights, HUDOC). © Council of Europe / European Court of Human Rights. Reuse permitted with attribution; the Court's translations into languages other than English and French are not authoritative.